Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

I don't see why it would need a standards change, or why the option can't be, well, optional. We aren't trying to force all gpg installations to conform, but to make it possible to configure an installation to conform. Normal gpg should continue to function. (Mobile/Handy) Am 10.05.2011 15:33 sch

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Dienstag, 10. Mai 2011, 07:10:42 schrieb Jerome Baum: > an option for GnuPG: reject-subkey-signatures > No need to change OpenPGP for this. This is possible only if it is safe for old implementations. I see one option for that: A signature notation for this purpose could be defined and this

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 07:42, Grant Olson wrote: > Okay, yeah, if the CA sets up the card, authenticates it with their > signing key, and ships it to you, then there would never be a separate > master key, no problem there. I get the feeling the card won't like it > if you try to create a softw

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 07:42, Grant Olson wrote: > On 5/10/2011 1:35 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > > AFAIK, the CAs over here will just supply a card. There is no question > > of whether the key is generated on-card or not -- the CA confirms this > > implicitly with their certification of "this is a

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/10/2011 1:35 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 07:30, Grant Olson > wrote: > > But there's no way to prove that the keys were originally generated > on-card, and weren't imported from a software private key where there > was never a sep

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 07:30, Grant Olson wrote: > But there's no way to prove that the keys were originally generated > on-card, and weren't imported from a software private key where there > was never a separate master certification key. > AFAIK, the CAs over here will just supply a card. The

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/10/2011 1:10 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 07:01, Grant Olson > wrote: > > On 5/10/2011 12:41 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > > Maybe one of the folks with experience implementing these devices can > > give more concrete details? >

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 07:01, Grant Olson wrote: > On 5/10/2011 12:41 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > > Maybe one of the folks with experience implementing these devices can > > give more concrete details? > > I can confirm. The cards only get the hash and sign that. The trouble > is the the

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/10/2011 12:41 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 05/10/2011 12:32 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: >> Is that an implementation problem? i.e. is it possible to write an >> implementation that does distinguish, or is it technically impossible w/out >> processing the entire data on-card? > > As i unders

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/10/2011 12:32 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > Is that an implementation problem? i.e. is it possible to write an > implementation that does distinguish, or is it technically impossible w/out > processing the entire data on-card? As i understand the process, i think it would be necessary to pass all

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 06:18, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 05/10/2011 12:01 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > > c) Program the smart-card so it doesn't sign sub-keys? I'm not familiar > with > > the internals of smart-card implementations but the OpenPGP sub-key > > signatures are of a different type

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/10/2011 12:01 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > c) Program the smart-card so it doesn't sign sub-keys? I'm not familiar with > the internals of smart-card implementations but the OpenPGP sub-key > signatures are of a different type than the data signatures. The smart-card > can probably recognize if i

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Mon, May 9, 2011 at 18:09, Hauke Laging wrote: > IMHO there are only two possibilities for making (a new version of) OpenPGP > signature law compatible: > > a) The CA creates a mainkey and subkeys. The mainkey is destroyed > immediately > afterwards. That might be legally acceptable but has not

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Montag, 9. Mai 2011, 19:51:12 schrieb MFPA: > Could that be a form of attack? Bob and Mallory sign a contract of > some kind - it transpires the contract benefits Bob - Mallory tries to > make it look as if Bob had not signed. That would not work for several reasons which arise not from techni

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 9 May 2011 at 5:09:00 PM, in , Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Sonntag, 8. Mai 2011, 14:50:36 schrieb MFPA: >> Mainly the key's owner, but could also protect others from relying on >> signatures from a compromised key for which they have no

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Sonntag, 8. Mai 2011, 14:50:36 schrieb MFPA: > Mainly the key's owner, but could also protect others from relying on > signatures from a compromised key for which they have not received a > revocation certificate. Right. The problem: Protection you don't know of. So seriously this additional p

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Sunday 8 May 2011 at 3:21:41 AM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > The trial court ruled in favor of the farmers. I remember literature from my bank saying that cheques did not need to be on their printed form so long as all the required deta

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Sunday 8 May 2011 at 2:16:33 AM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > "I offer you 10 dollars if you give me 10 euros, and > this is valid for two days from now." -- that statement > of intent is legally binding (or it would be, if I were > being seri

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Sunday 8 May 2011 at 3:34:52 AM, in , Hauke Laging wrote: > There is probability but no safety in this assumption. I have no idea what is the probability. I have seen no figures relating to what fraction of people using subkeys with expiry

