On Wed, 21 Apr 2004 01:33:26 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here's the real problem description.
[...]
What approach would provide sufficient assurance that the code
does not contain any Easter eggs or trap doors to allow
future egg-laying?
Too bad the Perl script is lost. It was the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
...
What approach would provide sufficient assurance that the code
does not contain any Easter eggs or trap doors to allow
future egg-laying?
Heavily reviewed OSS (note not necessarily FOSS)?
But then how can you be sure that the binary delivered
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Wed, 21 Apr 2004, at 8:23am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Heavily reviewed OSS (note not necessarily FOSS)?
FOSS == (Free|Open Source) Software
They are the same thing. Open Source Software was the term popularized
by Eric Raymond as an alternative
On Wed, 21 Apr 2004, at 1:33am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Electronic voting machines are feared to be vulnerable to hidden malicious
code (Easter eggs) that could subvert voter intentions and deliver votes
to the wrong candidates.
Open the source code to public review.
That's the solution.
On Wed, 21 Apr 2004, at 9:24am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It seems to me that what FOSS denotes and what it commonly connotes are
two different things.
Absolutely. However, you still haven't clarified what *you* meant in your
message, which is why I brought it up. :-)
--
Ben Scott [EMAIL
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Here's the real problem description.
Electronic voting machines are feared to be vulnerable to
hidden malicious code (Easter eggs) that could subvert voter
intentions and deliver votes to the wrong candidates. One
proposed solution is to require paper ballots be
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Wed, 21 Apr 2004, at 9:24am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Absolutely. However, you still haven't clarified what *you* meant in your
message, which is why I brought it up. :-)
Basicly, what you said in your other message: That while free
in FOSS doesn't
Travis Roy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I also don't think that any company that is writing software for these
electronic voting machines is going to try to fix the elections.. The
risk is far to great for the companies and the people running the
companies. That's not to say an outside party
On Wed, Apr 21, 2004 at 10:07:44AM -0400, Kevin D. Clark wrote:
What approach would provide sufficient assurance that the code
does not contain any Easter eggs or trap doors to allow
future egg-laying?
That's a tough question, but any solution that doesn't include a
non-corruptible
Original message
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Wed, 21 Apr 2004, at 8:13am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I always wondered about this sudden desire to audit the
voting system.
The issue with the close electoral vote for the US
President in Dade
County in Florida during 2000 woke up
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kevin D. Clark)
Think about what you're asking for [...]
I did, and your PERL multi-liner might be the way to solve it.
I hope that you were being as facetious as I was.
--kevin
___
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kevin D. Clark)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
One proposed solution
is to require paper ballots be produced by electronic
voting machines, but this creates other problems.
I would contend that an audit trail is worth any minor
problems.
Reasonable men may differ.
On Wed, Apr 21, 2004 at 01:16:44AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The approach I thought of is based on doing exactly that, in an
emulator or virtual machine environment, single stepping automagically
through the debugger until a conditional transfer of control is
recognized.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Open the source code to public review.
That's the solution. Full stop. If a vendor will not
agree to those
terms, invalidate the use of their products for public
elections. Sorry if
that means Diebold or whoever makes a few less bucks. Our
government is
more
On Wed, Apr 21, 2004 at 01:33:26AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here's the real problem description.
Electronic voting machines are feared to be vulnerable to hidden
malicious code (Easter eggs) that could subvert voter intentions and
deliver votes to the wrong candidates. One proposed
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Hint to others, I would also appreciate greatly any other
similar tools to the Bullseye coverage analyzer, pointers
thereto and discussion thereof.
Hint to you: what you asked for is a solution to a very difficult
problem. A tool like Bullseye (or PureCoverage,
On Wed, 21 Apr 2004, at 10:45am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This tends to feed the desire (requirement?) for a system that counts
votes accurately. Florida 2000 just provided proof that the existing
systems did not meet requirements.
Question is, how to meet those requirements?
Again: The
On Wed, 21 Apr 2004, at 11:15am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Some folks think that's important too, maybe enough to accept the flaws in
those systems.
I might argue that, in that event, we deserve what we get.
Of course, I might also argue that, in that case, we are already doomed.
But
I need help identifying a tool to satisfy a specific testing
requirement, or at least to determine whether such a tool does
exist.
Requirement is to be able to take an executable image and
determine every reference to specific data item(s) by
simulating execution of every possible code path. In
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Requirement is to be able to take an executable image and
determine every reference to specific data item(s) by
simulating execution of every possible code path. In other
words, the equivalent of setting a debug watchpoint on a
variable (or small set of variables,
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kevin D. Clark)
Unless you work for a goverment agency with a three-letter
acronym, this process ought to settle any doubts that you
have about this executable.
a) as far as I know I do not work for any three-letter
government agency (except perhaps the IRS :-( ).
b)
Here's the real problem description.
Electronic voting machines are feared to be vulnerable to
hidden malicious code (Easter eggs) that could subvert voter
intentions and deliver votes to the wrong candidates. One
proposed solution is to require paper ballots be produced by
electronic voting
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