Re: GPG Decryption Issue

2013-02-06 Thread Hauke Laging
Am Do 07.02.2013, 10:28:29 schrieb Kamalakannan N: > Application is run by the same user and secret key is protected by a > passphrase. Take the passphrase off the key and check whether the batch file works then. > Actually we are using the batch file to decrypt the file and we calling the ba

Re: More secure than smartcard or cryptostick against remote attacks?

2013-02-06 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 2/6/13 4:28 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > Can you explain (broadly) how one would compromise the signature/the device > that > you sign with? Happily! I have an OpenPGP smartcard and an SCM card reader. I installed it under Fedora 16 and it worked beautifully. Under Fedora 17 it's broken. Aft

Fw: GPG Decryption Issue

2013-02-06 Thread Kamalakannan N
Hi Hauke Laging , Kindly look into the below command and result . Help me out to resolve the NO SECRET KEY issue. E:\>gpg --list-keys C:/Documents and Settings/dstage/Application Data/gnupg/pubring.gpg --- pub 2048R/D36AB872 2

Re: GPG Decryption Issue

2013-02-06 Thread Kamalakannan N
Hello Hauke Laging , Really thanks for the mail , but still am facing the same issue . when i try to import my public and private key once again through Command prompt ,CMD say's that my keys are already in keyring . I have one query on Key IDs, while am importing massage show that Key ID file

Re: More secure than smartcard or cryptostick against remote attacks?

2013-02-06 Thread Hubert Kario
On Wednesday 06 of February 2013 11:57:40 ved...@nym.hush.com wrote: > On Wednesday, February 06, 2013 at 5:42 AM, "Hauke Laging" wrote: > >The problem is not to forge a signature but the difficulty to > >force that only data with checked integrity gets signed. How are you going > >to do that with

Re: More secure than smartcard or cryptostick against remote attacks?

2013-02-06 Thread vedaal
On Wednesday, February 06, 2013 at 5:42 AM, "Hauke Laging" wrote: >The problem is not to forge a signature but the difficulty to >force that only data with checked integrity gets signed. How are you going to >do >that with a PDF? There is a bigger problem with a pdf, that if, once a hash al

Re: More secure than smartcard or cryptostick against remote attacks?

2013-02-06 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 06/02/13 11:37, Hauke Laging wrote: > Then you can (safely...) copy the data to several PCs and have them show you > both the file hash and the document (in that order). Hoping that at least one > of the PCs is not compromised. In my other mail I got kinda hung up on manual verification but for

Re: More secure than smartcard or cryptostick against remote attacks?

2013-02-06 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 06/02/13 11:37, Hauke Laging wrote: > That seems easy to me: Except for small amounts (secure device's display > capacity) of very simple data (plain text) [...] Seems to me to be enough to do what OP requested: signing e-mails he/she wrote. It indeed seems easy to me that this won't work for

Re: GPG Decryption Issue

2013-02-06 Thread Hauke Laging
Am Mi 06.02.2013, 13:10:32 schrieb Kamalakannan N: > Really thanks for the mail , but still am facing the same issue . > > when i try to import my public and private key once again through Command prompt ,CMD say's that my keys are already in keyring . > > I have one query on Key IDs, > while am

Re: More secure than smartcard or cryptostick against remote attacks?

2013-02-06 Thread Hauke Laging
Am Mi 06.02.2013, 10:28:13 schrieb Peter Lebbing: > Can you explain (broadly) how one would compromise the signature/the device > that you sign with? That seems easy to me: Except for small amounts (secure device's display capacity) of very simple data (plain text) you have the problem that the P

Re: More secure than smartcard or cryptostick against remote attacks?

2013-02-06 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 06/02/13 02:49, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > It makes no sense to me to believe that it's somehow possible to have a > dongle that you can plug into a compromised PC to make it safe (or > safer) to sign with. Can you explain (broadly) how one would compromise the signature/the device that you sign