Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-15 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Tobias Gondrom
wrote:

>  On 09/09/13 09:29, Eliot Lear wrote:
>
> We're talking.
>
> Eliot
>
>
> On 9/9/13 10:20 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>
>  So, has Bruce Schneier actually been invited to speak at the Technical 
> Plenary (or elsewhere) during the Vancouver IETF?  I recall him giving an 
> informative talk at least one previous Tech Plenary, and in light of his 
> 'proposal', if would be interesting to hear what he believes to be broken, 
> and what the IETF might be able to do to help fix it.
>
>   Ross.
>
>
>
>
>
> A small comment: actually I would like to (read: expect to) read what he
> (and others) believe to be broken _before_ the next Plenary and giving a
> speak there. And as specific and constructive as possible. That way we will
> be much more effective talking about issues at the plenary and starting
> stuff at WGs.
>

Quite, pointing out what is broken is exactly the type of contribution
Schneier could make. He is very good at spotting holes in security schemes.
I must say I am a little annoyed by his approach. He could deign to post on
the IETF lists himself rather than give oracular statements and then take
the credit.

Security is all about risk mitigation, not risk elimination, as I argued to
Bruce in the wake of his 15 risks of PKI article before he wrote Secrets
and Lies. Security design means tradeoffs and designing to mitigate the
chief risks. Unlike generals who can spend millions of tax payer dollars
making their operations room look like the bridge of the Enterprise, I have
to consider resources.

We do have several areas where we could make significant advances however:

1) Technical improvements to TLS such as recommending sites turn on PFS by
default and remove weak ciphers.

2) Stop sending authentication cookies in the clear whether or not they are
sent inside an encrypted tunnel.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-httpsession-01

3) Fix the missing 5% that stops people using secure email. We have PGP
that has mindshare and S/MIME that has deployment and both are too much
trouble for most IETF people to use, let alone the typical Internet user.
We can and should fix that.


Phill



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-15 Thread Tobias Gondrom
On 09/09/13 09:29, Eliot Lear wrote:
> We're talking.
>
> Eliot
>
>
> On 9/9/13 10:20 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> So, has Bruce Schneier actually been invited to speak at the Technical 
>> Plenary (or elsewhere) during the Vancouver IETF?  I recall him giving an 
>> informative talk at least one previous Tech Plenary, and in light of his 
>> 'proposal', if would be interesting to hear what he believes to be broken, 
>> and what the IETF might be able to do to help fix it.
>>
>>  Ross.
>>
>>
>>

A small comment: actually I would like to (read: expect to) read what he
(and others) believe to be broken _before_ the next Plenary and giving a
speak there. And as specific and constructive as possible. That way we
will be much more effective talking about issues at the plenary and
starting stuff at WGs.

Best regards, Tobias



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-09 Thread Erik Nordmark

On 9/5/13 8:28 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:


What we lack is not the technology, it is demand for deployment.


Exactly, and that is not actionable in the IETF.


Brian,

Some years back when we saw the lack of IPv6 deployment we started with 
some IPv4-free plenary time slots - eating our own dog food. Thus I 
think we can do something even on the deployment front.


Wouldn't it make sense for us to do something similar in this space? 
That would help iron out implementation and usability issues.


Regards,
   Erik




Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-09 Thread Eliot Lear
We're talking.

Eliot


On 9/9/13 10:20 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> So, has Bruce Schneier actually been invited to speak at the Technical 
> Plenary (or elsewhere) during the Vancouver IETF?  I recall him giving an 
> informative talk at least one previous Tech Plenary, and in light of his 
> 'proposal', if would be interesting to hear what he believes to be broken, 
> and what the IETF might be able to do to help fix it.
>
>   Ross.
>
>
>



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-09 Thread Ross Finlayson
So, has Bruce Schneier actually been invited to speak at the Technical Plenary 
(or elsewhere) during the Vancouver IETF?  I recall him giving an informative 
talk at least one previous Tech Plenary, and in light of his 'proposal', if 
would be interesting to hear what he believes to be broken, and what the IETF 
might be able to do to help fix it.

Ross.



Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-09 Thread Hannes Tschofenig

I am wondering about the proposals made during this discussion.

1) It appears that some of the suggestions in this thread are about not 
using the existing Internet infrastructure to route packets but rather 
to either use local communication technology (e.g., short range radio) 
or adhoc networks.


I am not sure how practical this is given how the majority of the 
applications on the Internet work today. This would obviously have 
severe impacts on these applications.


2) Regarding the delegation of encryption to network nodes: Are talking 
about an approach similar to Onion routing here?


While I agree that it would be good to provide protection at various 
layers I wonder whether you are trying to find solutions at the wrong 
layer in the protocol stack.


Ciao
Hannes

On 07.09.2013 15:20, Noel Chiappa wrote:

 >  From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?=

 >  The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
 >  get fast deployment to.

Alas, now that I think about the practicalities I don't think the average
router has enough spare computing power to completely encrypt all the traffic.

Whether or not encrypting just the source+dest addresses, and the sort+dest
port (conviently next to each other in one block) is enough to do much good,
and if the average router has enough spare crunch to do even that, is a good
question.

Noel




RE: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-08 Thread l.wood
...and a rebuttal from Jeff Schiller.

http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12497.html

Pass the popcorn.

Lloyd Wood
http://sat-net.com/L.Wood/



From: [email protected] [[email protected]] On Behalf Of 
[email protected] [[email protected]]
Sent: 08 September 2013 22:32
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: RE: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to  saving  
the Internet from the NSA

http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12325.html

That's a pretty damning indictment of the development of IPSec from John 
Gilmore.

Lloyd Wood
http://sat-net.com/L.Wood


RE: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-08 Thread l.wood

http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12325.html

That's a pretty damning indictment of the development of IPSec from John 
Gilmore.

Lloyd Wood
http://sat-net.com/L.Wood

Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-08 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?= 

> Isn't the payload the important part to protect?

Ecrypting only the headers was a suggestion for the case where the routers
don't have enough spare crunch to encrypt the entire payload of every packet.

Whether that would do anything useful, or whether analysis of the payload
could bypass that, making that limited step useless, I don't know.

Noel


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Ted Lemon
On Sep 7, 2013, at 9:39 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker  wrote:
> Nor does being open source provide any additional security, only review 
> provides security and it is hard enough getting people to review other 
> people's code when you pay them to do that. Expecting people to spend their 
> time reviewing other people's code for fun is naive. Kerberos had a major 
> architectural flaw that went unnoticed for over a decade.