Fwd: Best practice for periodic key change?

rom: David Shaw Date: Sun, May 8, 2011 at 05:15 Subject: Re: Best practice for periodic key change? To: Jerome Baum Cc: MFPA , Jerome Baum on GnuPG-Users < gnupg-users@gnupg.org> On May 7, 2011, at 10:57 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 00:07, MFPA wrote: > Maybe we co

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On May 7, 2011, at 11:04 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 04:53, David Shaw wrote: > I knew a man (a lawyer, as it happened) who always signed documents with > several loops in a row. When I asked him why he didn't use a "real" > signature (i.e. why he didn't sign his name), he

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On May 7, 2011, at 10:57 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 00:07, MFPA wrote: > Maybe we could use something like > http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper.htm > > I checked the newsgroup (only through Google, last posting from '05) and > don't see the signatures being posted anymore.

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 04:53, David Shaw wrote: > I knew a man (a lawyer, as it happened) who always signed documents with > several loops in a row. When I asked him why he didn't use a "real" > signature (i.e. why he didn't sign his name), he just grinned and said > "Who's to say this isn't my

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 00:07, MFPA wrote: > Maybe we could use something like > http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper.htm I checked the newsgroup (only through Google, last posting from '05) and don't see the signatures being posted anymore. Can anyone confirm this? -- Jerome Baum tel +49-1578-

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On May 7, 2011, at 10:21 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/07/2011 09:50 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> Incidentally, speaking of bitmap signatures - a "signature" made via >> a rubber stamp of a signature can be binding under certain >> circumstances as well (at least in the US - I don't know about

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Samstag, 7. Mai 2011, 21:43:38 schrieb MFPA: > At what point does it become safe to assume that an individual with > expiry dates on their subkeys keeps their master key securely offline? There is probability but no safety in this assumption. But it this relevant? How and whom is an expiratio

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/07/2011 09:50 PM, David Shaw wrote: > Incidentally, speaking of bitmap signatures - a "signature" made via > a rubber stamp of a signature can be binding under certain > circumstances as well (at least in the US - I don't know about > elsewhere). Within the U.S., the standard doesn't invo

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 03:50, David Shaw wrote: > > Incidentally, speaking of bitmap signatures - a "signature" made via a > rubber stamp of a signature can be binding under certain circumstances as > well (at least in the US - I don't know about elsewhere). > Often enough you don't need an actua

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On May 7, 2011, at 5:49 PM, MFPA wrote: > On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 10:21:17 PM, in > , Jerome Baum > wrote: > > >> On digital signatures being legally binding, apparently >> a scanned bitmap of your signature is enough to be >> "binding" (as would be no signature), just that it >> isn't very st

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 23:56, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/07/2011 02:49 PM, MFPA wrote: > > What is to stop that scanned bitmap of a person's signature being > > applied to a document the individual has no knowledge about? > > Nothing. That's the nature of physical signatures. I was talkin

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 03:13, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 23:56, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >> On 05/07/2011 02:49 PM, MFPA wrote: >> > What is to stop that scanned bitmap of a person's signature being >> > applied to a document the individual has no knowledge about? >> >> Nothing.

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/7/2011 5:08 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: > On Sunday 08 May 2011, Grant Olson wrote: >=== > > You seem to send messages from the future. ;-) > That's funny. I wanted to make sure I wasn't lying before replying. A little later I was deploying code to some servers. After the upd

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 10:22:33 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > Definitely. I get his point about rejecting them > entirely though, as it is (and that's what this > dicussion is all about) difficult to verify the > (actual) signature time. Ma

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/07/2011 02:49 PM, MFPA wrote: > What is to stop that scanned bitmap of a person's signature being > applied to a document the individual has no knowledge about? Nothing. That's the nature of physical signatures. A physical signature binds tightly to the individual (handwriting being hard t

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 10:21:17 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > On digital signatures being legally binding, apparently > a scanned bitmap of your signature is enough to be > "binding" (as would be no signature), just that it > isn't very str

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

2011/5/7 MFPA > On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 9:56:14 PM, in > , Ingo Klöcker wrote: > > > > It depends on your definition of "valid". In my book a > > signature can only be valid if the corresponding key > > is valid. Expired keys are not valid (anymore). > > I thought a key was incapable of makin

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

2011/5/7 Ingo Klöcker > This explains why digital signatures with legally binding date often > (always?) require a timestamp by a certified third party. > Not always (every statement of intent is binding, even w/out a notary), but e.g. over here (Germany) for a digital signature to reach a certa

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sunday 08 May 2011, Grant Olson wrote: === You seem to send messages from the future. ;-) > On 5/6/11 3:48 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: > > On Thursday 05 May 2011, Hauke Laging wrote: > >> What is the difference between these two options with respect to > >> the point of confusion?

