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Ryan McGinnis via Gnupg-users wrote:
> I might be missing something really obvious here but... what is this
> trying to protect against?
What they say they are trying to protect against, I suppose.
I summarised my understanding of it by saying:
> > It might not address all threats but it
Exmos. Senhores,
Recebemos a informação que tiveram hoje a amabilidade de nos transmitir e que
muito agradecemos.
Vamos imediatamente analisar o caso e responderemos com a máxima brevidade
possível ao vosso pedido. Assim que for possível, o Serviço de Apoio ao Cliente
entrará em contacto
Exmos. Senhores,
Recebemos a informação que tiveram hoje a amabilidade de nos transmitir e que
muito agradecemos.
Vamos imediatamente analisar o caso e responderemos com a máxima brevidade
possível ao vosso pedido. Assim que for possível, o Serviço de Apoio ao Cliente
entrará em contacto
On Fri, 2019-11-01 at 15:42 -0400, Tony Lane via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On 10/29/19 8:33 PM, raf via Gnupg-users wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Sorry if this was mentioned before but I've just come
> > across a novel approach to email encryption that
> > doesn't do end-to-end encryption, but rather it
> >
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 10/29/19 8:33 PM, raf via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Sorry if this was mentioned before but I've just come
> across a novel approach to email encryption that
> doesn't do end-to-end encryption, but rather it
> encrypts email upon receipt so
I might be missing something really obvious here but... what is this
trying to protect against? It's not protecting against interception in
transit, since the message already transits the internet either in
cleartext or encrypted via TLS that your email service provider can
definitely read. So
Hi,
Sorry if this was mentioned before but I've just come
across a novel approach to email encryption that
doesn't do end-to-end encryption, but rather it
encrypts email upon receipt so that an individual can
encrypt the email that is stored in their IMAP account
as it arrives without the need
Andreas Boehlk writes:
> I do not agree with this one. IMHO the verification with a trusted GPG-Key is
> absolutely sufficiant and the checksum-proof is not needed at all.
True, since validating the signature means validating the secure hash of
the contents. That is, the checkum is reisistant
> john doe hat am 8. Oktober 2019 um 07:45 geschrieben:
> To summarize:
>
> - Checksumming a file insures that the file has not been corrupted
> - Verifying a file insures that the file has not been tempered with
I totally agree to both statements
>
> Idealy, both steps are to be done.
>
I
On Mon 07/Oct/2019 12:04:33 +0200 Werner Koch via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On Sat, 5 Oct 2019 21:21, vedaal said:
>
>> and then a separate option of
>> "Export Secret Keys"
>
> The OP explictly suggested to make the exporting of the secret key not
> too easy so that users don't accidently send out
> Hi
>
>
> On Monday 7 October 2019 at 9:15:54 AM, in
> , john doe wrote:-
>
>
>> would it be possible to add the ability to
>> checksum the binaries?
>
> When a new GnuPG version is announced, there are checksums in the
> announcement. For example, see https://gnupg.org/index.html#sec-3-2.
>
To
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Monday 7 October 2019 at 9:15:54 AM, in
, john doe wrote:-
> would it be possible to add the ability to
> checksum the binaries?
When a new GnuPG version is announced, there are checksums in the
announcement. For example, see
On 10/7/2019 12:03 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Oct 2019 10:15, john doe said:
>
>> In the above link, only the cli version of the 1.4 release is available.
>> I got it from (1).
>
> Nope. That is always the current 2.2.
>
Yes it is there, some how I mist it! :)
Maybe adding something
On Mon, 7 Oct 2019 10:15, john doe said:
> In the above link, only the cli version of the 1.4 release is available.
> I got it from (1).
Nope. That is always the current 2.2.
Salam-Shalom,
Werner
--
Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
signature.asc
On Sat, 5 Oct 2019 21:21, vedaal said:
> and then a separate option of
> "Export Secret Keys"
The OP explictly suggested to make the exporting of the secret key not
too easy so that users don't accidently send out their secret keys.
Shalom-Salam,
Werner
--
Die Gedanken sind frei.
Hi, thanks for your answer.
> Hi
>
>
> On Saturday 5 October 2019 at 7:05:55 PM, in
> , john doe wrote:-
>
>
>> In other words, how can I only install the command
>> line version of GPG on
>> Windows.
>
> At https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#sec-1-2 there's a link to
> download "Simple
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Saturday 5 October 2019 at 7:05:55 PM, in
, john doe wrote:-
> In other words, how can I only install the command
> line version of GPG on
> Windows.
At https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#sec-1-2 there's a link to
download "Simple
On 10/5/2019 at 12:58 PM, "Werner Koch via Gnupg-users"
wrote:
>I agree with you and, although I sometimes hack on GPA, I would
>suggest
>Kleopatra. On Windows Kleopatra and the Explorer plugin do
>actually do
>what you suggest and we LOTS of folks using Gpg4win. Be it for
>plain
>file
On 10/5/2019 6:54 PM, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On Mon, 30 Sep 2019 10:58, Roland Siemons said:
>
>> 4/ Here is my proposal:
>> 4.1/ Stimulate that people use a GUI like GPA or Kleopatra. Not Enigmail,
>
> Enigmail folks won't like that suggestion. Users need to install a
> second tool
On Mon, 30 Sep 2019 10:58, Roland Siemons said:
> 4/ Here is my proposal:
> 4.1/ Stimulate that people use a GUI like GPA or Kleopatra. Not Enigmail,
Enigmail folks won't like that suggestion. Users need to install a
second tool which behaves different (because Enigmail implements parts
of
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