On the contrary, I used to suffer through security audits on ISC DHCP code back 
in the day; people were doing this entirely on a volunteer basis.   I think 
it's incorrect to suggest that open source code doesn't get audited, and indeed 
it's likely that it gets audited more thoroughly and more usefully than a lot 
of closed source code.

It really depends on the setting.   My own company sells closed-source code; 
Andrea asked me the other night whether I thought there might be something 
scary in the code.   I thought about it, and concluded that it was unlikely, 
because we have a very small, tight team, and everybody sees all commits.   I 
think it would be difficult to suborn our code without everyone on the team 
knowing about it, and knowing who is on the team, that would quickly be the 
rest of the world.

An open source project with a less tight team, or a completely suborned team, 
might be far less trustworthy.   But another closed-source project might be far 
worse, if for example the repository were so big that nobody watched all 
commits, and the set of committers so large that it would be easy to suborn one 
of them.

I think the only rule you can go by here is caveat emptor, whether the code is 
open or closed.   You need to actually figure out who you are doing business 
with.

As for compilation versus source, that's a real issue, but open source is a 
clear win here, because you have both the input and the output, and you can 
compare them.   Here, an open source project with a clear build process that is 
replicable is a huge win over one that is complex and wonderful and 
non-replicable. Knowing quite a few of the latter, I hope to see improvements 
that some increased paranoia might yield as people flock to the more verifiable 
builds, and the projects with poor build processes fix them.



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread ned+ietf
> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Tim Bray  wrote:

> > How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety of
> > security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?
> >
> > *ducks*
> >

> And the user MUST compile them themselves from the sources?

> Nobody runs open source, (unless its an interpreted language). They run the
> compiled version and there is no infrastructure to check up on the
> compilation.

And don't forget:

   http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html

Ned


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Masataka Ohta
Noel Chiappa wrote:

> There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
> traffic on the inter-xTR stage.

Making intermediate systems more intelligent is against
the end to end principle and assured to fail.

Considering that google, facebook, yahoo, etc., which are
end systems that many victims are relying upon, are socially
compromised by USG, it can not protect the victims.

Worse, considering that services of Microsoft, Apple, etc. are
socially compromised by USG, end systems manufactured by
Microsoft, Apple, etc.  are totally unsafe.

As for secure end systems, PCs with open source UNIX are much
safer, even though USG can still use a lot of approaches to
compromise them.

Masataka Ohta


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Tim Bray  wrote:

> How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety of
> security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?
>
> *ducks*
>

And the user MUST compile them themselves from the sources?

Nobody runs open source, (unless its an interpreted language). They run the
compiled version and there is no infrastructure to check up on the
compilation.

Nor does being open source provide any additional security, only review
provides security and it is hard enough getting people to review other
people's code when you pay them to do that. Expecting people to spend their
time reviewing other people's code for fun is naive. Kerberos had a major
architectural flaw that went unnoticed for over a decade.





-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Patrik Fältström
On 7 sep 2013, at 14:33, Jorge Amodio  wrote:

> And who certify such agencies ?

Today the governments, and by mutual cooperation.

That said, I think we need a generic way to have oversight over _any_ process. 
Including oversight where the review is done under NDA.

In many countries that kind of oversight is by having (for example in Sweden) 
the Parliament appoint an independent body that do have insight in the police 
wiretap orders. Is that good enough? I do not know.

But that is sort of my point. If we manage to design how to ensure things are 
done as they are announced, then we have solved many of the problems.

   Patrik

> -J
> 
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 1:24 AM, Patrik Fältström  wrote:
> 
> 
> We do have a program in the world called Common Criteria. That certification 
> program includes CCRA (CC Recognition Agreement) that implies that countries 
> that run certification agencies agree that what is certified in one country 
> by one such certification agency is also viewed as certified in all countries.
> 
> 



Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Roger Jørgensen
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 2:20 PM, Noel Chiappa  wrote:
> > From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?= 
>
> > The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
> > get fast deployment to.
>
> Alas, now that I think about the practicalities I don't think the average
> router has enough spare computing power to completely encrypt all the traffic.

I don't really see that as an issue, it's just a matter of engineering
and building
the router in a way that they can do it. AFAIK I think most routers have the
options of being extended by dedicated encrypt-all-traffic tasks? Probably some
changes needed on the software layer to use the extension but that's doable.

It is also just the situation right now on the router side. In general
should our
current technology and processing power be up for the job if needed.


> Whether or not encrypting just the source+dest addresses, and the sort+dest
> port (conviently next to each other in one block) is enough to do much good,
> and if the average router has enough spare crunch to do even that, is a good
> question.

Isn't the payload the important part to protect? the content of the package?


-- 

Roger Jorgensen   | ROJO9-RIPE
[email protected]  | - IPv6 is The Key!
http://www.jorgensen.no   | [email protected]


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Jorge Amodio
And who certify such agencies ?

-J

On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 1:24 AM, Patrik Fältström  wrote:

>
>
> We do have a program in the world called Common Criteria. That
> certification program includes CCRA (CC Recognition Agreement) that implies
> that countries that run certification agencies agree that what is certified
> in one country by one such certification agency is also viewed as certified
> in all countries.
>
>
>


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?= 

> The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
> get fast deployment to.

Alas, now that I think about the practicalities I don't think the average
router has enough spare computing power to completely encrypt all the traffic.

Whether or not encrypting just the source+dest addresses, and the sort+dest
port (conviently next to each other in one block) is enough to do much good,
and if the average router has enough spare crunch to do even that, is a good
question.

Noel


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Roger Jørgensen
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 5:05 AM, Noel Chiappa  wrote:
> > From: Scott Brim 
>
> > The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
>
> There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
> traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
>
> The win in doing it in the xTRs, of course, is that you don't have to go
> change all the hosts, application by application: _all_ traffic, of any kind,
> from that site to any/all other sites which are encryption-enabled, will get
> a certain degree of confidentiality.
>
> Does this count as something the IETF can do reasonably quickly that will
> help somewhat? :-)

One easy fix then would be to have a MUST encrypt traffic between
xTRs, and that the encryption used MUST be strong. Are LISP@WG up for
the challenge? :-)

The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
get fast deployment to.



