------------------------------------------------------------------------
* G * O * A * N * E * T **** C * L * A * S * S * I * F * I * E * D * S *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Planning to get married in Goa?

www.weddingsetcgoa.com

Making your 'dream wedding' possible

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some serious food for thought below. The Goan author is a retired Commodore
from the Indian Navy, now settled in a coastal village in Salcete. -v

=============
FIGHTING A SEABORNE ATTACK ON GOA
We need to urgently devise a strategy to deal with the threat of a seaborne 
attack on Goa, says COMMODORE GILBERT MENEZES (RETD)
(http://oheraldo.in/pagedetails.asp?nid=28366&cid=14)


I have a confession to make. For many years, I have planned commando attacks 
from the sea on the territory of India. And I must
confess that I have actively participated in a successful one in the late 1970s 
as well. This is how it goes. Every nation's armed
forces prepare contingency plans and war games. I was invariably a part of the 
'Orange' or Enemy Force, whose stated purpose was to
catch the 'Blue' or Friendly force by surprise by carrying out preemptive 
attacks on his homeland - in this case, the territory of
India.


If I recall correctly, the coast of Goa was the scenario of many such attacks, 
and the high-value targets were the airport, fuel
storage tanks, five-star hotels and densely crowded locations to achieve 
maximum impact. The favoured means of insertion of
commandos was by unobtrusive fishing vessels or by submarine. I was a submarine 
captain and have landed commandos on at least 3
occasions. This is how it is done - and it's absolutely foolproof, with almost 
zero chances of detection. The submarine approaches
the coast and dives, at night, and at periscope depth, ideally mixing with 
coastal traffic or fishing activity. When about 5 miles
from the coast, the submarine surfaces, and launches two sets of 5-member 
commando teams in two inflatable rubber dinghies fitted
with outboard motors and oars, and carrying the weapons, ammunition and 
explosives required for the mission. The entire time spent
on the surface, when the submarine is vulnerable to detection, is only about 10 
minutes. After launch, the submarine dives and
clears the area. This is the preferred method of launching an attack and only 
careful sanitisation of the coastal area by the Navy
or Coast Guard can prevent it. In the case of Goa we have almost 100 km of 
beach where a stealthy landing can be made quite easily.


I must stress here that this sort of coastal attack was practiced for offence 
during full-scale war or during the precautionary
stage leading up to it, when the political climate between two nations had 
deteriorated to the point of no return. In the case of
the recent Mumbai attacks, we have a completely different political scenario, 
and therefore a much lower level of preparedness to
respond to it. It is therefore obvious that we have to seriously revise our 
strategy to counter such possibilities.


In the case of Goa, I feel that the government should not waste too much money 
on waterborne assets, but leave the task of
sanitisation and coastal policing to the Coast Guard (CG), who are 
professionally competent to do this. However, there is no doubt
that the control of trawler traffic and education of their crews about the 
terrorist menace is the responsibility of the Goa
Government, in close collaboration with CG authorities. The crux of the matter 
is that the internal security of Goa is the bounden
responsibility of the government, as well as every institution in Goa, and 
every citizen of the state too. As of today, we are
ill-prepared to deal with any threat, ill-prepared to deal with any calamity, 
natural or manmade, and ill-prepared to ensure minimum
collateral damage in case any attack gets through. When I mention the word 
'government', please read the word 'bureaucrat', because
this is one group of people who are responsible for perspective planning, 
monitoring and implementation of the internal security
situation, but who vanish into thin air when things go wrong and the blame game 
starts. Politicians are birds of the night, who come
and go, and who resign from time to time, as in the case of the Mumbai terror 
attacks. So it is time that the people of Goa take a
hard look at the Head of Police and other bureaucrats of the Home Ministry at 
Goa.


Take the case of the Goa Police. After years of poor leadership and 
mismanagement, I would best describe them as a ramshackle force
of men in uniform. There is nothing wrong with each man of the force per se, 
but they are improperly and inadequately trained, lack
weapons and, most of all, motivation. There is nothing worse than seeing a 
potbellied man in uniform, slouching with his hands in
his pockets, watching the world go by. Can you put him against a terrorist 
armed with an Uzi machine gun and 10 loaded magazines and
expect results? You can rerun the CCTV footage of VT station and see the Mumbai 
police running away. It was a shame for us Indians
when this was beamed to the world.

For starters, let our Goan politicians and bureaucrats do some introspection, 
followed by radical surgery. Remove most of the police
security for public personalities and their red lights and sirens to make them 
unobtrusive and cost the state exchequer less. They
should accept it as one of the perils of being in high office for the service 
of the people, a service which they profess so loudly
from time to time. Form a core of about 20 highly trained rapid reaction 
commandos who can reach any trouble spot in the state
within an hour to deal with an emergency, until reinforcements arrive from 
other NSG hubs outside the state. Our small commando
force should train with the NSG (National Security Guard) or MARCOS (Marine 
Commando Force), and be deployed only for emergencies,
not for routine security cover of politicians.


Start training and arming every policeman in the state. Start arming them with 
heavy-duty batons and handcuffs for starters. And,
for heaven's sake, do not supply them with wooden dandas like some banana 
republic. It is surprising that our police do not carry
even plastic tie-wraps which are cheap and quite effective for restraining 
violent people. Small-arms training is a must, and even
traffic policemen should be armed, because, during emergencies, they can be 
diverted to deal with serious law and order situations.
Besides, an armed policeman is a deterrent to anyone contemplating crime, and 
weapons by themselves instil fear. Lastly, have
quality and continuous training for the force.


The state has to increase the level of surveillance and monitoring of outside 
visitors and workforce. Modern computer infrastructure
coupled with electronic data sharing in the police network of the state is 
sorely lacking. Even today it is impossible for a citizen
to send an email to a police station. It is shocking to see that some police 
stations do not even have a caller ID facility on their
phones to identify callers, and this is a free facility of BSNL!


Is there enough funding available for all this infrastructure? You bet your 
bottom dollar there is, if our politicians curb all
their grandiose projects and stick to the basics. All these recommended 
measures are not designed to deal with the threat of
terrorism alone, but to improve the long-term law and order situation in the 
state.


Terrorists use three of the classical principles of war: surprise, 
concentration of force, and economy of effort. Of these, surprise
is always paramount for an attack to succeed. For a state like Goa, we have to 
be eternally vigilant to foil such attempts to create
death and mayhem, because the very existence of tourism and the livelihood of 
thousands of our brother Goans depends on it. This is
where the common man or the ordinary citizen is the main actor. The mind of 
every man on the street needs to be conditioned to
report any unusual occurrence or sighting. This calls for education and 
discipline right from the school level. If we do not learn
from our mistakes in Mumbai, we will be like those policemen in VT - running for cover.

Reply via email to