Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-06 Thread Robert S. Hansel (RSH)
Dave,

You've touched on the one concern I have with using BPXMODEL to automatically 
set up a HOME for every user coupled with an automount policy that 
automatically creates the home file system. While it certainly is convenient, 
it potentially turns every ordinary CICS and IMS user into a telnet, ssh, or 
putty user. For this reason, the installations we've been working with to 
implement BPX.UNIQUE.USER have chosen to create a BPXMODEL user having an OMVS 
segment with PROGRAM(/bin/echo -or- /bin/false) and/or HOME that specifies a 
non-existing directory so as to deny use of telnet. A proper PROGRAM and HOME 
are assigned only to those relatively few individuals who need to access Unix 
files and directories, and this is done either manually or via ID provisioning 
scripts.

While this technique blocks use of telnet and the like, it does not address use 
of other TCPIP applications such as FTP. FTP does not use PROGRAM or HOME. Most 
installations have not been aware that BPX.DEFAULT.USER made every ordinary 
CICS and IMS user an FTP user, and this realization has only come about as a 
result of its replacement. To restrict use of FTP and other such applications, 
you need to employ APPL and/or SERVAUTH profiles.

I do not think it necessary to assign OMVS(NOUID) to all your ordinary users. 
This would simply trip them up and add to your administrative burden if they 
need legitimate access to a Unix service. Besides, they'd previously been 
getting such assess all along via BPX.DEFAULT.USER. But you don't want them all 
to be telnet users either. Properly securing both the data (as John McKown 
wisely points out) and system entry points is the better way to go.

P.S. While we're on the subject of FTP, now is a good time to review its 
JESINTERFACELEVEL configuration parameter and related RACF controls. See our 
RSH RACF Tips article on this topic:
http://www.rshconsulting.com/racftips/RSH_Consulting__RACF_Tips__April_2010.pdf

Regards, Bob

Robert S. Hansel
Lead RACF Specialist
RSH Consulting, Inc.
617-969-8211
www.linkedin.com/in/roberthansel
http://twitter.com/RSH_RACF
www.rshconsulting.com
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-Original Message-
Date:Fri, 5 Jun 2015 08:27:24 -0500
From:David Magee david.ma...@dillards.com
Subject: OMVS segments created on demand

Environment: running z/OS V2R1,  using profiles BPX.NEXT.USER and 
BPX.UNIQUE.USER, the BPXMODEL profile is set up correctly (with HOME as 
/u/racuid), and all users are automount manged under /u/ and the system 
dynamically creates and mounts the OMVS user's file system.

New userid is added to RACF with no OMVS segment and neither it nor its GROUP 
is in any access list. 

Using an ssh client, I attempt to sign in to my z/OS host and it succeeds.  The 
userid now has an OMVS segment and a mounted file system. 

That's great for adding new users that are members of our IT department, etc. 
But there are thousands of non-IT userids that exist in RACF for business 
purposes (users of CICS or IMS, etc.) and they have been in RACF for years with 
no OMVS segment. These days, a lot of that access is via browser or TN3270 
clients on a PC of some type. A PC where an ssh client or putty could be used 
to attempt to access the z/OS host. 

Have I missed something? This seems to be a security issue to me. Other than 
going out and adding OMVS(NOUID) to a LOT of RACF USER profiles (which disables 
the dynamic creation of a new OMVS segment), what else is available to control 
this? 

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Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-05 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On 2015-06-05, at 10:14, Jousma, David wrote:

 Unless I am missing something, how is it a security issue?   You had to logon 
 with an id and password.   It can access its own home directory, and was 
 created based on a template I am assuming you or someone in your shop setup.
  
o Agreed.  It might be a resource issue, but hardly if the default
  home directory is small.  What's one cylinder, nowadays, anyway?

o But in our environment, we have enough other UNIX network that
  we want to ensure that z/OS UIDs match other UNIX UIDs.  Can
  this be automated?  Perhaps with LDAP for z/OS?  (This might
  be a lot easier if it weren't for the asinine 7-character
  constraint.  USERIDALIASTABLE?)

 -Original Message-
 From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List On Behalf Of David Magee
 Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 9:27 AM
 
 Have I missed something? This seems to be a security issue to me. Other than 
 going out and adding OMVS(NOUID) to a LOT of RACF USER profiles ...
  
Must that be done individually?  Can't it be set as a default?

  (which disables the dynamic creation of a new OMVS segment), what else is 
 available to control this? 
  
Does that curtail use of FTP, either as server or client?  (But
that might be your intent anyway.)

-- gil

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Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-05 Thread Jousma, David
Have to have a segment to use any IP services on the mainframe side.   We are 
going through the conversion off of BPX.DEFAULT user now.   We just decided 
that everything will get a omvs segment.  Retro fitting the more critical stuff 
now, will turn on the autoassign soon to get the rest.