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 9:56:14 PM, in , Ingo Klöcker wrote: > It depends on your definition of "valid". In my book a > signature can only be valid if the corresponding key > is valid. Expired keys are not valid (anymore). I thought a key

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Saturday 07 May 2011, MFPA wrote: > Hi > > > On Friday 6 May 2011 at 10:18:29 PM, in > , Jerome Baum > > wrote: > >>> If my key expired yesterday, no-one can > >>> forge a message with that key and claim it's from > >>> today. > >> > >> Never heard of a system clock that was wrong? > > > >

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 23:07, MFPA wrote: > On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 9:52:51 PM, in > , Jerome Baum > wrote: > > > I don't think you get what kind of assumption we are > > talking about. There are two kinds: > > > 1. I assume something is generally true, e.g.: I assume > > the world is around. >

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 9:52:51 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > I don't think you get what kind of assumption we are > talking about. There are two kinds: > 1. I assume something is generally true, e.g.: I assume > the world is around. > 2. I

Re: [OT] Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 22:47, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 22:38, MFPA wrote: > >> As for the meaning of the date, whether it is supposed to mean the >> > date the signature was written or the date the instruction to pay >> becomes effective or simply the date the cheque is issued

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Friday 06 May 2011, MFPA wrote: > Hi > > > On Friday 6 May 2011 at 8:48:03 PM, in > > , Ingo Klöcker wrote: > > Unless I'm missing something the difference is as > > follows: - With prolongation of the expiration time > > releases signed before the prolongation will keep > > having a valid s

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 21:43, MFPA wrote: > On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 3:06:16 PM, in > , Hauke Laging > wrote: > > > > Am Samstag, 7. Mai 2011, 15:54:21 schrieb MFPA: > >> You can't assume. > > > You can very well if you don't claim that for all cases but use this > > assumption for distinguishun

Re: [OT] Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 22:38, MFPA wrote: > On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 8:50:45 PM, in > , Jerome Baum > wrote: > > > > We weren't talking about fraud and deception. Only > > about lying -- rather, telling an untruth, which you > > may or may not be doing intentionally. But it is still > > an untru

Re: [OT] Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 8:50:45 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > We weren't talking about fraud and deception. Only > about lying -- rather, telling an untruth, which you > may or may not be doing intentionally. But it is still > an untruth if

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/7/2011 7:54 AM, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Samstag, 7. Mai 2011, 04:33:17 schrieb Grant Olson: > >> 1) I digitally sign a document saying I owe you money. The signing key >> has an expiration date. >> >> 2) Key expires. I do nothing. >> >> 3) The original document is invalidated. I no longer

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 3:06:16 PM, in , Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Samstag, 7. Mai 2011, 15:54:21 schrieb MFPA: >> You can't assume. > You can very well if you don't claim that for all cases but use this > assumption for distinguishung betwe

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 4:03:19 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > Next time can you read the whole email and reply to it > as a whole? It's generally better to read the whole email and then reply to whichever points I have anything to say about

Re: [OT] Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 21:36, MFPA wrote: > On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 6:42:06 PM, in > , Jerome Baum > wrote: > > In that case we had a different understanding. Checks > > aren't common over here and I never saw a post-dated > > check -- which I assumed is a check that is meant to be > > avail

Re: [OT] Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 6:42:06 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > Hey not that any of this relates to the original > question on digital signatures, but interesting > nonetheless so I guess let's keep it on the list as OT. Since (like any other

[OT] Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Hey not that any of this relates to the original question on digital signatures, but interesting nonetheless so I guess let's keep it on the list as OT. On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 19:16, Jean-David Beyer wrote: > > When I was on a grand jury, the prosecutor said that while the words of > the law made

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Jerome Baum wrote: > On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 15:54, MFPA > wrote: > > (snip huge email) > > > Next time can you read the whole email and reply to it as a whole? > > As for signature checking, I stand by my point: Over here, signing a > document today and claimi

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 15:54, MFPA wrote: > (snip huge email) > Next time can you read the whole email and reply to it as a whole? As for signature checking, I stand by my point: Over here, signing a document today and claiming on the signature that it was signed tomorrow is going to be an offe

