Re: glib@2.62.6 is vulnerable to CVE-2021-27218 and CVE-2021-27219

2021-03-11 Thread Léo Le Bouter
On Thu, 2021-03-11 at 06:23 -0500, Mark H Weaver wrote: > Mark H Weaver writes: > > > As I wrote in another thread: I'll backport the fixes for CVE-2021- > > 27218 > > and CVE-2021-27219 to our version of Glib, based on the backports > > already published by Ubuntu for Glib 2.56.4 and 2.64.4. >

Examples on why ungrafting is necessary

2021-03-11 Thread zimoun
Hi, Updating the package r-chemminer, it leads to this huge stack of grafts. To be concrete, it is 84 grafts for a “simple” R packages. On my machine, the grafting steps are longer than building (compiling and R dance). We definitively need a way to tackle this. Maybe when is in frozen state,

Re: glib@2.62.6 is vulnerable to CVE-2021-27218 and CVE-2021-27219

2021-03-11 Thread Mark H Weaver
Mark H Weaver writes: > As I wrote in another thread: I'll backport the fixes for CVE-2021-27218 > and CVE-2021-27219 to our version of Glib, based on the backports > already published by Ubuntu for Glib 2.56.4 and 2.64.4. Done in commit 21b3b755151028647081fe96d2992b3743531d71 on the 'master'

Release 1.2.1: python2-pylibmc and libmemcached

2021-03-11 Thread zimoun
Hi, Currently the package Python 2 python2-pylibmc fails to build because Cuirass fails to build the dependency libmemcached. However, this package libmemcached locally builds. Well, I think it fails because this test: --8<---cut here---start->8---

Re: Commit pushed to master with unauthorised signature

2021-03-11 Thread Taylan Kammer
On 11.03.2021 08:37, Maxime Devos wrote: > On Thu, 2021-03-11 at 00:15 +0100, Taylan Kammer wrote: >> [...] >> Damn, sorry about that. I assumed of course that an improperly signed >> commit would not be accepted, so I didn't pay any special mind. >> >> However, I also assumed that adding a new

Re: Release 1.2.1: Cuirass failed to build Haskell 179 packages

2021-03-11 Thread zimoun
Hi Tobias, On Thu, 11 Mar 2021 at 00:37, Tobias Geerinckx-Rice wrote: >> Attached, the list of the 180 ghc-* packages. > > I've started the builds on berlin except haddock. Not restarted: > none of these had failed. Judging by how quickly it finished I > think most of them had already been

Re: Release on April 18th?

2021-03-11 Thread Efraim Flashner
On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 12:58:50AM -0800, Chris Marusich wrote: > Hi Efraim, > > Efraim Flashner writes: > > > I wanted an Easy Win™ and I've pushed a branch wip-ppc64le-for-master, > > which cherry-picked (I think) all of the powerpc64le commits and > > adjusted them to work against master

Re: Commit pushed to master with unauthorised signature

2021-03-11 Thread Julien Lepiller
Also, make sure to install the pre-push hook, it should not have let you commit without checking your commits were properly recognised. Le 11 mars 2021 08:11:38 GMT-05:00, Taylan Kammer a écrit : >On 11.03.2021 08:37, Maxime Devos wrote: >> On Thu, 2021-03-11 at 00:15 +0100, Taylan Kammer

Re: Commit pushed to master with unauthorised signature

2021-03-11 Thread Tobias Geerinckx-Rice
Taylan, So if I needed to send you encrypted mail, I'd have to possess all of your current GPG keys and encrypt to all of them? Thanks for the heads-up ;-) I'm not sure if that's how GPG is supposed to work (‘who does’, you say? fair point). I do know that UIDs like ‘Jessie Doe

Re: Commit pushed to master with unauthorised signature

2021-03-11 Thread Leo Famulari
On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 12:15:19AM +0100, Taylan Kammer wrote: > Damn, sorry about that. I assumed of course that an improperly signed > commit would not be accepted, so I didn't pay any special mind. The security model is based on the client-side, i.e. `guix pull`. That way, we don't have to

