I am wondering about the proposals made during this discussion.
1) It appears that some of the suggestions in this thread are about not
using the existing Internet infrastructure to route packets but rather
to either use local communication technology (e.g., short range radio)
or adhoc network
> From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?=
> Isn't the payload the important part to protect?
Ecrypting only the headers was a suggestion for the case where the routers
don't have enough spare crunch to encrypt the entire payload of every packet.
Whether that would do anything useful, o
Noel Chiappa wrote:
> There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
> traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
Making intermediate systems more intelligent is against
the end to end principle and assured to fail.
Considering that google, facebook, yahoo, etc., which are
en
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 2:20 PM, Noel Chiappa wrote:
> > From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?=
>
> > The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
> > get fast deployment to.
>
> Alas, now that I think about the practicalities I don't think the average
> r
> From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?=
> The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
> get fast deployment to.
Alas, now that I think about the practicalities I don't think the average
router has enough spare computing power to completely encrypt all
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 5:05 AM, Noel Chiappa wrote:
> > From: Scott Brim
>
> > The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
>
> There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
> traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
>
> The win in doing it in
On 7 Sep 2013, at 04:05, j...@mercury.lcs.mit.edu (Noel Chiappa) wrote:
>> From: Scott Brim
>
>> The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
>
> There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
> traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
>
> The win i
> From: Scott Brim
> The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
The win in doing it in the xTRs, of course, is that you don't have to go
change all the
On Sep 6, 2013 10:06 PM, "Noel Chiappa" wrote:
>
> > From: Scott Brim
>
> > LISP does nothing for decentralization. Traffic still flows
> > hierarchically
>
> Umm, no. In fact, one of LISP's architectural scaling issues is that it's
> non-hierarchical, so xTRs have neighbour fanouts t
> From: Scott Brim
> LISP does nothing for decentralization. Traffic still flows
> hierarchically
Umm, no. In fact, one of LISP's architectural scaling issues is that it's
non-hierarchical, so xTRs have neighbour fanouts that are much larger than
typical packet switches. In basic uni
On Sep 6, 2013 4:33 PM, "Roger Jørgensen" wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak wrote:
> >
> > One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to
reduce
> > centralization in the Internet's architecture. Right now, the way the
> > Internet works in practice for pri
hum…
i did work on a DNS architecture that can be fully disconnected from
the "Internet" and still work with nodes within the visible topology.
Needs serious rework of DNSSEC and has some assumptions about topology
discovery - but it might be a basis for starting some discussio
On 07/09/2013 08:55, Tim Chown wrote:
> On 6 Sep 2013, at 21:32, Roger Jørgensen wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak wrote:
>
>
>>> The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary
>>> network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between private
On 6 Sep 2013, at 21:32, Roger Jørgensen wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak wrote:
>> The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary
>> network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between private
>> individuals, it could make it much more expen
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