Re: GPGShell caught with malware?

2009-07-30 Thread Faramir
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Allen Schultz escribió: > I recently installed Comodo AntiVirus and it said that GPGShell had a > malware called "daisy-2...@31780980". But could not find any details If I'm not wrong, Comodo Antivirus is the newest of their products, and I would

Re: list of OpenPGP implementations [was: Re: Changing GPG's default key type?]

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
RSA was not added in RFC-4880. It dates back to PGP 5 (1997-ish), and was first formalized (in the RFC sense) in RFC-2440 in 1998. It's been in a RFC for 10+ years now. Of course, it's been optional for all that time as well. Yes; it was more a general statement about why when talking ab

Re: list of OpenPGP implementations [was: Re: Changing GPG's default key type?]

2009-07-30 Thread David Shaw
On Jul 30, 2009, at 10:06 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: Is that an example of a potential problem implementation? Note that the McAfee product does support RSA (not surprising, given its ancestry). I don't know. There are a wide number of implementations with various degrees of conformanc

Re: list of OpenPGP implementations [was: Re: Changing GPG's default key type?]

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Is that an example of a potential problem implementation? Note that the McAfee product does support RSA (not surprising, given its ancestry). I don't know. There are a wide number of implementations with various degrees of conformance, RFC4880 is fairly new and there's no guarantee vendor

Re: list of OpenPGP implementations [was: Re: Changing GPG's default key type?]

2009-07-30 Thread David Shaw
On Jul 30, 2009, at 9:23 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: Hence, McAfee may be a much bigger player than people think. Is that an example of a potential problem implementation? Note that the McAfee product does support RSA (not surprising, given its ancestry). David ___

Re: list of OpenPGP implementations [was: Re: Changing GPG's default key type?]

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Have you had the opportunity to publish this tally someplace? Wikipedia has a pretty good list, last I checked. If you're really interested, check there; my list will not be as comprehensive. Deployment numbers are both hard to come by and misleading. GnuPG is probably overwhelmingly the

Re: Changing GPG's default key type?

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
There is theory and then there is practice. I missed the original poster's qualification that 90% of his correspondents used GnuPG. Given that, I'll agree with you on this: RSA won't be a problem. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg

Re: Changing GPG's default key type?

2009-07-30 Thread David Shaw
On Jul 29, 2009, at 11:14 AM, Jan Suhr wrote: For my understanding GnuPG is standard conform and creates a "DSA primary key (1024 bits - not "DSA2") with an Elgamal subkey per default." It was discussed in May to change this standard to 2048-bit RSA key: http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/mail-

Re: Changing GPG's default key type?

2009-07-30 Thread David Shaw
On Jul 30, 2009, at 7:06 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: No; only people using OpenPGP applications that don't support RSA will have problems. This is potentially quite a lot of people. The last time I tallied it up there were at least ten different OpenPGP implementations, and some of them o

Re: gpg - what are the strange characters ?

2009-07-30 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Hi Alain-- On 07/29/2009 05:27 AM, Alain Williams wrote: > I have been generating GPG keys, when it does it GPG prints out strings of > '+.-<>' (see below). > > What are these characters, I can see that it is trying to show progress, but > what do > the different characters mean ? [...] > I di

list of OpenPGP implementations [was: Re: Changing GPG's default key type?]

2009-07-30 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 07/30/2009 07:06 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > No; only people using OpenPGP applications that don't support RSA will > have problems. This is potentially quite a lot of people. The last > time I tallied it up there were at least ten different OpenPGP > implementations, and some of them only s

Re: GPGShell caught with malware?

2009-07-30 Thread gerry-lowry (alliston ontario canada 705-250-0112)
Check a site like Symantec on how to send it to them ... AFAIK, they should be able to verify whether it's a real virus of just a false positive. gerry - Original Message - From: "Allen Schultz" To: "gnupg-users" Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2009 5:09 PM Subject: GPGShell caught with malw

Re: Changing GPG's default key type?

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
The patent for RSA has now been expired for a few years (since 2003) The patent never expired. It was due to expire in September 2000; in August 2000 the patentholders released it into the public domain. Some people (myself included) think they did this in order to prevent the media cove

Re: Changing GPG's default key type?

2009-07-30 Thread Lionel Elie Mamane
On Wed, Jul 29, 2009 at 05:14:04PM +0200, Jan Suhr wrote: > For my understanding GnuPG is standard conform and creates a "DSA > primary key (1024 bits - not "DSA2") with an Elgamal subkey per > default." > It was discussed in May to change this standard to 2048-bit RSA key: > http://www.imc.org/i

Re: new AES 256 vulnerability

2009-07-30 Thread markus reichelt
* "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: > >(am not overly worried, still use IDEA when encrypting for diehard > >pgp2.x e-mailers, and that has 5 of 8 rounds broken ;-) )) > > 6. 7 - raise? fold? -- left blank, right bald pgpFiYo0Yf06I.pgp Description: PGP signature

GPGShell caught with malware?

