--On Wednesday, May 19, 2004 01:38:21 +0200 jfcm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dear Måns,
your points would be well taken if we were talking of the same thing
We talk about the scalability and stability of a global name-to-number
system. Between us lies some disagreement on how this should be
Paul, and other rootserveroperators (good scrabble word :), what would
your answer/problem/arguments/... be if an ISP would decide to inject
routes to the root-servers into their local network and point these
request to a local dns cache(s), which would have the correct routes to
the the
Configure your client so it *requires* start-tls, and it will error out
if this attack is attempted. The same attack is possible against SASL,
if you remove DIGEST-MD5 and add PLAIN. The defense is to configure
your client to only allow non-plaintext SASL mechanisms.
--
Joe Hildebrand
On Tue, 18 May 2004, Paul Vixie wrote:
Paul, and other rootserveroperators (good scrabble word :), what would
your answer/problem/arguments/... be if an ISP would decide to inject
routes to the root-servers into their local network and point these
request to a local dns cache(s), which
thanks for your comments, Pekka!
wrt review subjects - we went a few rounds on this, and the current list is
probably a reasonable compromise between no list and exhaustive list -
it's short enough to make people notice that such as probably covers a
lot of stuff not mentioned. Good that you
We should also remember that the people don't comes just from US. When I
called they (not very kindly) suggested me if I can call back in 6 hours
(!) because registration services doesn't work so early. Incredible,
this is having fun and supporting international guests. Just quality,
hopefully
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- I talk of real world when you talk of the current (unsecure and
overloaded?) implementation of the current DNS architecture.
In what way overloaded? Do you have any pointers? Proof? Data?
The problem we face is an old and too large unique
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On 2004-05-19, at 00.54, Dean Anderson wrote:
On 18 May 2004, Paul Vixie wrote:
The result is a service which has never been down hard, not ever,
not for
any millisecond out of the last 15 years. This is strength by
diversity.
This isn't
Ken Hornstein wrote:
To be fair ... I've certainly experienced the same thing at non-US IETF
hotels (the one that sticks out in my mind is Adelaide, but I believe
there were others).
I remember setting my alarm for 3:00 AM to make a reservation for Oslo.
--
The reason there are no rooms available through the normal online
reservation system is that the IETF owns a huge room block. I tried
booking at the end of MARCH having a hunch it would be this hotel. Same
story back then.
It would of course be nice if you could enter a special code and get the
At 18:12 19/05/04, Kurt Erik Lindqvist wrote:
- I talk of real world when you talk of the current (unsecure and
overloaded?) implementation of the current DNS architecture.
In what way overloaded? Do you have any pointers? Proof? Data?
Dear Kurt Eric,
Let not play this, please. Either you think
This isn't really a serious resolution.
It smacks exactly of the Army's response to the red cross over abuse at
Abu Graib. For months, the Army has said it responded promptly to the Red
Cross' written complaints. Today, in the NY Times, it was revealed what
the response was: Tell us when you
On Tue, 18 May 2004, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:
After re-checking with legal counsel, I repeat what I said before, trying
to be as clear as possible:
Bouncing a message to the sender is NOT public defamation.
Not by itself, no. But that isn't the whole story of what happened. It is
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