On 30/01/14 02:14, DUELL, BOB wrote:
On my server, I created a directory named /opt/app/apps/dbmprod/gpg and set
the permissions to global access (777).
I set the permission on all the files in this directory to allow global
read access (744).
If you're trying to achieve by the 744 what I
On Thursday 30 January 2014 11:49:47 Peter Lebbing wrote:
If you're trying to achieve by the 744 what I think you're trying to
achieve, namely that users can't change the files, I think you're
mistaken[1]. Look at the following session I just did[2]:
The thing is, you're not allowed to change
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Thursday 30 January 2014 at 12:58:44 AM, in
mid:20140130005844.1f0f5b54@steves-laptop, Steve Jones wrote:
The advantage you have here though is the web of trust.
1 level 1 signature would probably be not enough, but
5, 10, 100..?
If
On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 09:09:45PM +, MFPA wrote:
The advantage you have here though is the web of trust.
1 level 1 signature would probably be not enough, but
5, 10, 100..?
If the signatures are made automatically be email software without
verifying identity, where is the web of
[resent, this time to the mailing list]
Hi,
On Thursday 30 January 2014 21:09:45 MFPA wrote:
mid:20140130005844.1f0f5b54@steves-laptop, Steve Jones wrote:
The advantage you have here though is the web of trust.
1 level 1 signature would probably be not enough, but
5, 10, 100..?
If the
On Thu, 30 Jan 2014 21:09:45 +
MFPA 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net wrote:
On Thursday 30 January 2014 at 12:58:44 AM, in
mid:20140130005844.1f0f5b54@steves-laptop, Steve Jones wrote:
The advantage you have here though is the web of trust.
1 level 1 signature would probably be
If you know a user has a signature that they use to always end a message
with, does that data aid in the decryption of the file? Would this exploit
be applicable to symmetric encryption methods as well?
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Hi again,
Firstly, as a Windows Outlook user, I've never figured out the correct
etiquette on formatting responses to list-server messages, so I'm just going to
post a new message without previous references.
Taking previous comments to heart, I've altered my home directory permissions
to
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Thursday 30 January 2014 at 10:43:39 PM, in
mid:20140130224339.5fcb0d27@steves-laptop, Steve Jones wrote:
Well therein lies my problem with the PGP system. It
relies on the notion of there being this singular thing
called your identity.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
El 30-01-2014 18:15, Donald Morgan Jr. escribió:
If you know a user has a signature that they use to always end a
message with, does that data aid in the decryption of the file?
Would this exploit be applicable to symmetric encryption methods as
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Thursday 30 January 2014 at 10:03:53 PM, in
mid:1703510.WrKrPo3DPU@mani, Johannes Zarl wrote:
If the same email-address is used together with the
same key for a long time, it effectively ties the
email-address to a person for all
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Thursday 30 January 2014 at 9:28:27 PM, in
mid:20140130212827.GA30954@leortable, Leo Gaspard wrote:
About emails reused by different persons... AFAICT most
major email services never re-issue the same email
address twice. Which could
Short answer: No.
This would be a form of a (partially) known plaintext attack.
Semantically secure ciphers are safe against this attack and it is not
possible to extract information on the key. To be precise, you may of
course be able guess a lot in the plaintext domain: Edward Snowden is a
%@µ
On January 30, 2014 1:15:08 PM PST, Donald Morgan Jr.
donaldmorga...@gmail.com wrote:
If you know a user has a signature that they use to always end a
message
with, does that data aid in the decryption of the file? Would this
exploit
be applicable to symmetric encryption methods as well?
A
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