t you for defending your (the us) administration, yet in my
opinion both our administrations deserve some bashing once in a while
for excessive ignorance and/or sluggishness.
Cheers,
Michael Anders
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ely gone nuts and assumes others are
too stupid to implement strong crypto by themselves or else -and this
semms more probable to me- they go for a cheap short term advantage and
stage a theater to make others believe the software that was exported
would be secure while it is not...
regards
ork plugged into it. I wouldn't want to code it.
By the way - Green (rightfully) critizises PGP for bad defaults (e.g. using SHA1) yet he praises TextSecure which heavily relies on SHA1. This leaves me baffled.
Cheers,
Michael Anders
__
with me on this point, yet I have never heard a
convincing argument for the MAC in an asymmetric cipher.)
If you want authenticity, you have to have the message or cipher be
digitally signed by the sender.
For me the critcism of PGP is clearly unfair regarding this second
aspect.
Regards,
ome improvement
compared to the publicly known methods to factor RSA moduli, expect such
improvement from other sources or else just want to push ECC.
(I like ECC -> google "open source elliptic curve cryptography".))
Cheers
Michael Anders
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t keys, however, and that you could always
at least embed the exported subkey into a newly created parent key
structure and newly design whatever sub/super-key structure you like
around the exported key.
So unless there is convincing cryptographic reasoning about why you
cannot do something to the key
> nt-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> > Now where did you calculate that from?
>
> $dS = \frac{\delta Q}{T}$
>
> Second Law of Thermodynamics, which you just broke. Have a nice day.
>
The (cold) system where the calculation is done and the (hot) system the
result is transferred only ex
On Wed, 2014-05-14 at 22:26 +0200, gnupg-users-requ...@gnupg.org wrote:
> If you want to run the temperature lower than the ambient
> temperature
> of the cosmos (3.2K), you have to add energy to run the heat pump --
> and the amount of energy required to run that heat pump will bring
> your
>
> GPG encrypted data (using RSA) can be collected today and easily decrypted
> after 50-100 years using a quantum computer. See:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s_algorithm
Well let's see. Usually in a new technology, once you are really going
to apply it in the real world, new problems
of
cryptography in many contexts. There is no such thing as attrition of
security by heavy usage of a public RSA or ECC key.
When it comes to system compromise leading to broken security. This is
not kind of an aging process smoothly proceeding with time and
eventually leading to death. They target
such thing as attrition of security by heavy usage of a public RSA or ECC key.
When it comes to system compromise leading to broken security. This is not kind of an aging process smoothly proceeding with time and eventually leading to death. They target you or they don't.
ch
iven when it is not needed.
This seems reasonable to me.
regards
Michael Anders
(http://www.fh-wedel.de/~an/)
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ave been a
keylogger in place and security of the key is gone.
If you consider the NSA to be a benevolent organization, you might make
a distinction between security against criminals and security against
the NSA, but that is politics and not cryptography.
Cheers,
Mich
PGP, which thankworthily is usually more
or less hidden from the user anyways?
A good reason would help the complicated workings to stick with my
memory :-)
Why would we need more than one key and this hierarchy on top of it?
(Proper padding according to the standard to my knowledge removes even
the dan
iberately and unnecessarily, which the
user has to trust. This pattern smells like a backdoor mechanism to
me.
I would outrighly reject to use such a card.
Cheers
Michael Anders
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cally sound.
If you are interested in this topic, you may have fun listening into Dan
Bonehs great lectures on cryptography in coursera (for free).
https://www.coursera.org/courses?orderby=upcoming&search=cryptography
regards
Michael Anders
__
GnuPG config files and tranferring to and fro windows and linux.
There seems to be a danger to mess up things using wrong editor
settings.
I don't know if hash preference information is additionally attached to
keys. I would guess it is not, it wouldn't make sense to
ecurity:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis_o.html
regards,
Michael Anders
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est some minutes in understanding what asymmetric
cryptography is about, however. That should be well within the scope of
people with normal intelligence.
Without that very basic understanding, using GnuPG(or other public key
crypto) would be reckless nonsense anyways. Becoming a console wizar
I wish you all had a Merry Christmas and will have a Happy New Year,
Michael Anders
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On Tue, 2013-12-17 at 13:01 -0600, Anthony Papillion wrote:
> I know that gnupg is experimenting with ECC and I'm wondering which
> curves the team has decided to use. I know there are some curves that
> are now suspected of being tainted by the NSA through NIST. Has the
> gnupg team ruled using th
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