Re: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 27-nov-03, at 23:20, jfcm wrote: Some others have technical implications. I would like to quote some suggestions listed in the preparatory document, to get advices I could quote at the meeting or in its report. Also to list the alternative and additional suggestions some might do. Ok, I'm

Re[2]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
Iljitsch van Beijnum writes: In the multi6 (multihoming in IPv6) working group, as one of many proposals, we've been looking at putting a 64 bit host identifier in the bottom 64 bits of an IPv6 address. If such a host identifier is crypto-based (ie, a hash of a public key) then it is

Re: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Jari Arkko
Anthony, In the multi6 (multihoming in IPv6) working group, as one of many proposals, we've been looking at putting a 64 bit host identifier in the bottom 64 bits of an IPv6 address. If such a host identifier is crypto-based (ie, a hash of a public key) then it is possible to authenticate a

Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
Iljitsch van Beijnum writes: I guess not because I have no idea what you're talking about. There is a natural tendency to think that by dividing a 128-bit address field into two 64-bit fields, the address space is cut in half (or perhaps not diminished at all). However, in reality, dividing

Re[2]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
Jari Arkko writes: However, I do not believe these proposals consume any more address space than, say, manual or EUI-64 based address assignment. In order to use the full potential address space, you must devise a scheme that allocates every single combination of bits. The simplest scheme of

Re: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Jaap Akkerhuis
While parallel issues start being discussed and better understood at WSIS, we have next week a meeting on Internet national security, sovereignty and innovation capacity. Who is we in above paragraph? jaap

Re: Re[2]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Spencer Dawkins
From: Anthony G. Atkielski [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: IETF Discussion [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 7:52 AM Subject: Re[2]: national security In order to use the full potential address space, you must devise a scheme that allocates every single combination of bits. The simplest

Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Donald Eastlake 3rd
See RFC 1715, November 1994, and the endless discussions that appeared on a variety of mailing list about IPv6 addresses. Thanks, Donald == Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [EMAIL PROTECTED] 155 Beaver Street

Re: national security

2003-11-28 Thread John Kristoff
On Fri, 28 Nov 2003 14:47:41 +0100 Anthony G. Atkielski [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (or perhaps not diminished at all). However, in reality, dividing the field in this way may reduce the address space by a factor of as much as nineteen orders of magnitude. Again and again, engineers make this

Re: Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 28-nov-03, at 14:47, Anthony G. Atkielski wrote: I guess not because I have no idea what you're talking about. There is a natural tendency to think that by dividing a 128-bit address field into two 64-bit fields, the address space is cut in half (or perhaps not diminished at all). Ah, I see

Re[5]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
Donald Eastlake 3rd writes: See RFC 1715, November 1994, and the endless discussions that appeared on a variety of mailing list about IPv6 addresses. I guess the endless discussions didn't help, but that doesn't surprise me.

Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
Spencer Dawkins writes: Well, sure. And then you do routing aggregation how? I was describing the simplest scheme that ensures use of the entire address space, nothing more. I also deplore the waste of bits, and would love to hear alternatives... I've described alternatives before, but

Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Exactly. And the *reason* why IPv6 has 128 bit addresses is because the designers realized that such losses happen ... Such losses don't just happen. They are the result of incompetent engineering.

Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Exactly. And the *reason* why IPv6 has 128 bit addresses is because the designers realized that such losses happen, and ruled out 64-bit addresses because of that effect. Since those losses are not significantly diminished by doubling the address length, why bother?

Re[6]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
Iljitsch van Beijnum writes: Ah, I see what you mean now. However, the devision is a done deal as RFC 3513 mandates that all unicast IPv6 addresses except the ones starting with the bits 000 must have a 64-bit interface identifier in the lower 64 bits. This has some important advantages,

Re: Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 28 Nov 2003 20:06:26 +0100, Anthony G. Atkielski [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: 33 bits 8,589,934,592 times as many addresses. At current burn rates, it will take us some 20 years to go through the *current* free IPv4 space. And nobody's proposed any killer app that will take millions of

Re: Re[4]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 28 Nov 2003 18:40:53 +0100, Iljitsch van Beijnum said: a /48 further deminishes the available bits. The situation is most notable in the case of a home user, who would get a single IPv4 address but gets a /48 in IPv6. So we've quadrupled our address space (in bits) for a 50%

Re[6]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: OK, so a /48 has 50% more bits than a /32. On the other hand, I've heard no *major* problems with end users getting their /32 from their provider, and there's 65,536 more /48s. Also, remember that many end users are getting *multiple* IP's from their provider for

Crypto tokens in addresses

2003-11-28 Thread Christian Huitema
In the multi6 (multihoming in IPv6) working group, as one of many proposals, we've been looking at putting a 64 bit host identifier in the bottom 64 bits of an IPv6 address. If such a host identifier is crypto-based (ie, a hash of a public key) then it is possible to authenticate a host at

Re: national security

2003-11-28 Thread jfcm
At 15:20 28/11/03, Jaap Akkerhuis wrote: While parallel issues start being discussed and better understood at WSIS, we have next week a meeting on Internet national security, sovereignty and innovation capacity. Who is we in above paragraph? Hi! Jaap, we is a public open follow-up of

Re[2]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread jfcm
Dear Anthony, RFC 2373 permits 6 plans. The best would be to organize them by purpose. Not them all to do the same thing. Here we talk about national security not about intellectual elegance. When you are at war, you want your network to continue operating, not to depend on a numeration

Re[3]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Anthony G. Atkielski
jfcm writes: I am sure that many security officers or generals would feel unatease if they known their HQ IPv6 address can be just one unknown bit different from the IPv6 address of a ennemy computer. Nah ... security officers and generals--if they are competent--don't put their HQ computers

Re: Re[3]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 28 Nov 2003 23:20:20 +0100, Anthony G. Atkielski [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: jfcm writes: I am sure that many security officers or generals would feel unatease if they known their HQ IPv6 address can be just one unknown bit different from the IPv6 address of a ennemy computer. Nah

Re[3]: national security

2003-11-28 Thread jfcm
At 23:20 28/11/03, Anthony G. Atkielski wrote: I am sure that many security officers or generals would feel unatease if they known their HQ IPv6 address can be just one unknown bit different from the IPv6 address of a ennemy computer. Nah ... security officers and generals--if they are