Re: Commit pushed to master with unauthorised signature

2021-03-11 Thread Taylan Kammer
On 11.03.2021 20:16, Leo Famulari wrote: > On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 12:15:19AM +0100, Taylan Kammer wrote: >> Damn, sorry about that. I assumed of course that an improperly signed >> commit would not be accepted, so I didn't pay any special mind. > > The security model is based on the

glib vulnerable to CVE-2021-28153

2021-03-11 Thread Léo Le Bouter
Hello! CVE-2021-28153 11.03.21 23:15 An issue was discovered in GNOME GLib before 2.66.8. When g_file_replace() is used with G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION to replace a path that is a dangling symlink, it incorrectly also creates the target of the symlink as an empty file, which could

Re: Commit pushed to master with unauthorised signature

2021-03-11 Thread Taylan Kammer
On 11.03.2021 15:59, Tobias Geerinckx-Rice wrote: > Taylan, > > So if I needed to send you encrypted mail, I'd have to possess all of > your current GPG keys and encrypt to all of them?  Thanks for the > heads-up ;-)  I'm not sure if that's how GPG is supposed to work (‘who > does’, you say? fair

Re: GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix and security

2021-03-11 Thread Ricardo Wurmus
Léo Le Bouter writes: > I must come to the conclusion that using GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix right > now is just straight out insecure. I would advise we either, get rid of > GNOME, backport all individual security patches (they can be > numerous..), or upgrade GNOME to latest and keep up over

Re: glib vulnerable to CVE-2021-28153

2021-03-11 Thread Mark H Weaver
Hi Léo, Léo Le Bouter writes: > CVE-2021-2815311.03.21 23:15 > An issue was discovered in GNOME GLib before 2.66.8. When > g_file_replace() is used with G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION to > replace a path that is a dangling symlink, it incorrectly also creates > the target of the

Re: glib vulnerable to CVE-2021-28153

2021-03-11 Thread Léo Le Bouter
On Fri, 2021-03-12 at 01:47 -0500, Mark H Weaver wrote: > Thanks. I backported the upstream fix, and pushed it to 'master' in > commit 5a06b83fc92710c5846a83bbf49f0ea84c8ecec2. > > Mark Many thanks to you!! signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part

Re: GNU Guix (pull?) on i686 broke after zstd grafting

2021-03-11 Thread zimoun
Hi, On Thu, 11 Mar 2021 at 03:11, Léo Le Bouter wrote: > On Wed, 2021-03-10 at 11:37 +0100, Ludovic Courtès wrote: >> So I think there’s a genuine bug here. Could you take a look? At >> worst, we should skip the offending test on i686 (and perhaps >> ARMv7?). > > I pushed

Re: GNU Guix (pull?) on i686 broke after zstd grafting

2021-03-11 Thread Léo Le Bouter
On Thu, 2021-03-11 at 10:37 +0100, zimoun wrote: > This disable the complete test suite for all the architecture. I > have > not look into the details but it seems better to only disable the > offending test only the architecture affected. Yes it does that and it would be better not to but zstd

Re: GNU Guix (pull?) on i686 broke after zstd grafting

2021-03-11 Thread zimoun
On Thu, 11 Mar 2021 at 10:40, Léo Le Bouter wrote: > On Thu, 2021-03-11 at 10:37 +0100, zimoun wrote: >> This disable the complete test suite for all the architecture. I >> have >> not look into the details but it seems better to only disable the >> offending test only the architecture affected.