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Samstag, 7. Mai 2011, 15:54:21 schrieb MFPA: > > and since the cost is so > > low, that there is no point in not having them > > (assuming, of course, that you separate master and > > sub-keys). > > You can't assume. You can very well if you don't claim that for all cases but use this assump

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 1:09:25 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > Then I would say it is the recipients responsibility to > only accept "reasonable" signatures. Fair enough. "Reasonable" is subjective. > As you say, it is > only an "attempt"

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 01:43, MFPA wrote: > On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 12:11:06 AM, in > , Jerome Baum > wrote: > > > Say my sub-key expired yesterday. Today, you come > > up to me and ask me to sign something (say, a statement > > that I agree to specific contractual terms). Whoever is > > in pos

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 04:33, Grant Olson wrote: > On 5/6/2011 10:05 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > > > > Several people have mentioned that a signature does not become invalid by > > expiration of the key. That is formally correct an describes the GnuPG > > behaviour. But with regard to content in su

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Samstag, 7. Mai 2011, 04:33:17 schrieb Grant Olson: > 1) I digitally sign a document saying I owe you money. The signing key > has an expiration date. > > 2) Key expires. I do nothing. > > 3) The original document is invalidated. I no longer owe you money? Whether you owe me money does no

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/6/2011 10:05 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > > Several people have mentioned that a signature does not become invalid by > expiration of the key. That is formally correct an describes the GnuPG > behaviour. But with regard to content in such a case there has to be an > additional proof that the

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Freitag, 6. Mai 2011, 22:37:12 schrieb Doug Barton: > > That's not correct for subkeys and offline mainkeys as the good guys do > > it. > > I don't understand this response. What I'm saying is that if the key is > compromised, expiration dates become irrelevant. Perhaps you could > expand your

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Freitag, 6. Mai 2011, 21:48:03 schrieb Ingo Klöcker: > > What is the difference between these two options with respect to the > > point of confusion? > > Unless I'm missing something the difference is as follows: > - With prolongation of the expiration time releases signed before the > prolong

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 12:01:30 AM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > Email > headers don't really make a difference -- they would > have signed it yesterday and sent it today, but the > message is still from yesterday. OK, when was this message s

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Saturday 7 May 2011 at 12:11:06 AM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > Actually let me put this in context so you see what I > mean. I already see what you mean; I just happen to disagree. (-; > Say my sub-key expired yesterday. Today, you come

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 01:01, Jerome Baum wrote: > Okay, let me rephrase that. "claim it's from today" should have been "have > the signature date as today". That's how I would interpret such a claim. > Email headers don't really make a difference -- they would have signed it > yesterday and sent

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 00:40, MFPA wrote: > > On Friday 6 May 2011 at 10:18:29 PM, in > , Jerome Baum > wrote: > > > >>> If my key expired yesterday, no-one can > >>> forge a message with that key and claim it's from > >>> today. > > Suppose your master key is secure and offline but Mallory has c

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Friday 6 May 2011 at 10:18:29 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: >>> If my key expired yesterday, no-one can >>> forge a message with that key and claim it's from >>> today. >> Never heard of a system clock that was wrong? > I'll give a summary

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Fri, May 6, 2011 at 23:07, MFPA wrote: > On Friday 6 May 2011 at 9:48:26 PM, in > , Jerome Baum > wrote: > > > > If my key expired yesterday, no-one can > > forge a message with that key and claim it's from > > today. > > > Never heard of a system clock that was wrong? I'll give a summary re

Fwd: Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Meant to sent on-list... Original Message Subject: Re: Best practice for periodic key change? Date: Sun, 08 May 2011 16:39:34 -0400 From: Grant Olson To: Ingo Klöcker On 5/6/11 3:48 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: > On Thursday 05 May 2011, Hauke Laging wrote: >> Wh

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Friday 6 May 2011 at 9:48:26 PM, in , Jerome Baum wrote: > If my key expired yesterday, no-one can > forge a message with that key and claim it's from > today. Never heard of a system clock that was wrong? - -- Best regards MFPA

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Friday 6 May 2011 at 8:48:03 PM, in , Ingo Klöcker wrote: > Unless I'm missing something the difference is as > follows: - With prolongation of the expiration time > releases signed before the prolongation will keep > having a valid signat