-- 

Roger Jorgensen   | ROJO9-RIPE
[email protected]  | - IPv6 is The Key!
http://www.jorgensen.no   | [email protected]


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-07 Thread Tim Chown
On 7 Sep 2013, at 04:05, [email protected] (Noel Chiappa) wrote:

>> From: Scott Brim 
> 
>> The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
> 
> There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
> traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
> 
> The win in doing it in the xTRs, of course, is that you don't have to go
> change all the hosts, application by application: _all_ traffic, of any kind,
> from that site to any/all other sites which are encryption-enabled, will get
> a certain degree of confidentiality.
> 
> Does this count as something the IETF can do reasonably quickly that will
> help somewhat? :-)

It certainly wouldn't hurt :)

Tim



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Patrik Fältström
On 7 sep 2013, at 00:02, Tim Bray  wrote:

> How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety of 
> security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?
> 
> *ducks*

Well, there is something in there that makes sense.

We do have a program in the world called Common Criteria. That certification 
program includes CCRA (CC Recognition Agreement) that implies that countries 
that run certification agencies agree that what is certified in one country by 
one such certification agency is also viewed as certified in all countries.

This makes it possible to go also with closed source items to one such 
certification agency and get it certified according to a specification.

Now, there are of course (at least) two weaknesses in this:

1. A certification must be against some certification testing. That is not an 
RFC, but the test itself might though refer to RFCs as for example "a router" 
is quite complicated and it is specifically important to know it does not do 
MORE things than what is specified in the certification testing specification.

2. How do one know that the certification agency is not lying.

But I think this (or something similar) is still the best we can do and/or 
possibly what we should do.

Also with open source software that "claim to implement gPGP" :-)

   Patrik



Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: Scott Brim 

> The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.

There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
traffic on the inter-xTR stage.

The win in doing it in the xTRs, of course, is that you don't have to go
change all the hosts, application by application: _all_ traffic, of any kind,
from that site to any/all other sites which are encryption-enabled, will get
a certain degree of confidentiality.

Does this count as something the IETF can do reasonably quickly that will
help somewhat? :-)

Noel


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Scott Brim
On Sep 6, 2013 10:06 PM, "Noel Chiappa"  wrote:
>
> > From: Scott Brim 
>
> > LISP does nothing for decentralization. Traffic still flows
> > hierarchically
>
> Umm, no. In fact, one of LISP's architectural scaling issues is that it's
> non-hierarchical, so xTRs have neighbour fanouts that are much larger than
> typical packet switches. In basic unicast mode, any xTR is always a direct
> neighbour to any other xTR; no xTR (in basic unicast mode, at least) ever
goes
> _through_ another xTR to get to a third xTR. All LISP basic unicast paths
> always include exactly two xTRs.
> The actual detailed paths do mimic the underlying network, of course: if
the
> network is hierarchical, the paths will be hierarchical, but if the
network
> were flat, the paths would be flat. (Or is that what you meant?)

Yup. The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.

> > you add the mapping system which is naturally hierarchical and
another
> > vulnerability.
>
> No more so than DNS; they are exactly parallel in their functional design.

Yes but DNS vulnerabilities have been covered elsewhere.

Cheers... Scott


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: Scott Brim 

> LISP does nothing for decentralization. Traffic still flows
> hierarchically

Umm, no. In fact, one of LISP's architectural scaling issues is that it's
non-hierarchical, so xTRs have neighbour fanouts that are much larger than
typical packet switches. In basic unicast mode, any xTR is always a direct
neighbour to any other xTR; no xTR (in basic unicast mode, at least) ever goes
_through_ another xTR to get to a third xTR. All LISP basic unicast paths
always include exactly two xTRs.

The actual detailed paths do mimic the underlying network, of course: if the
network is hierarchical, the paths will be hierarchical, but if the network
were flat, the paths would be flat. (Or is that what you meant?)

> you add the mapping system which is naturally hierarchical and another
> vulnerability.  

No more so than DNS; they are exactly parallel in their functional design.

Noel


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Scott Brim
On Sep 6, 2013 4:33 PM, "Roger Jørgensen"  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak  wrote:
> >
> > One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to
reduce
> > centralization in the Internet's architecture. Right now, the way the
> > Internet works in practice for private individuals, all your traffic
goes up
> > one pipe to your ISP. It's trivial to tap, since the tapping can be
> > centralized at the ISP end.
>
> excellent idea... any suggestion on how that should be done?
>
> Only one I can remember right now are LISP which sort of create a new
> network on top of our current network, and the EID-block drafts being
> worked on by some people (including me) tries to address how the
> IP-space of this "new" network can be done.

LISP does nothing for decentralization.  Traffic still flows
hierarchically,  encapsulated or not, and you add the mapping system which
is naturally hierarchical and another vulnerability.  The diameter of the
Internet has not increased much despite its growth, due to both
cross-connects and hubs. I don't think there is much more that can be done
practically to decentralize traffic flow.

Scott


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Scott Brim
On Sep 6, 2013 3:34 PM, "Dave Crocker"  wrote:
> To what end?  Their poor uptake clearly demonstrates some basic usability
deficiencies.  That doesn't get fixed by promotional efforts.

Or rather, as we've seen in other cases, people just don't see potential
benefits large enough to motivate them.


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread David Morris


On Fri, 6 Sep 2013, Ted Lemon wrote:

> On Sep 6, 2013, at 6:02 PM, Tim Bray  wrote:
> > How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety of 
> > security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?
> 
> So clearly we should do all our crypto on devices built out of 7400-series 
> logic.   Hm, where has my old wire-wrap tool gone?

Only if you purchased the 7400 stuff 20 years ago so that you know modern 
logic isn't hidden in the 74xx case.

Seriously though, NSA makes a nice villan, but much of our hardware is 
manufactured in counties with fewer restraints than the NSA when it
comes the right to privacy, etc. Wouldn't suprise me that my major
brand router has sniffers from more than one country's security agency.


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Dave Crocker

On 9/6/2013 4:19 PM, Scott Brim wrote:

On Sep 6, 2013 3:34 PM, "Dave Crocker" mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
 > To what end?  Their poor uptake clearly demonstrates some basic
usability deficiencies.  That doesn't get fixed by promotional efforts.

Or rather, as we've seen in other cases, people just don't see potential
benefits large enough to motivate them.



Perhaps.  But fundamental usability deficiencies can move these issues 
into the realm that warrants quoting Marshall Rose: "With enough thrust, 
pigs /can/ fly."  Only in this case, it's more like "for some issues, no 
amount of thrust can get this pig into the air."


In other words, considering the issues only in terms of user motivation 
ignores actual basic usability design deficiencies.


Currently, problems with security usability include:

   0. Systems providing very poor information

   1. Systems providing information at very poor times

   2. Users having to know too much

   3. Users having to do too much

Working on user motivation can help a little bit with #3 and none of the 
rest.  It can't help with all of #3 because there are cognitive limits 
that frequently apply.


d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread SM

Hi Tim,
At 15:02 06-09-2013, Tim Bray wrote:
How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety 
of security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?