_
Dave Jousma
Assistant Vice President, Mainframe Engineering
david.jou...@53.com
1830 East Paris, Grand Rapids, MI  49546 MD RSCB2H
p 616.653.8429
f 616.653.2717



-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Paul Gilmartin
Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 12:58 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: OMVS segments created on demand

On 2015-06-05, at 10:14, Jousma, David wrote:

 Unless I am missing something, how is it a security issue?   You had to logon 
 with an id and password.   It can access its own home directory, and was 
 created based on a template I am assuming you or someone in your shop setup.
  
o Agreed.  It might be a resource issue, but hardly if the default
  home directory is small.  What's one cylinder, nowadays, anyway?

o But in our environment, we have enough other UNIX network that
  we want to ensure that z/OS UIDs match other UNIX UIDs.  Can
  this be automated?  Perhaps with LDAP for z/OS?  (This might
  be a lot easier if it weren't for the asinine 7-character
  constraint.  USERIDALIASTABLE?)

 -Original Message-
 From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List On Behalf Of David Magee
 Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 9:27 AM
 
 Have I missed something? This seems to be a security issue to me. Other than 
 going out and adding OMVS(NOUID) to a LOT of RACF USER profiles ...
  
Must that be done individually?  Can't it be set as a default?

  (which disables the dynamic creation of a new OMVS segment), what else is 
 available to control this? 
  
Does that curtail use of FTP, either as server or client?  (But that might be 
your intent anyway.)

-- gil

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Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-05 Thread Staller, Allan
snip
Unless I am missing something, how is it a security issue?   You had to logon 
with an id and password.   It can access its own home directory, and was 
created based on a template I am assuming you or someone in your shop setup.
/snip

Agreed!




snip
Environment: running z/OS V2R1,  using profiles BPX.NEXT.USER and 
BPX.UNIQUE.USER, the BPXMODEL profile is set up correctly (with HOME as 
/u/racuid), and all users are automount manged under /u/ and the system 
dynamically creates and mounts the OMVS user's file system.

New userid is added to RACF with no OMVS segment and neither it nor its GROUP 
is in any access list. 

Using an ssh client, I attempt to sign in to my z/OS host and it succeeds.  The 
userid now has an OMVS segment and a mounted file system. 

That's great for adding new users that are members of our IT department, etc. 
But there are thousands of non-IT userids that exist in RACF for business 
purposes (users of CICS or IMS, etc.) and they have been in RACF for years with 
no OMVS segment. These days, a lot of that access is via browser or TN3270 
clients on a PC of some type. A PC where an ssh client or putty could be used 
to attempt to access the z/OS host. 

Have I missed something? This seems to be a security issue to me. Other than 
going out and adding OMVS(NOUID) to a LOT of RACF USER profiles (which disables 
the dynamic creation of a new OMVS segment), what else is available to control 
this? 
/snip


This is the defined function of BPX.NEXT.USER/BPX.UNIQUE.USER
If you really want to restrict OMVS access, set the OMVS PGM to FALSE in the 
MODEL user id.


HTH,

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Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-05 Thread John McKown
On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 11:14 AM, Jousma, David david.jou...@53.com wrote:

 Unless I am missing something, how is it a security issue?   You had to
 logon with an id and password.   It can access its own home directory, and
 was created based on a template I am assuming you or someone in your shop
 setup.


​I can, sort of, see a possible security concern here. At present, to
access CICS, a RACF id must have a CICS segment. To access TSO, ​it must
have a TSO segment. A CICS user cannot log in to TSO if they don't have a
TSO segment. But, with the automatic UID  GID assignment, that CICS user
could, if they were knowledgeable enough, use PuTTY on their PC to connect
and have a z/OS UNIX prompt. Depending on the environment, they may then
have access to information to which they should not. Especially if the
security department in the past has been lax because they can only get
to stuff via CICS, so why bother with a lot of unnecessary data set
profiles?

At the very least, the unauthorized user could be running stuff for
learning purposes which would use up CPU and DASD resources (e.g. fill up
/tmp) and so impact performance and perhaps even billing (MSU increase).
Can _you_ say fork bomb? Also, it could cause other problems with
auditing. As in not having any reports for this sort of thing at present
because nobody uses it. So now the auditors and security people may need
to be involved. And that may have other, political, repercussions.


-- 
Yoda of Borg, we are. Futile, resistance is, yes. Assimilated, you will be.

My sister opened a computer store in Hawaii. She sells C shells down by the
seashore.
If someone tell you that nothing is impossible:
Ask him to dribble a football.

He's about as useful as a wax frying pan.

10 to the 12th power microphones = 1 Megaphone

Maranatha! 
John McKown

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Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-05 Thread Jousma, David
Unless I am missing something, how is it a security issue?   You had to logon 
with an id and password.   It can access its own home directory, and was 
created based on a template I am assuming you or someone in your shop setup.

_
Dave Jousma
Assistant Vice President, Mainframe Engineering
david.jou...@53.com
1830 East Paris, Grand Rapids, MI  49546 MD RSCB2H
p 616.653.8429
f 616.653.2717


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf 
Of David Magee
Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 9:27 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: OMVS segments created on demand

Environment: running z/OS V2R1,  using profiles BPX.NEXT.USER and 
BPX.UNIQUE.USER, the BPXMODEL profile is set up correctly (with HOME as 
/u/racuid), and all users are automount manged under /u/ and the system 
dynamically creates and mounts the OMVS user's file system.