2009-07-30 Thread Allen Schultz
I recently installed Comodo AntiVirus and it said that GPGShell had a malware called "daisy-2...@31780980". But could not find any details about this. Is there a GPGShell like program that does the same job as GPGShell? Allen ___ Gnupg-users mailing lis

Re: new AES 256 vulnerability

2009-07-30 Thread David Shaw
On Jul 30, 2009, at 4:17 PM, ved...@hush.com wrote: a new attack has been found against AES - 256 http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/another_new_aes.html it only works against 10 round AES-256 (which normally has 16 rounds) It breaks 11 rounds of 14. David _

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread gerry_lowry (alliston ontario canada (705) 250-0112)
Robert, you are absolutely 100% correct when you write: "The danger comes from assuming you're more sophisticated than the people who want your information." The television show "So you think you are smarter than a fifth grader" proves your point time and time again. g.

Re: new AES 256 vulnerability

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
(am not overly worried, still use IDEA when encrypting for diehard pgp2.x e-mailers, and that has 5 of 8 rounds broken ;-) )) 6. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

new AES 256 vulnerability

2009-07-30 Thread vedaal
a new attack has been found against AES - 256 http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/another_new_aes.html it only works against 10 round AES-256 (which normally has 16 rounds) (am not overly worried, still use IDEA when encrypting for diehard pgp2.x e-mailers, and that has 5 of 8 round

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Even simple systems like pig-latin are sufficient as long as they are more sophisticated than those from whom one wishes to safeguard information. The danger comes from assuming you're more sophisticated than the people who want your information. __

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
"solitaire" is done with cards, it was used by two men in jail, both characters in Neal Stephenson's "Cryptonomicon" ... imo a novel worth reading ... Bruce Schneier invented the game at Stephenson's request AFAIK. Solitaire has some serious problems, and is not a public-key algorithm. The or

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Brian Mearns
On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 2:06 PM, Brian Mearns wrote: > On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 2:02 PM, gerry_lowry (alliston ontario canada > (705) 250-0112) > wrote: >> Robert wrote in part that  "We've known since '99 that Solitaire is weak, >> thanks to the work of Paul Crowley". >> >> It was, however, suffic

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread gerry_lowry (alliston ontario canada (705) 250-0112)
Robert wrote in part that "We've known since '99 that Solitaire is weak, thanks to the work of Paul Crowley". It was, however, sufficient as a plot device in "Cryptonomicon". Even simple systems like pig-latin are sufficient as long as they are more sophisticated than those from whom one wishe

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread gerry_lowry (alliston ontario canada (705) 250-0112)
http://www.schneier.com/solitaire.html "solitaire" is done with cards, it was used by two men in jail, both characters in Neal Stephenson's "Cryptonomicon" ... imo a novel worth reading ... Bruce Schneier invented the game at Stephenson's request AFAIK. gerry

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
don't know of any 'public key' systems, but there are 'by hand' systems that are described as secure http://www.schneier.com/solitaire.html We've known since '99 that Solitaire is weak, thanks to the work of Paul Crowley. ___ Gnupg-users mailing

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread vedaal
Brian Mearns wrote: >if anyone knows of a >public key system that can realistically be done by pencil and paper ... >anything that can reasonably be >done by hand wouldn't be secure. >Oh well. Pad locks it is. =) don't know of any 'public key' systems, but there are 'by hand' systems that ar

WHIRLPOOL patch for GnuPG 2

2009-07-30 Thread Jeroen Schot
Hi, Some time ago there was a question about support for the WHIRLPOOL hash in GnuPG. I thought it wouldn't be to difficult since libgcrypt already implements WHIRLPOOL. Attached is a patch against the current svn (r5101). If it gets mangled by the mailing list it is also available as download[1]

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread David SMITH
On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 09:30:47AM -0400, Brian Mearns wrote: > Thanks, Harry. Interesting page, but I don't think primes on the > order of 3 and 11 really qualify as secure, which was pretty much > what I figured would be the case: anything that can reasonably be > done by hand wouldn't be secure.

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Brian Mearns
On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 8:44 AM, Harry Rickards wrote: [clipped 7/30/2009 9:26:46 AM] > Brian Mearns wrote: >> Sorry, this is a bit of topic. But I wonder if anyone knows of a >> public key system that can realistically be done by pencil and paper. >> I realize anything a computer can calculate cou

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Sorry, this is a bit of topic. But I wonder if anyone knows of a public key system that can realistically be done by pencil and paper. I realize anything a computer can calculate could conceivably be done by hand, but I'm looking for something realistic. I don't consider raising very large numbers

Re: Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Harry Rickards
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Brian Mearns wrote: > Sorry, this is a bit of topic. But I wonder if anyone knows of a > public key system that can realistically be done by pencil and paper. > I realize anything a computer can calculate could conceivably be done > by hand, but I'm lo

Public key crypto by hand

2009-07-30 Thread Brian Mearns
Sorry, this is a bit of topic. But I wonder if anyone knows of a public key system that can realistically be done by pencil and paper. I realize anything a computer can calculate could conceivably be done by hand, but I'm looking for something realistic. I don't consider raising very large numbers

FYI: Keysigning Party at FrOSCon 2009 in Sankt Augustin (August 22nd)

2009-07-30 Thread markus reichelt
Hi, for those interested, there's going to be a keysigning party at FrOSCon 2009 in Sankt Augustin on August 22nd, 12:30h: http://ksp.froscon.org/ Deadline for key submission is Thursday, August 20th 2009. More info about the conference is online at http://www.froscon.org/ -- left blank, righ