trivial doc patch: "the the"

2018-05-19 Thread Claus Assmann
--- tools.texi- Sat May 19 18:52:35 2018 +++ tools.texi Sat May 19 18:52:45 2018 @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ Apply the configuration settings listed in @var{file} to the configuration files. If @var{file} has no suffix and no slashes the command first tries to read a file with the suffix @code{.prf}

doc patches: spelling errors

2018-05-19 Thread Claus Assmann
--- gnupg.info-1- Sat May 19 19:01:41 2018 +++ gnupg.info-1Sat May 19 19:02:04 2018 @@ -2516,7 +2516,7 @@ below. A "!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while checking

Re: [openpgp-email] Efail - Possible Measures?

2018-05-19 Thread Vincent Breitmoser
(Also cross-posting to Autocrypt) Patrick Brunschwig(patr...@enigmail.net)@Sat, May 19, 2018 at 06:47:08PM +0200: > In the light of the Efail vulnerability I am asking myself if it's > really needed to decrypt non-regular types of emails at all. In other > words, should we decrypt a

Re: Breaking MIME concatenation

2018-05-19 Thread Alexander Veit
Am 16.05.2018 um 06:21 schrieb Patrick Brunschwig: > I have actually thought through this during a sleepless night, and I > believe that it could work as a quick and easy to implement *short term* > measure until the mail clients have fixed the HTML rendering. I do not think that HTML rendering

Re: Efail - Possible Measures?

2018-05-19 Thread Lukas Pitschl | GPGTools
> I would consider the following "regular" MIME structures: > > 1. top-level MIME part is multipart/encrypted. > 2. an attached email (Content-Type = message/rfc822) containing a > multipart/encrypted MIME part as direct child. We have been doing this in the past but changed it especially for

Efail - Possible Measures?

2018-05-19 Thread Patrick Brunschwig
In the light of the Efail vulnerability I am asking myself if it's really needed to decrypt non-regular types of emails at all. In other words, should we decrypt a multipart/encrypted MIME part at all if we detect an irregular MIME structure? If we would not decrypt irregular MIME structures,

Re: Efail or OpenPGP is safer than S/MIME

2018-05-19 Thread Jean-David Beyer
On 05/19/2018 09:00 AM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: > On 19.05.18 14:15, Werner Koch wrote: >> On Fri, 18 May 2018 12:18, patr...@enigmail.net said: >> >>> How far back will that solution work? I.e. is this supported by all >>> 2.0.x and 2.2.x versions of gpg? >> >> 2.0.19 (2012) was the first to

Re: Efail or OpenPGP is safer than S/MIME

2018-05-19 Thread Patrick Brunschwig
On 19.05.18 14:15, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 18 May 2018 12:18, patr...@enigmail.net said: > >> How far back will that solution work? I.e. is this supported by all >> 2.0.x and 2.2.x versions of gpg? > > 2.0.19 (2012) was the first to introduce DECRYPTION_INFO In any case > 2.0 is

Re: Efail or OpenPGP is safer than S/MIME

2018-05-19 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 18 May 2018 12:18, patr...@enigmail.net said: > How far back will that solution work? I.e. is this supported by all > 2.0.x and 2.2.x versions of gpg? 2.0.19 (2012) was the first to introduce DECRYPTION_INFO In any case 2.0 is end-of-life. In theory we could backport that to 1.4 but I