>> b. The validation server does not need to manage a "stack" of keys
>>awaiting feedback from the validation emails.
>>
> indeed, that's an argument
>
Hmm, but IMO we anyway need a state in validation servers to deal with
different spam schemes
(i.e. avoiding that any request to a v-server
Am 29.07.2015 um 03:30 schrieb MFPA:
>
> Hi
>
>
> On Monday 27 July 2015 at 1:15:57 PM, in
> , Neal H. Walfield wrote:
>
>
>> Regarding the design: personally, I wouldn't have the
>> user follow a link that includes a swiss number, but
>> have the user reply to the mail, include the swiss
>>
Hello,
I forgot to address some way to recover.
On 07/28/2015 04:09 AM, Josef Schneider wrote:
> I insert the other card and do a card-status:
[...]
> General key info..: pub 2048R/988E7DDD 2015-07-07 Josef Schneider
>
> sec> 4096R/9BE45ED0 erzeugt: 2012-12-10 verfällt: 2017-04-13
>
Is there a way to comment a key locally?
Examples:
Let's say I met a guy and we exchanged keys. After 10 years I decide to
send him an encrypted email. How would I remember the guy - key link?
I'm thinking of adding an alias like 'red haired funny tall guy from XYZ
meeting'
Other scenario: I dow
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Hi
On Tuesday 28 July 2015 at 8:17:28 PM, in
, n...@enigmail.net wrote:
> AFAIK, there are not THAT many faked keys, but the
> problem exists especially for key parties of our
> internet world (a famous German magazine, at least one
> GPG tool, .
Hello,
Thank you for the report describing complicated issue. Your
detailed description helps me understand the situation.
On 07/28/2015 04:09 AM, Josef Schneider wrote:
> I have a problem with my Key. I have a 4096bit RSA key since 2012 and it
> is stored on a OpenPGP smartcard.
> Recently I ad
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Hi
On Tuesday 28 July 2015 at 9:06:03 PM, in
, Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
> Let's concentrate on this one, I think this is the real
> tough task: establishing a trust chain from the
> validating servers to the client.
> There's one root certifi
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Hi
On Tuesday 28 July 2015 at 11:46:10 PM, in
, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> At Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:22:29 +0100, MFPA wrote:
>> It also eliminates any attempt to to establish a link
>> between the key and the email address in the UID.
> I'm not so
At Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:22:29 +0100,
MFPA wrote:
> On Tuesday 28 July 2015 at 8:22:23 AM, in
> , Neal H. Walfield wrote:
>
> > Did you consider user a proof-of-work scheme? For
> > instance, the user does a 1 week PoW, signs the result
> > and attackes it to the key. These would be refreshed
> >
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On 28.07.15 16:46, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> On Monday 27 July 2015 21:05:26 Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
>> Hi Ingo,
>>
>> On 27.07.15 16:31, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
(...)
>> Why should there not be a similar community approach for setting
>> up a (smaller
Hi,
thanks again for the great feedback.
Am 28.07.2015 um 19:26 schrieb MFPA:
>
> Hi
>
> On Monday 27 July 2015 at 6:55:24 PM, in
> , n...@enigmail.net wrote:
>
>> If the
>> goal is to keep validations in sync, key owners might
>> have to confirm emails added over the year earlier,
>> which
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Hi
On Monday 27 July 2015 at 3:06:53 PM, in
, Marko Božikovic wrote:
> On 27/07/2015 14:31, MFPA wrote:
>> When I run gpg -K, or gpg --list-secret-keys, the
>> listing for each key starts with the location of
>> pubring.kbx and not the location
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Hi
On Tuesday 28 July 2015 at 3:46:54 PM, in
, Ingo Klöcker
wrote:
> I'm confident that the smaller mail providers who focus
> on security would be willing to add such an interface.
> Frankly, I do not care that much for the big mail
> providers.
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Hi
On Tuesday 28 July 2015 at 8:22:23 AM, in
, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> Did you consider user a proof-of-work scheme? For
> instance, the user does a 1 week PoW, signs the result
> and attackes it to the key. These would be refreshed
> about
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Hi
On Monday 27 July 2015 at 7:00:08 PM, in
, Kristian Fiskerstrand
wrote:
> It makes the information more compact and will make hkp
> vindex lists look cleaner.
I thought Base64 encodes 3 bytes into 4, so has a 33% overhead.
> Presuming thi
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Hi
On Monday 27 July 2015 at 6:55:24 PM, in
, n...@enigmail.net wrote:
> If the
> goal is to keep validations in sync, key owners might
> have to confirm emails added over the year earlier,
> which shouldn't be too bad. - - If the goal is to
On Tue, 28 Jul 2015 15:58, bo...@kset.org said:
> When we're talking about private keys "not being there", is there a difference
> between a private key that has been deleted from your own keypair and a
> private key that's never been there (i.e. you only have someone else's public
You can't know
Hello Guys,
Greetings from Honduras,
It's my first time using gng from the AS400 (IBMi) but when I'm trying to
setting up a user with private key, I'm getting an error:
Command: gpg --gen-key
Error: gpg: cannot open `/dev/tty': No such device or address
Could you help me to solve this issue?
Be
On Tuesday 28 July 2015 09:22:23 Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Did you consider user a proof-of-work scheme? For instance, the user
> does a 1 week PoW, signs the result and attackes it to the key. These
> would be refreshed about once a year.
Which problem do you propose to address with su
On 28.07.15 16:46, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> On Monday 27 July 2015 21:05:26 Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
>> Hi Ingo,
>>
>> On 27.07.15 16:31, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
>>> This whole concept of a whitelist of "trusted validation servers"
>>> included in the email clients sounds a lot like the CA certificate
>
On Monday 27 July 2015 20:19:07 n...@enigmail.net wrote:
> Am 27.07.2015 um 16:31 schrieb Ingo Klöcker:
> > This whole concept of a whitelist of "trusted validation servers" included
> > in the email clients sounds a lot like the CA certificate bundles
> > included in browsers and/or OSes. Who is g
On Monday 27 July 2015 21:05:26 Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
> Hi Ingo,
>
> On 27.07.15 16:31, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> > This whole concept of a whitelist of "trusted validation servers"
> > included in the email clients sounds a lot like the CA certificate
> > bundles included in browsers and/or OSes
On 28/07/2015 14:34, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 27 Jul 2015 12:46, bo...@kset.org said:
>
>> I know that, and I'm using 2.1 exclusively... Still, it would be nice to be
>> able to see the state of private keys (e.g. primary key not present in the
>> keyring, private keys are on the card, etc) wh
On Mon, 27 Jul 2015 12:46, bo...@kset.org said:
> I know that, and I'm using 2.1 exclusively... Still, it would be nice to be
> able to see the state of private keys (e.g. primary key not present in the
> keyring, private keys are on the card, etc) while editing keys. It seems
Right, that makes s
On Mon, 27 Jul 2015 19:54, kristian.fiskerstr...@sumptuouscapital.com
said:
> The way I read this proposal isn't about keyservers per se, but the
> individual validation servers publishing a chained list (like a
Right. I assume that these validation servers still work like the
the regualr keyser
Hi,
Did you consider user a proof-of-work scheme? For instance, the user
does a 1 week PoW, signs the result and attackes it to the key. These
would be refreshed about once a year.
This eliminates the verification servers and the problems associated
with them (namely, people need to trust them
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