A BCP is not needed to do that.  It is already doable "but we [1] 
know that you [2] are not going to do it".


Speaking of open source, 
http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c?rev=141&view=diff&r1=141&r2=140&p1=openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c&p2=/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c



*ducks*


Where?  I don't see any ducks. :-)

Regards,
-sm

1. The word "we" is used in a general context.
1. The word "you" is used in a general context. 



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Tim Bray
How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety of
security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?

*ducks*


On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 2:34 PM, David Conrad  wrote:

> On Sep 6, 2013, at 2:06 PM, Måns Nilsson 
> wrote:
> >> Right, because there's no way the NSA could ever pwn the DNS root key.
> > It is probably easier for NSA or similar agencies in other countries
> > to coerce X.509 root CA providers that operate on a competetive market
> > than fooling the entire international DNS black helicopter cabal.
>
> Probably the wrong place to apply the paranoia. How much do you trust the
> AEP Keyper HSM tamperproof blackbox hasn't had a backdoor installed into it
> at the factory?
>
> > Audit and open source seem to be good starting points.
>
> Where feasible, sure. Unfortunately, the rabbit hole is deep.  How many
> billions of transistors are there in commodity chips these days?
>
> Regards,
> -drc
>
>


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Ted Lemon
On Sep 6, 2013, at 6:02 PM, Tim Bray  wrote:
> How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety of 
> security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?

So clearly we should do all our crypto on devices built out of 7400-series 
logic.   Hm, where has my old wire-wrap tool gone?



Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread manning bill
hum…

i did work on a DNS architecture that can be fully disconnected from 
the "Internet" and still work with nodes within the visible topology.

Needs serious rework of DNSSEC and has some assumptions about topology 
discovery -  but it might be a basis for starting some discussion

on decentralization of that part of the centralized DNS.


/bill



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Måns Nilsson
Subject: Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving 
the Internet from the NSA Date: Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 11:46:17AM -0400 Quoting 
Ted Lemon ([email protected]):
> On Sep 6, 2013, at 3:25 AM, Måns Nilsson  wrote:
> > I do think that more distributed technoligies like DANE play an important
> > rôle here.
> 
> Right, because there's no way the NSA could ever pwn the DNS root key.

It is probably easier for NSA or similar agencies in other countries
to coerce X.509 root CA providers that operate on a competetive market
than fooling the entire international DNS black helicopter cabal. But
that is -- I admit -- an educated guess, based on personal relations.

> What we should probably be thinking about here is:
> 
>   - Mitigating single points of failure (IOW, we _cannot_ rely
> on just the root key)

In effect, DANE exchanges one trust model for another. I happen
to believe that the damage risque is lower with DNSSEC + DANE than the
traditional "any CA can issue a certificate for any domain name" setup.

>   - Hybrid solutions (more trust sources means more work to
> compromise)
>   - Sanity checking (if a key changes unexpectedly, we should
> be able to notice)
>   - Multiple trust anchors (for stuff that really matters, we
> can't rely on the root or on a third party CA)
>   - Trust anchor establishment for sensitive communications
> (e.g. with banks)

agree on all. 
 
> The threat model isn't really the NSA per se—if they really want to bug you, 
> they will, and you can't stop them, and that's not a uniformly bad thing.   
> The problem is the breathtakingly irresponsible weakening of crypto systems 
> that has been alleged here, and what we can do to mitigate that.   Even if we 
> aren't sure that it's happened, or precisely what's happened, it's likely 
> that it has happened, or will happen in the near future.  We should be 
> thinking in those terms, not crossing our fingers and hoping for the best.
 
Audit and open source seem to be good starting points. 

-- 
Måns Nilsson primary/secondary/besserwisser/machina
MN-1334-RIPE +46 705 989668
Yow!  It's some people inside the wall!  This is better than mopping!


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread SM

Hi Dean,
At 11:31 06-09-2013, Dean Willis wrote:
What if they didn't say they were NSA guys, but just discretely 
worked a weakness into a protocol? What if they were a trusted 
senior member of the community?


Trust does not work well without accountability.  There is less to 
worry about if you do not implicitly trust senior members of the community.


Regards,
-sm 



Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Brian E Carpenter
On 07/09/2013 08:55, Tim Chown wrote:
> On 6 Sep 2013, at 21:32, Roger Jørgensen  wrote:
> 
>> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak  wrote:
> 
> 
>>> The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary
>>> network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between private
>>> individuals, it could make it much more expensive to mount large-scale
>>> traffic interception attacks.
>> Think there are work being done on the topic? However, how are you
>> going to interconnect all of this private peerings? It sort of imply
>> that everyone need to have their own netblock they can exchange with
>> others.
> 
> Mobile IPv6 gives one way to run multiple devices in one subnet. Someone 
> needs to be the HA though. And/or if future homes have multiple /64's, it's 
> not infeasible to dedicate one or more to virtual/overlay LANs.

It serves no purpose as long as there's an underlying customer/provider
relationship, because it's the provider that is suborned by the government
agency.

 Brian



RE: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread George, Wes
+Bruce Schneier (at least the email address published in his latest I-D), since 
he should be at least aware of the discussion his callout has generated.

> -Original Message-
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of
> Ted Lemon
>
> On Sep 5, 2013, at 8:46 PM, Lucy Lynch  wrote:
> >> I'd like to share the challenge raised by Bruce Schneier in:
>
> I thought it was a great call to action.   Is Bruce coming to Vancouver?

[WEG] Sounds to me like he just volunteered to be the keynote for the Tech 
Plenary.

Wes George

Anything below this line has been added by my company's mail server, I have no 
control over it.
-


This E-mail and any of its attachments may contain Time Warner Cable 
proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to 
copyright belonging to Time Warner Cable. This E-mail is intended solely for 
the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not 
the intended recipient of this E-mail, you are hereby notified that any 
dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relation to the 
contents of and attachments to this E-mail is strictly prohibited and may be 
unlawful. If you have received this E-mail in error, please notify the sender 
immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this E-mail and 
any printout.


Re: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Tim Chown
On 6 Sep 2013, at 21:32, Roger Jørgensen  wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak  wrote:


>> The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary
>> network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between private
>> individuals, it could make it much more expensive to mount large-scale
>> traffic interception attacks.
> 
> Think there are work being done on the topic? However, how are you
> going to interconnect all of this private peerings? It sort of imply
> that everyone need to have their own netblock they can exchange with
> others.

Mobile IPv6 gives one way to run multiple devices in one subnet. Someone needs 
to be the HA though. And/or if future homes have multiple /64's, it's not 
infeasible to dedicate one or more to virtual/overlay LANs.

