Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

Hi, On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 03:38:15PM +0200, Philip Homburg wrote: > The TTL hack is used in ND. Because ND uses GUAs (which it should have never done in the first place). > It strikes me as really bad for security to come > up with a different mechanism to achieve the same result for no

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

>>> Yeah, the so-called "TTL hack". > >> Care to explain why it would not be useful? > >At the time I wrote down Babel, I decided that given that we have link-local >addresses that are securely scoped to a single link, the TTL hack is not >necessary. The TTL hack is used in ND. It strikes me as

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

>Yeah, the so-called "TTL hack". Care to explain why it would not be useful? ___ homenet mailing list homenet@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

In your letter dated Wed, 26 Jul 2017 20:49:10 +0200 you wrote: >> Historically, a popular brand of router would forward packets with LL source >. > >"Historically"? Has this been fixed? I wanted to give them the benefit of the doubt. Sometimes they do fix a bug and I didn't want to spend any

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

> A trick used in some places, such as ND, is to require the receiver to check > that the hop limit is equal to 255. This ensures that the packet has not > been forwarded by any router (obviously the sender also has to send it with > a hop limit of 255). Yeah, the so-called "TTL hack". I

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

>Nasty comments on list, please, compliments by private mail ;-) A trick used in some places, such as ND, is to require the receiver to check that the hop limit is equal to 255. This ensures that the packet has not been forwarded by any router (obviously the sender also has to send it with a hop

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

> ...one might recommend starting with "an upper-layer security protocol" > such as CMS, COSE, JOSE or some other layer-3 encapsulation. We're planning to use DTLS for both HNCP and Babel. But the authentication mechanism is not our main concern. This being Homenet, we need to generate keys

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

> On Jul 25, 2017, at 1:27 PM, Juliusz Chroboczek wrote: > > Dear all, > > All security wizards are kindly requested to carefully read and if > necessary criticise the following section: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-homenet-babel-profile-02#section-4 Based on

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

On 25/07/2017 22:58, Stephen Farrell wrote: > I suggest asking the chairs to hit the "request directorate" review > (iirc only they can see that button?) for an early secdir review. Good idea - I've just done this. Ray ___ homenet mailing list

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

> 1) The first sentence seems to not say what to do if a packet comes > from a 1918 IPv4 address. Even if that's not supposed to happen, it > could be attempted. What's an implementation supposed to do then? Both HNCP and Babel use IPv6 for carrying control data. There's no way an IPv4 packet

Re: [homenet] Please review security considerations of draft-homenet-babel-profile

Hiya, I suggest asking the chairs to hit the "request directorate" review (iirc only they can see that button?) for an early secdir review. For myself, I've not read the draft yet (I will over the next few weeks) but have two questions while I'm here: 1) The first sentence seems to not say