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/06/2011 13:48, Jerome Baum wrote: On Fri, May 6, 2011 at 22:37, Doug Barton mailto:do...@dougbarton.us>> wrote: I don't understand this response. What I'm saying is that if the key is compromised, expiration dates become irrelevant. Up to a point. If my key expired yesterday, no

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/6/11 4:48 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: > On Fri, May 6, 2011 at 22:37, Doug Barton > wrote: > > > I don't understand this response. What I'm saying is that if the key > is compromised, expiration dates become irrelevant. > > > Up to a point. If my key expired

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Fri, May 6, 2011 at 22:37, Doug Barton wrote: > > > I don't understand this response. What I'm saying is that if the key is > compromised, expiration dates become irrelevant. Up to a point. If my key expired yesterday, no-one can forge a message with that key and claim it's from today. Just

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/06/2011 08:34, Hauke Laging wrote: Am Freitag, 6. Mai 2011, 09:47:57 schrieb Doug Barton: There's also another element, the expiration date is irrelevant if the key is actually compromised. If Eve has your secret key she can simply update or remove the expiration date, and upload the new

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Thursday 05 May 2011, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Donnerstag, 5. Mai 2011, 11:19:30 schrieb Werner Koch: > > A > > period key change is problematic because it confuses those who want > > to verify the signatures. > > > > BTW, the prolongation of the expiration time has showed (by means > > of a lo

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Freitag, 6. Mai 2011, 09:47:57 schrieb Doug Barton: > There's also another element, the expiration date is irrelevant if the > key is actually compromised. If Eve has your secret key she can simply > update or remove the expiration date, and upload the new version of the > public key to the pub

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/06/2011 03:47 AM, Doug Barton wrote: > There's also another element, the expiration date is irrelevant if the > key is actually compromised. If Eve has your secret key she can simply > update or remove the expiration date, and upload the new version of the > public key to the public keyserver

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/05/2011 23:22, Andreas Heinlein wrote: Like Werner said, many people never refresh their keys, so expiring is indeed a way to force them to do that. ( I admit that, in our case, even this will not help, since gpg will happily verify a signature made by an expired key. It will tell you that

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am 05.05.2011 22:10, schrieb Doug Barton: > On 05/04/2011 23:52, Andreas Heinlein wrote: >> We have a OpenPGP key which we use for signing our software releases. >> That key should be changed yearly and carry an expiration date to >> enforce this change. > > What are you trying to accomplish by doi

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 4:10 PM, Doug Barton wrote: > On 05/04/2011 23:52, Andreas Heinlein wrote: >> >> We have a OpenPGP key which we use for signing our software releases. >> That key should be changed yearly and carry an expiration date to >> enforce this change. > > What are you trying to acco

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/04/2011 23:52, Andreas Heinlein wrote: We have a OpenPGP key which we use for signing our software releases. That key should be changed yearly and carry an expiration date to enforce this change. What are you trying to accomplish by doing it this way? I've yet to see a good rationale for

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 5/5/11 2:52 AM, Andreas Heinlein wrote: > Hello, > > I hope you can give me some advice on the following problem: > > We have a OpenPGP key which we use for signing our software releases. > That key should be changed yearly and carry an expiration date to > enforce this change. However, for th

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Hauke Laging wrote: > > BTW: Would it be a good idea for gpg to suggest the user to check for an > updated version of the key (or do it automatically before if configured to do > so) if it find an expired subkey? This would probably not work with the GUIs > though (but might make the GUI develo

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Thu, 5 May 2011 17:07, mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de said: > Are there people who check the subkey IDs of old and new signatures, get > confused by a change despite of gpg saying it's all right (which IMHO demands > they have not understood the concept of subkeys)? No they are confused that

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

Am Donnerstag, 5. Mai 2011, 11:19:30 schrieb Werner Koch: > A > period key change is problematic because it confuses those who want to > verify the signatures. > > BTW, the prolongation of the expiration time has showed (by means of a > lot of complaining mails) that many folks don't refresh the

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On Thu, 5 May 2011 08:52, aheinl...@gmx.com said: > We have a OpenPGP key which we use for signing our software releases. > That key should be changed yearly and carry an expiration date to > enforce this change. However, for the signatures to be useful, the key > has to be signed by quite a lot

Best practice for periodic key change?

Hello, I hope you can give me some advice on the following problem: We have a OpenPGP key which we use for signing our software releases. That key should be changed yearly and carry an expiration date to enforce this change. However, for the signatures to be useful, the key has to be signed by qu