Tim



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread David Conrad
On Sep 6, 2013, at 2:06 PM, Måns Nilsson  wrote:
>> Right, because there's no way the NSA could ever pwn the DNS root key.
> It is probably easier for NSA or similar agencies in other countries
> to coerce X.509 root CA providers that operate on a competetive market
> than fooling the entire international DNS black helicopter cabal. 

Probably the wrong place to apply the paranoia. How much do you trust the AEP 
Keyper HSM tamperproof blackbox hasn't had a backdoor installed into it at the 
factory?

> Audit and open source seem to be good starting points. 

Where feasible, sure. Unfortunately, the rabbit hole is deep.  How many 
billions of transistors are there in commodity chips these days?

Regards,
-drc



signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Spencer Dawkins

On 9/6/2013 11:38 AM, Noel Chiappa wrote:

 > From: Spencer Dawkins 

 > I have to wonder whether weakening crypto systems to allow pervasive
 > passive monitoring by "national agencies" would weaken them enough for
 > technologically savvy corporations to monitor their competitors, for
 > instance.

More importantly, if crypto systems are weaked so that the intelligence
agencies of the 'good guys' can monitor them, they're probably weak enough
that the intelligence agencies of the 'bad guys' can monitor them too.

The smarts level on the other side should not be under-estimated, although I
fear this often happens.


Noel,

I agree that's important (and perhaps "more important"), and that 
underestimating 'bad guys' is all too tempting, and all too easy.


I thought to call attention to the opportunities for commercial leakage, 
from everything from trade secrets to medical records, if our strong 
crypto turns out to contain intentional weaknesses.


We have plenty of potential exposures to worry about, depending on who's 
likely to be interested in seeing what we're trying to hide.


Spencer


decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Roger Jørgensen
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak  wrote:
>
> One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to reduce
> centralization in the Internet's architecture. Right now, the way the
> Internet works in practice for private individuals, all your traffic goes up
> one pipe to your ISP. It's trivial to tap, since the tapping can be
> centralized at the ISP end.

excellent idea... any suggestion on how that should be done?

Only one I can remember right now are LISP which sort of create a new
network on top of our current network, and the EID-block drafts being
worked on by some people (including me) tries to address how the
IP-space of this "new" network can be done.

But there must be other ways than through LISP-alike way of doing it?


> The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary
> network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between private
> individuals, it could make it much more expensive to mount large-scale
> traffic interception attacks.

Think there are work being done on the topic? However, how are you
going to interconnect all of this private peerings? It sort of imply
that everyone need to have their own netblock they can exchange with
others.



-- 

Roger Jorgensen   | ROJO9-RIPE
[email protected]  | - IPv6 is The Key!
http://www.jorgensen.no   | [email protected]


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Keith Moore
On 09/06/2013 11:46 AM, Ted Lemon wrote:
> The threat model isn't really the NSA per se—if they really want to bug you, 
> they will, and you can't stop them, and that's not a uniformly bad thing. 

I disagree, or at least, I think that your statement conflates two
different threat models.

One kind of threat is that the NSA will bug you specifically.   And yes,
if they consider it important to do so, they very likely will.  There is
almost certainly some vulnerability in your hardware or software or
physical security, and they have lots of resources that can be invested
in finding it.

The other kind of threat, is that NSA will bug you because it's
currently really easy for them to engage in mass surveillance.   Most
traffic isn't even encrypted; and at least some of what is encrypted is
trivially broken.

I don't think IETF can (or should) do much about the former kind of
threat.   Most of it is out of our scope.But we should be working
hard to address the latter kind of threat.

Keith



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Ted Lemon
On Sep 6, 2013, at 2:31 PM, Dean Willis  wrote:
> What if they didn't say they were NSA guys, but just discretely worked a 
> weakness into a protocol? What if they were a trusted senior member of the 
> community?

If we have trusted senior members making false statements that can be shown to 
be false, then they won't get consensus if we do our consensus process right.   
So if this has happened in the past, you should be able to find evidence that 
it has happened.  If you can't find such evidence, I think it's harmful to 
assume that it has happened.   The IETF process is in principle extremely 
robust in the face of this kind of behavior.   I encourage you to go looking, 
but don't descend into madness.



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Dave Crocker

On 9/6/2013 11:42 AM, Dean Willis wrote:

On Sep 6, 2013, at 9:55 AM, Dave Crocker  wrote:

In other words, the IETF needs to assume that we don't know what
will work for end users and we need to therefore focus more on
processing by end /systems/ rather than end /users/.


But we are also end users.


Mostly we are /not/.

That is... of course we are end-users.  And to the extent that the
target market for something is users similar to "us", then fine.

The problem is when the target market is mass-market end-users.  The 3-4
billion other folk who don't participate in the IETF.  The average IETF
participant is  wildly different from the average mass-market end-user,
in many different ways.  Very many.



So, we could eat our own dogfood,


Oh we definitely /should/ eat our own dogfood.  If the stuff we produce
is not even usable for us, well then...  And I think we can learn quite
a bit of how to improve things.

But my deeper point is that that is nowhere close to sufficient, for
demonstrating mass-market usability or efficacy.




On 9/6/2013 10:25 AM, Michael Richardson wrote:

1) We could be telling the public about the protocols that we
designed 10, 15, and even 20 years ago. Some of which even have
rather widespread implementation, but seem to have zero use. (S/MIME
is in every copy of Outlook and Thunderbird, AFAIK)


To what end?  Their poor uptake clearly demonstrates some basic 
usability deficiencies.  That doesn't get fixed by promotional efforts.




What would the spam situation be like if 90% of emails were
regularly signed back in 1999?


You mean the way that postal mail and telephone calls require you to 
authenticate yourself personally before you can use them?


Or the way you have to authenticate yourself before you can buy anything 
in a store?


There are tradeoffs here and they can have very considerable downsides.

d/

--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Dean Willis

On Sep 6, 2013, at 9:55 AM, Dave Crocker  wrote:
> 
> In other words, the IETF needs to assume that we don't know what will work 
> for end users and we need to therefore focus more on processing by end 
> /systems/ rather than end /users/.

But we are also end users. I recall being laughed at 6 or 7 years ago when I 
suggested that email security implementations would "get better" if the IETF 
insisted on using them for our email. My proposal at the time was, that since 
we thought S/MIME was the cat's whiskers, we should set up a CA and issue free 
end-user certs to all participants. Messages to IETF lists would require 
signing with said certs to be considered valid. This would make it easy to 
eliminate most of our SPAM.