New userid is added to RACF with no OMVS segment and neither it nor its GROUP 
is in any access list. 

Using an ssh client, I attempt to sign in to my z/OS host and it succeeds.  The 
userid now has an OMVS segment and a mounted file system. 

That's great for adding new users that are members of our IT department, etc. 
But there are thousands of non-IT userids that exist in RACF for business 
purposes (users of CICS or IMS, etc.) and they have been in RACF for years with 
no OMVS segment. These days, a lot of that access is via browser or TN3270 
clients on a PC of some type. A PC where an ssh client or putty could be used 
to attempt to access the z/OS host. 

Have I missed something? This seems to be a security issue to me. Other than 
going out and adding OMVS(NOUID) to a LOT of RACF USER profiles (which disables 
the dynamic creation of a new OMVS segment), what else is available to control 
this? 

 

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distribution or use of the contents of this information is prohibited. Please 
reply to the message immediately by informing the sender that the message was 
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Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-05 Thread David Magee
On Fri, 5 Jun 2015 12:09:42 -0500, John McKown john.archie.mck...@gmail.com 
wrote:

​I can, sort of, see a possible security concern here. At present, to
access CICS, a RACF id must have a CICS segment. To access TSO, ​it must
have a TSO segment. A CICS user cannot log in to TSO if they don't have a
TSO segment. But, with the automatic UID  GID assignment, that CICS user
could, if they were knowledgeable enough, use PuTTY on their PC to connect
and have a z/OS UNIX prompt. Depending on the environment, they may then
have access to information to which they should not. Especially if the
security department in the past has been lax because they can only get
to stuff via CICS, so why bother with a lot of unnecessary data set
profiles?

At the very least, the unauthorized user could be running stuff for
learning purposes which would use up CPU and DASD resources (e.g. fill up
/tmp) and so impact performance and perhaps even billing (MSU increase).
Can _you_ say fork bomb? Also, it could cause other problems with
auditing. As in not having any reports for this sort of thing at present
because nobody uses it. So now the auditors and security people may need
to be involved. And that may have other, political, repercussions.

John,
Thanks for the additional input. You added some points  that I was vaguely 
concerned about, but had not actually put words to in my haste to post what I 
consider to be a concern. Prior to the changes with the various BPX.*.USER 
profiles, I had not realized a user originally added to RACF for just CICS 
could acquire an session via ssh to the host. Therefore none of those userids 
have ever had OMVS(NOUID) added to them. I'm thinking that I might need to go 
alter all of those userids and our process for adding new userids to RACF needs 
to be changed.

Anyone else out there already doing something in this area or have plans to do 
so? 

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Re: OMVS segments created on demand

2015-06-05 Thread Tony's Outlook via Mozilla
I may be missing something obvious here but if in my past life I worked 
with many thousands of CICS only users none of whom had a CICS 
segment. Now if they did use their PC to acquire a z/OS UNIX prompt, 
then what?  They would have access to any ID(*) or UACC=notNONE dataset 
profiles.  I suppose they could submit a job whose last step submits 
itself 10 more time, etc etc.  Likewise FTP some datasets.


On 6/5/2015 4:05 PM, David Magee wrote:

On Fri, 5 Jun 2015 12:09:42 -0500, John McKown john.archie.mck...@gmail.com 
wrote:


​I can, sort of, see a possible security concern here. At present, to
access CICS, a RACF id must have a CICS segment. To access TSO, ​it must
have a TSO segment. A CICS user cannot log in to TSO if they don't have a
TSO segment. But, with the automatic UID  GID assignment, that CICS user
could, if they were knowledgeable enough, use PuTTY on their PC to connect
and have a z/OS UNIX prompt. Depending on the environment, they may then
have access to information to which they should not. Especially if the
security department in the past has been lax because they can only get
to stuff via CICS, so why bother with a lot of unnecessary data set
profiles?

At the very least, the unauthorized user could be running stuff for
learning purposes which would use up CPU and DASD resources (e.g. fill up
/tmp) and so impact performance and perhaps even billing (MSU increase).
Can _you_ say fork bomb? Also, it could cause other problems with
auditing. As in not having any reports for this sort of thing at present
because nobody uses it. So now the auditors and security people may need
to be involved. And that may have other, political, repercussions.


John,
Thanks for the additional input. You added some points  that I was vaguely 
concerned about, but had not actually put words to in my haste to post what I 
consider to be a concern. Prior to the changes with the various BPX.*.USER 
profiles, I had not realized a user originally added to RACF for just CICS 
could acquire an session via ssh to the host. Therefore none of those userids 
have ever had OMVS(NOUID) added to them. I'm thinking that I might need to go 
alter all of those userids and our process for adding new userids to RACF needs 
to be changed.

Anyone else out there already doing something in this area or have plans to do 
so?

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