On 2013-12-27 01:41, adrelanos wrote:
The latter often requires breaking into a flat or an office. While
smartcards are carried around.
The solution in this scenario is so simple: don't take your smartcard
with you; at all times leave it next to your PC.
I'm not saying this solves all proble
Il 27/12/2013 01:42, adrelanos ha scritto:
[...]
>> You're saying that he can lockpick your security door but can't break
>> the glass of the window nearby...
> I don't understand how you get to that conclusion.
You're assuming that breaking into a smartcard is something easy, while
it's the most
Peter Lebbing:
> The result is that the on-disk key again adds nothing,
> because an adversary that can physically access the smartcard can also
> physically access the computer.
The latter often requires breaking into a flat or an office. While
smartcards are carried around. Breaking into a a fla
NdK:
> Il 24/12/2013 02:41, adrelanos ha scritto:
>
>> Adversary capabilities:
>> - Can physically steal the smartcard.
>> - Capable of dismantling a smartcard to extract the key its holing.
>> [Maybe not now, but maybe in a few years the tool required to so so will
>> be available. Only making up
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Hi
On Tuesday 24 December 2013 at 10:23:14 AM, in
, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> Even if you keep a tiny computer on your
> lanyard (easy to realise these days), that still leaves
> the keyboard.
Some of the laser projection virtual keyboard units are
On 24/12/13 02:41, adrelanos wrote:
> Scenario #1
> ###
>
> Adversary capabilities:
> - Can physically steal the smartcard.
The smartcard you could always keep on your person. This is slightly difficult
with computer hardware. So it seems to me that your adversary has an easier job
access
Il 24/12/2013 02:41, adrelanos ha scritto:
> Adversary capabilities:
> - Can physically steal the smartcard.
> - Capable of dismantling a smartcard to extract the key its holing.
> [Maybe not now, but maybe in a few years the tool required to so so will
> be available. Only making up the scenario
Peter Lebbing:
>> By "part" I don't mean split one key in halves, but rather use two keys.
> It's an interesting thought, I'll definitely give you that. However, if you
> need
> that kind of protection, I don't think you should use a normal computer with a
> normal operating system. It seems to me
Il 23/12/2013 19:29, adrelanos ha scritto:
> This would be lucky, if one could enter the PIN using an external keypad
> (possible) AND a password using the keyboard (not possible).
I'd like it was possible, but for other reasons: that would mean you
could instantiate an object in card's RAM, havin
On 23/12/13 19:29, adrelanos wrote:
> This would be lucky, if one could enter the PIN using an external keypad
> (possible) AND a password using the keyboard (not possible).
The smartcard needs to know the plaintext key. It is no use to encrypt the key
with a password, because you'll simply offer
NdK:
> Il 22/12/2013 04:13, adrelanos ha scritto:
>
>> Or in other words, is it possible to store an already encrypted
>> (password protected) gpg private keys on a smartcard? So the smartcard
>> never gets to see the plain key?
> That would be really useless: smartcardneeds the key to *do* crypto
Il 22/12/2013 04:13, adrelanos ha scritto:
> Or in other words, is it possible to store an already encrypted
> (password protected) gpg private keys on a smartcard? So the smartcard
> never gets to see the plain key?
That would be really useless: smartcardneeds the key to *do* crypto ops!
It's not
Hi,
is it possible to somehow combine gpg's private key password protection
(gpg --edit-key; passwd) and smartcards?
Or in other words, is it possible to store an already encrypted
(password protected) gpg private keys on a smartcard? So the smartcard
never gets to see the plain key?
I've learne
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