So, we could eat our own dogfood, with whatever anti-surveillance mechanisms we 
specify. I am positive that would make things more end-user usable, over time.

--
Dean

Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Arturo Servin

   
On 9/6/13 4:47 AM, Adam Novak wrote:
> On 09/05/2013 08:19 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>> Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.
>>
>> I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users should
>> be doing; still less about what legislators should or shouldn't be
>> doing. I care about all those things, but the question here is what
>> standards or informational outputs from the IETF are needed, in addition
>> to what's already done or in the works.
>>
>> I don't intend that to be a rhetorical question.
>>
>>   Brian
>
> One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to
> reduce centralization in the Internet's architecture. Right now, the
> way the Internet works in practice for private individuals, all your
> traffic goes up one pipe to your ISP. It's trivial to tap, since the
> tapping can be centralized at the ISP end.
And all our security is based in single points that are easy to abuse.

/as


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Spencer Dawkins

On 9/6/2013 10:46 AM, Ted Lemon wrote:
The threat model isn't really the NSA per se—if they really want to 
bug you, they will, and you can't stop them, and that's not a 
uniformly bad thing. The problem is the breathtakingly irresponsible 
weakening of crypto systems that has been alleged here, and what we 
can do to mitigate that. Even if we aren't sure that it's happened, or 
precisely what's happened, it's likely that it has happened, or will 
happen in the near future. We should be thinking in those terms, not 
crossing our fingers and hoping for the best. 


IIUC, I'm with Ted.

We should be thinking in those terms, and thinking broadly.

I have to wonder whether weakening crypto systems to allow pervasive 
passive monitoring by "national agencies" would weaken them enough for 
technologically savvy corporations to monitor their competitors, for 
instance.


Spencer


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Dean Willis

On Sep 6, 2013, at 8:07 AM, Eliot Lear  wrote:

> 
> On 9/6/13 3:04 PM, Martin Sustrik wrote:
>> So, what if an NSA guys comes in and proposes backdoor to be added to
>> a protocol? Is it even a valid interest? Does IETF as an organisation
>> have anything to say about that or does it remain strictly neutral?
>> 
> It's happened before and we as a community have said no.  See RFC 2804.

What if they didn't say they were NSA guys, but just discretely worked a 
weakness into a protocol? What if they were a trusted senior member of the 
community?

That way lies madness -- but it is a madness we must contemplate. Broader REAL 
consensus, rather than apathetic agreement with a single contributor's 
assertions is probably the right way to go.

That means an increasing thrust on educating IETFers, broadly, about security 
issues. Not just the math, but the whole op-sec envelope.

--
Dean

Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Hannes Tschofenig

Dave,

On 06.09.2013 18:58, Dave Crocker wrote:

On 9/6/2013 8:34 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:

On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 08:20:17AM -0700,
Dave Crocker  wrote
a message of 21 lines which said:


We currently do not have a concise catalog the basic 'privacy'
threats and their typical mitigations, appropriate for concern with
IETF protocols.


What about RFC 6973?



It certainly provides useful background. As such, it's an excellent
starting point for the topic.

However it is not concise nor does it offer threat templates nor design
templates.


The document actually contains a list of common threats that we found 
applicable in the Internet protocol standardization context.


The design template is essentially the questions listed in the 
guidelines section.


Unfortunately, like in security the story is not that easy that you can 
give simple recommendation. As a protocol designer, you unfortunately 
have to think a bit.



It also doesn't define privacy...


It does define privacy but not in a single sentence.


Ciao
Hannes



d/






Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Abdussalam Baryun
On 9/6/13, Brian E Carpenter  wrote:
>
> Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.
>
> I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users should
> be doing; still less about what legislators should or shouldn't be
> doing. I care about all those things, but the question here is what
> standards or informational outputs from the IETF are needed, in addition
> to what's already done or in the works.

I think we need to rethink the way we do protocols or the way security
WGs do standards. It will be easy to blame/ask the Security Area
participants/experts of what was not done or what should been done,
however, this area seems more as a cross-area, and I suggest that the
IETF re-thinks or re-structures the Security area and/or its WGs'
Charteres.

AB


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Hannes Tschofenig

On 06.09.2013 18:53, SM wrote:

At 06:04 06-09-2013, Martin Sustrik wrote:

So, what if an NSA guys comes in and proposes backdoor to be added to
a protocol? Is it even a valid interest? Does IETF as an organisation
have anything to say about that or does it remain strictly neutral?


Would anyone notice it on a Last Call?  Would anyone say something about
it?  I doubt that.  Ted Lemon said it nicely: "we should pay attention".



You will have to interpret what a backdoor in a protocol would be.
I guess that would be a weaker security feature, delaying work or
starting some other work that plays in their favor.

That would, however, be a bit tricky.

In some sense this is not really needed by them since we have lots of 
companies who already argue for weaker security properties, for a 
variety of different reasons.


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Adam Novak
You're right that a flat mesh is not the best topology for
long-distance communication, especially with current routing
protocols, which require things like global lists of all routeable
prefixes.

On the protocol front, I suggest that the IETF develop routing
protocols that can work well in a flat mesh topology. Parallelizing
traffic streams over many available routes, so it all doesn't try to
take the shortest path, would appear to be a particularly important
feature, as would preventing all of a node's links from being swamped
by through traffic that other nodes want it to route.

The problem with long-distance traffic over flat mesh networks is less
with throughput (if everything isn't taking the shortest path) than
with the latencies involved in sending traffic over a very large
number of hops. I think the solution there is to send traffic that's
leaving your local area over the existing (tapable) long-distance
infrastructure. The idea is to make tapping expensive, not impossible.

There's also the point to be made that current traffic patterns depend
to a significant extent on current Internet architectural decisions.
If everyone had a gigabit connection to their neighbors, but only a 10
megabit uplink to route long-distance traffic over, they might find a
use for all that extra local bandwidth.

On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 7:22 AM, Noel Chiappa  wrote:
> > One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to
> > reduce centralization in the Internet's architecture.
> > ...
> > [If] The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the
> > necessary network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between
> > private individuals, it could make it much more expensive to mount
> > large-scale traffic interception attacks.
>
> I'm not sure this is viable (although it's an interesting concept).
>
> With our current routing tools, switching to a flat mesh, as opposed to the
> current fairly-structured system, would require enormous amounts of
> configuration/etc work on the part of smaller entities.
>
> Also, traffic patterns being what they are (e.g. most of my traffic goes
> quite a distance, and hardly any to things close by), everyone would wind up
> handling a lot of 'through' traffic - orders of magnitude more than their
> current traffic load.
>
> Noel


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Michael Richardson

Brian E Carpenter  wrote:
>> I think we all knew NSA was collecting the data.  Why didn't we do
>> something about it sooner?  Wasn't it an emergency when the PATRIOT
>> act was passed?  We certainly thought it was an emergency back in the
>> days of Skipjack, but then they convinced us we'd won.  Turns out they
>> just went around us.

> Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.

1) We could be telling the public about the protocols that we designed 10, 15,
   and even 20 years ago. Some of which even have rather widespread
   implementation, but seem to have zero use.
   (S/MIME is in every copy of Outlook and Thunderbird, AFAIK)

What would the spam situation be like if 90% of emails were regularly
signed back in 1999?  Yes, and DKIM can sign message bodies now too.
We should be telling people about it.

2) Use this stuff ourselves

--
Michael Richardson , Sandelman Software Works




pgpmBrxgfskmQ.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread SM

Hi Vinayak,
At 01:13 06-09-2013, Vinayak Hegde wrote:
It is tragic if the community does understand strong encryption is 
essential in many cases (with the caveat that it is not a panacea 
for all security breaches) As for raising issues at the last-call. 
Why not ? The last-call is no different than any other mailing list 
discussion or going to the mic in a physical meeting. (Other than 
the urgency of having the last chance to comment ?)


The Last Call is different from going to the microphone in a physical 
meeting.  Fancy speeches at the microphone are impressive.  It takes 
more work to identify issues and explain why it is or can be a 
problem.  Martin Sustrik asked:


At 06:04 06-09-2013, Martin Sustrik wrote:
So, what if an NSA guys comes in and proposes backdoor to be added 
to a protocol? Is it even a valid interest? Does IETF as an 
organisation have anything to say about that or does it remain 
strictly neutral?


Would anyone notice it on a Last Call?  Would anyone say something 
about it?  I doubt that.  Ted Lemon said it nicely: "we should pay attention".


Regards,
-sm 



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Dave Crocker

On 9/6/2013 8:34 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:

On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 08:20:17AM -0700,
  Dave Crocker  wrote
  a message of 21 lines which said:


We currently do not have a concise catalog the basic 'privacy'
threats and their typical mitigations, appropriate for concern with
IETF protocols.


What about RFC 6973?



It certainly provides useful background.  As such, it's an excellent 
starting point for the topic.


However it is not concise nor does it offer threat templates nor design 
templates.


It also doesn't define privacy...

d/


--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Dave Crocker



There are a lot more threats to privacy than just the NSA


We currently do not have a concise catalog the basic 'privacy' threats 
and their typical mitigations, appropriate for concern with IETF 
protocols.  In effect, every new protocol effort must start with a blank 
sheet, and invent its own list of threats and possible protections 
against them.


One common outcome from this is that we tend to think of very localized 
mechanisms, rather than end-to-end.  So we assume a model of things 
being one-hop or we implicitly trust intermediaries.  (Hint, the web is 
often not 1-hop, what with proxies, etc...)


We need privacy templates for protocol design.

d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Ted Lemon
On Sep 6, 2013, at 3:25 AM, Måns Nilsson  wrote:
> I do think that more distributed technoligies like DANE play an important
> rôle here.

Right, because there's no way the NSA could ever pwn the DNS root key.

What we should probably be thinking about here is:

  - Mitigating single points of failure (IOW, we _cannot_ rely
on just the root key)
  - Hybrid solutions (more trust sources means more work to
compromise)
  - Sanity checking (if a key changes unexpectedly, we should
be able to notice)
  - Multiple trust anchors (for stuff that really matters, we
can't rely on the root or on a third party CA)
  - Trust anchor establishment for sensitive communications
(e.g. with banks)

The threat model isn't really the NSA per se—if they really want to bug you, 
they will, and you can't stop them, and that's not a uniformly bad thing.   The 
problem is the breathtakingly irresponsible weakening of crypto systems that 
has been alleged here, and what we can do to mitigate that.   Even if we aren't 
sure that it's happened, or precisely what's happened, it's likely that it has 
happened, or will happen in the near future.  We should be thinking in those 
terms, not crossing our fingers and hoping for the best.



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: Spencer Dawkins 

> I have to wonder whether weakening crypto systems to allow pervasive
> passive monitoring by "national agencies" would weaken them enough for
> technologically savvy corporations to monitor their competitors, for
> instance.

More importantly, if crypto systems are weaked so that the intelligence
agencies of the 'good guys' can monitor them, they're probably weak enough
that the intelligence agencies of the 'bad guys' can monitor them too.

The smarts level on the other side should not be under-estimated, although I
fear this often happens. 


> From: Ted Lemon 

> What we should probably be thinking about here is:
> - Mitigating single points of failure (IOW, we _cannot_ rely
>  on just the root key)
> - Hybrid solutions (more trust sources means more work to
> compromise)
> ...
> - Multiple trust anchors (for stuff that really matters, we
> can't rely on the root or on a third party CA)

I'm not sure if this is entirely responsive to your points here, but it is
possible to have multiple 'root trust anchors' with the DNS. I have worked
this out in some detail, which I won't give here.

But basically the concept is that multiple entities (e.g. IEEE, EFF,
add-your-favourite here) can all sign the root zone (independently, but in
parallel), and also any subsidiary zones they care about (e.g. .EDU).
(Signing everything all the way down is clearly impractical, but if you can
n-way secure the root of the tree, that will help.)

I seem to recall that DNSSEC as it stands could deal with this; the real
issue would be gaining agreement from the zone owner to include multiple
signatures. Of course, it's possible to distributed those signatures in other
ways, but that would require new mechanism.

Noel


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Dave Crocker

On 9/6/2013 5:51 AM, Jorge Amodio wrote:


IMHO. There is no amount of engineering that can fix stupid people doing
stupid things... on both sides of the stupid line.



Correct.  Within the IETF, the most serious example of stupidity is any 
line of analysis that considers end-users to be stupid or lazy, rather 
than treating them as system components with various pragmatic 
constraints, just like any other system component.


So the real challenge is for us to be clear about the pragmatics when we 
talk about end-users.  Here the real problem is that the pragmatics are 
only superficially understood, even by the usability (HCI, UXD, UCE, 
UCD...) experts.


That points to a second serious challenge, namely that we can't know 
very well what will work for end-users and what won't.


The model that I've described for some years is that the best user 
design cognitive processing models -- processing limits, memory limits, 
attention limits, etc. -- about end-users suggest reasonable theories 
for /starting/ designs, but never ensure good /final/ designs.  That 
requires testing.


