On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
Use
gpg --keyid-format long --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg
to see the non-abbreviated key ID as stored in the file. Use this to
find the key on a server, etc.
i've seen a lot of these mistakes where people seem to think that 32-bit
keyids are
Am Di 29.05.2012, 11:51:06 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor:
I think switching the default to long would be on balance a Good Thing.
A smaller change which should solve most of these problems could be to
change the error message. If gpg is operating with the short format then a
respective hint
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2012-05-29 17:51, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
...
I think switching the default to long would be on balance a Good
Thing.
I agree, and don't see much of a reason not to use a long KeyID rather
On 5/29/12 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
Perhaps GnuPG should change the default of --keyid-format from short
to long?
Hurts interoperability. Once someone learns the process on PGP or
BouncyCastle or [insert OpenPGP implementation here], they're going to
want to take those same skills
On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
Use
gpg --keyid-format long --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg
to see the non-abbreviated key ID as stored in the file. Use this to
find the key on a server, etc.
i've seen a lot of these
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 1:47 PM, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote:
On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision?
Certainly both; while accidental collision isn't probable, 32-bit IDs
aren't exactly
On May 29, 2012, at 2:05 PM, Sam Whited wrote:
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 1:47 PM, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote:
On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision?
Certainly both; while accidental
On 05/29/2012 02:18 PM, David Shaw wrote:
The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs have
no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e. an
attacker generating a key with the same key ID as the victim in order to
confuse matters and/or
On May 29, 2012, at 3:34 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
On 05/29/2012 02:18 PM, David Shaw wrote:
The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs
have no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e.
an attacker generating a key with the same