Re: GNU Guix (pull?) on i686 broke after zstd grafting

2021-03-11 Thread Léo Le Bouter
On Thu, 2021-03-11 at 10:58 +0100, zimoun wrote: > Well, IMHO 1) «not durable» could mean months and 2) disabling all > the > tests for all the architectures is wrong especially when only one > test > is failing for only one architecture. I know that, I was tired yesterday and didnt want to block

Re: I've rebased wip-ppc64le onto core-updates

2021-03-11 Thread Chris Marusich
Hi, I've rebased wip-ppc64le again just now onto the latest core-updates. There were no conflicts. Because I committed 5d2863dfe4613d5091e61800fcd5a48922c8ce4e and 001fc29b43fd0beb365d536774fae96624309413 directly to core-updates before rebasing, I removed some similar commits from wip-ppc64le

Re: GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix and security

2021-03-11 Thread Jonathan Brielmaier
Am 11.03.21 um 09:08 schrieb Ricardo Wurmus: Léo Le Bouter writes: I must come to the conclusion that using GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix right now is just straight out insecure. I would advise we either, get rid of GNOME, backport all individual security patches (they can be numerous..), or

Re: Release on April 18th?

2021-03-11 Thread Chris Marusich
Hi Efraim, Efraim Flashner writes: > I wanted an Easy Win™ and I've pushed a branch wip-ppc64le-for-master, > which cherry-picked (I think) all of the powerpc64le commits and > adjusted them to work against master WITHOUT affecting other > architectures. It looks like you modified "gnu: glibc:

Re: GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix and security

2021-03-11 Thread Raghav Gururajan
Hi Ricardo! Thanks for the update! Also, then reason GNOME work got messed up is that, in wip-desktop, [1] I was not just working gnome packages, but also its dependencies [2] Work involved not just updates, but also improvements. This kinda complicated the "update stuff" norm. I think

Re: GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix and security

2021-03-11 Thread Mark H Weaver
Hi Léo, I appreciate your recent work on Guix security. Thank you for that. Léo Le Bouter writes: > I must come to the conclusion that using GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix right > now is just straight out insecure. I would advise we either, get rid of > GNOME, backport all individual security patches

Re: GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix and security

2021-03-11 Thread Raghav Gururajan
Hi Ricardo! I don’t know if anyone is working on it right now, though. I was told months ago that Raghav Gururajan was working on GNOME upgrades as part of the wip-desktop branch, but my occasional questions for a status upgrade have gone unanswered. Raghav, please correct me if I’m mistaken.

Re: GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix and security

2021-03-11 Thread Léo Le Bouter
On Thu, 2021-03-11 at 03:18 -0500, Mark H Weaver wrote: > Hi Léo, Hello! > I appreciate your recent work on Guix security. Thank you for that. Very happy to catch up there as well for my own usage of GNU Guix as well! > Can you please substantiate this? What vulnerabilities do you know > of,

Re: glib@2.62.6 is vulnerable to CVE-2021-27218 and CVE-2021-27219

2021-03-11 Thread Mark H Weaver
Hi Léo, Thanks for bringing this to our attention. Léo Le Bouter writes: > Upstream does not provide fixes for the 2.62.x series so we need to > backport ourselves. One does not follow from the other. Besides upstream, there exist other competent organizations (such as Debian, Red Hat, and

Re: I've rebased wip-ppc64le onto core-updates

2021-03-11 Thread Léo Le Bouter
Just wanted to say, Chris, thank you so much for following up steadily on this powerpc64le-linux work. I have been testing your changes on and off but without getting to actually solving issues as I have been busy with other things unrelated with GNU Guix and also GNU Guix CVE patching now.

Re: Release on April 18th?

2021-03-11 Thread Chris Marusich
Vincent Legoll writes: > I'm all for that, what can I do to help ? Thank you for offering to help! > I don't have a Talos, though... > > So only cross- or emulated- stuff... > > Willing to help, but needs directions. I can probably also set you up with a temporary multi-core VM for testing,

Re: GNOME 3.34 in GNU Guix and security

2021-03-11 Thread Ricardo Wurmus
Raghav Gururajan writes: > Hi Ricardo! > >> I don’t know if anyone is working on it right now, though. I was told >> months ago that Raghav Gururajan was working on GNOME upgrades as part >> of the wip-desktop branch, but my occasional questions for a status >> upgrade have gone unanswered.