I remember using a Windows-95-native PGP years ago that also used
keyboard and mouse events to acquire entropy; presumably, there was not
that much determinism, or every PGP key generated on Windows is likely
to be weak.
Win95 still allowed direct access to underlying hardware. In the
Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users wrote:
When generating the key-pair with Re: pgp263iamulti06, the
"randomness" is obtained by user's keyboard input. Is it
then that the above applies only when the session key is
generated?
No, the whole CSPRNG is (probably) compromised. PGP 2.6.3 used
Is this also used when generating symmetric keys? Or only used by secret
key generation? If the last is the case, then existing keys generated on
DOS (or Linux?) might be safe (apart from a possibly short key length).
Existing certificates would be unaffected, but since the CSPRNG is used
for
On 23-01-2022 21:23, Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users wrote:
> No, the whole CSPRNG is (probably) compromised. PGP 2.6.3 used keyboard
> interrupts harvested directly from the hardware to get a collection of
> random bits which it then fed into the CSPRNG to be expanded out into a
> large
When generating the key-pair with Re: pgp263iamulti06, the
"randomness" is obtained by user's keyboard input. Is it
then that the above applies only when the session key is
generated?
No, the whole CSPRNG is (probably) compromised. PGP 2.6.3 used keyboard
interrupts harvested directly from
from r...@sixdemonbag.org...:
The CSPRNG is almost certainly broken.
Thank you!
When generating the key-pair with Re: pgp263iamulti06, the
"randomness" is obtained by user's keyboard input. Is it
then that the above applies only when the session key is
generated?
PGP 2.6.3 was a DOS