Re: Request for community guidance on issue concerning a future meeting of the IETF

2009-09-21 Thread Alan DeKok
than Hiroshima. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

Re: AD review of draft-zorn-radius-pkmv1-04.txt

2009-08-17 Thread Alan DeKok
in previous RFCs. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

Re: AD review of draft-zorn-radius-pkmv1-04.txt

2009-08-17 Thread Alan DeKok
Glen Zorn wrote: Alan DeKok wrote: ... It would have been preferable ... To which I reply: So it seems that what you _really_ meant was ... well, screw 'em. I think there is a miscommunication here. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf

Re: AD review of draft-zorn-radius-pkmv1-04.txt

2009-07-27 Thread Alan DeKok
attributes are not security related. They either follow the RADIUS data model (int, IP address, etc.), or they are opaque data that RADIUS is simply transporting on the behalf of the other protocol. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https

Re: AD review of draft-zorn-radius-pkmv1-04.txt

2009-07-23 Thread Alan DeKok
interest. Maybe it should be a cisco VSA? If it's documented, sure. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

AD review of draft-zorn-radius-pkmv1-04.txt

2009-07-23 Thread Alan DeKok
the suggestion to use MS-MPPE-Send-Key into a mandatory requirement, and making it part of the specification. Alan DeKok. [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-design-07 [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-extended-attributes-08

Re: Comment on draft-ietf-radext-design-05.txt

2008-11-12 Thread Alan DeKok
Call... The guidelines document has seen multiple last calls, with last-minute comments at each one. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

Re: [HOKEY] Last Call: draft-ietf-hokey-erx (EAP Extensions for EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)) to Proposed Standard

2008-02-03 Thread Alan DeKok
/session, so that those keys can no longer be used to obtain network access. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

Re: [HOKEY] Last Call: draft-ietf-hokey-erx (EAP Extensions for EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)) to Proposed Standard

2008-01-31 Thread Alan DeKok
was that as it stands, it's unclear as to what that text means. Perhaps the EMSK document could define parameterized functions to calculate S. This document could then reference those functions. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org

Last Call: draft-ietf-hokey-erx (EAP Extensions for EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)) to Proposed Standard

2008-01-29 Thread Alan DeKok
, to avoid requiring people to read another document to discover how to calculate 'S'. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

Re: IETF last call on RADIUS GEOPRIV Document

2007-02-28 Thread Alan DeKok
On page 22, the second bullet point has a type, roaming is spell roamig, without the 'n'. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

Re: [Nea] UPDATED: WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

2006-10-27 Thread Alan DeKok
network traffic. Current RADIUS deployments *already* do ad-hoc posture assessment, there are a number of startups implementing this today. I don't see how NEA is such a big philosophical change from existing RADIUS practices. Alan DeKok. -- http://deployingradius.com - The web site

Re: [Nea] UPDATED: WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

2006-10-27 Thread Alan DeKok
in NEA is the desire to do *more* than what the current access protocols have to offer. Even if NEA was to leverage existing protocols to their fullest extent, we would *still* need a standardized way to exchange the data needed to implement the more part of NEA. Alan DeKok. -- http

Re: [Nea] UPDATED: WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

2006-10-27 Thread Alan DeKok
, authentication servers, administrators, etc. have all been around for years. The NEA names are new, because people are starting to realize that there are classes of behavior that cannot be adequately described using the existing names. Alan DeKok. -- http://deployingradius.com - The web site

Re: [Nea] UPDATED: WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

2006-10-27 Thread Alan DeKok
Alan DeKok. -- http://deployingradius.com - The web site of the book http://deployingradius.com/blog/ - The blog ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

Re: [Nea] Re: WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

2006-10-23 Thread Alan DeKok
- sensitive compliance certificates offering just the five points listed. Pretty much, yes. With the addition of a protocol to carry that information from the end point to elsewhere in the network. Alan DeKok. -- http://deployingradius.com - The web site of the book http

Re: [Nea] Re: WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

2006-10-13 Thread Alan DeKok
hosts in the network. No one can prevent a determined attacker from getting in. But by providing fewer hosts for him to attack, the attacks become less feasibly, and more visible. Alan DeKok. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org

Re: Appeal: Publication of draft-lyon-senderid-core-01 in conflictwith referenced draft-schlitt-spf-classic-02

2005-08-29 Thread Alan DeKok
proposal has an incompatible interpretation of SPF records, then that belief should be relevant to the discussion. Otherwise, any large company can DoS the IETF by publishing incompatible interpretations and/or implementations of proposals they don't like. Alan DeKok