At this summer's SOUPS conference I floated this summary past a variety 
of senior Usable Security folks during one of the sessions and folks 
generally nodded in agreement.


In other words, the IETF needs to assume that we don't know what will 
work for end users and we need to therefore focus more on processing by 
end /systems/ rather than end /users/.


We also need to avoid the 'then a miracle happens' faith that end system 
designers will magically figure out the best user interface design for 
security, since they have failed at that for the last 25 years; they'll 
eventually succeed but they haven't, so far.


d/


--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Scott Brim
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 10:55 AM, Dave Crocker  wrote:
> In other words, the IETF needs to assume that we don't know what will work
> for end users and we need to therefore focus more on processing by end
> /systems/ rather than end /users/.

... and do not close off any options because we assume people won't
want to use them.


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 08:20:17AM -0700,
 Dave Crocker  wrote 
 a message of 21 lines which said:

> We currently do not have a concise catalog the basic 'privacy'
> threats and their typical mitigations, appropriate for concern with
> IETF protocols.

What about RFC 6973?


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Ted Lemon
On Sep 6, 2013, at 2:46 AM, SM  wrote:
> At 20:08 05-09-2013, Ted Lemon wrote:
>> I think we all knew NSA was collecting the data.   Why didn't we do 
>> something about it sooner?   Wasn't it an emergency when the PATRIOT act was 
>> passed?   We certainly thought it was an emergency back in the days of 
>> Skipjack, but then they convinced us we'd won.   Turns out they just went 
>> around us.
> 
> I would describe it as a scuffle instead of a battle.  My guess is that the 
> IETF did not do anything sooner as nobody knows what to do, or it may be that 
> the IETF has become conservative and it does not pay attention to the 
> minority report.

It was definitely a battle.   There were threats of imprisonment, massive 
propaganda dumps (think of the children!), etc.   People broke the law, moved 
countries, etc.   We just forget it because "we" "won" it, and it seems smaller 
in memory than it was when it was happening.

The IETF didn't do anything because the tin foil hat contingent didn't have 
consensus, and we had no data to force the point.   As you alluded to earlier, 
it's historically been very difficult to get people to treat security and 
privacy seriously, and frankly it still is.

So this isn't an emergency.   It's a teachable moment.   We should pay 
attention.



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: Scott Brim 

> I wouldn't focus on government surveillance per se. The IETF should
> consider that breaking privacy is much easier than it used to be ...
> right now the Internet's weakness in privacy is far from "better". The
> mandatory security considerations section should become security and
> privacy considerations. The privacy RFC should be expanded and worded
> more strongly than just nice suggestions. 

Excellent point. There are a lot more threats to privacy than just the NSA
(and similar agencies in other large, powerful countries, which probably do
their own snooping, although not on the scale of the NSA's).

I am minded of the 'recent' revelations that Google, etc trawl through email
they handle, looking for URLs, which they then crawl. (I say 'recent' because
I discovered this some years ago. A 'private' page of mine - i.e. one with no
links to it - wound up in Google's search results, because I'd sent someone
on gmail a message with the URL in it...) Etc, etc. Added up across all the
large companies, I reckon the amount of 'private' surveillance is probably
close to what the NSA does.


> From: Theodore Ts'o 

> For too long, I think, we've let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
> At least this way they will be forced to go the NSL route ... or spend
> $$$ on huge racks of servers in public data centers, which maybe means
> less money to subvert standards setting activities.
> ...
> Although perfect security is ideal, increasing the cost of casual style
> dragnet surveillance is still a Good Thing.

Good point. But let's not make a similar diversion ourselves.

I suspect that for most people, the results of having their machine infected
with a virus, or identity theft from compromised information, is probably a
lot more painful than being the subject of dragnet surveillance by a
government (irritating though that may be).

So if we throw resources at attacking the dragnet surveillance, and take
those resources from efforts to tackle other security problems, that might
not be in the best overall interests of the networks' users.

Noel


PS: I'm having fun trying to imagine the reaction of the people at the NSA,
GCHQ, etc who are reading this thread. (Hi, all!)


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Theodore Ts'o
One thing that would be helpful is to encourage the use of
Diffie-Hellman everywhere.  Even without certificates that can be
trusted, we can eliminate the ability of casual, dragnet-style
surveillance.  Sure, an attacker can still do a MITM attack.  But (a)
people who are more clueful can do certificate pinning/verification,
and (b) if the NSA is really putting data taps into tier 1 providers'
high speed interconnects, they can only carry out MITM attacks on a
bulk scale by placing racks and racks of servers, which will require
significant amounts of cooling and power, in places that are much more
likely where they would be noticed.  It's no longer a data tap hidden
away somewhere in a closet near a tier 1's NAP.

For too long, I think, we've let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
Using TLS with DH to secure SMTP connections is valuable even if it is
subject to MITM attacks, and even if the NSA/FBI can hand a National
Security Letter to the cloud provider.  At least this way they will be
forced to go the NSL route (and it will show up in whatever
transparency reports that Google or Microsoft or Facebook are allowed
to show to the public), or spend $$$ on huge racks of servers in
public data centers, which maybe means less money to subvert standards
setting activities.

Although perfect security is ideal, increasing the cost of casual
style dragnet surveillance is still a Good Thing.

- Ted


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Stefan Winter
+1. I'd +10 if I could :-)

> One thing that would be helpful is to encourage the use of
> Diffie-Hellman everywhere.  Even without certificates that can be
> trusted, we can eliminate the ability of casual, dragnet-style
> surveillance.  Sure, an attacker can still do a MITM attack.  But (a)
> people who are more clueful can do certificate pinning/verification,
> and (b) if the NSA is really putting data taps into tier 1 providers'
> high speed interconnects, they can only carry out MITM attacks on a
> bulk scale by placing racks and racks of servers, which will require
> significant amounts of cooling and power, in places that are much more
> likely where they would be noticed.  It's no longer a data tap hidden
> away somewhere in a closet near a tier 1's NAP.
> 
> For too long, I think, we've let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
> Using TLS with DH to secure SMTP connections is valuable even if it is
> subject to MITM attacks, and even if the NSA/FBI can hand a National
> Security Letter to the cloud provider.  At least this way they will be
> forced to go the NSL route (and it will show up in whatever
> transparency reports that Google or Microsoft or Facebook are allowed
> to show to the public), or spend $$$ on huge racks of servers in
> public data centers, which maybe means less money to subvert standards
> setting activities.
> 
> Although perfect security is ideal, increasing the cost of casual
> style dragnet surveillance is still a Good Thing.
> 
>   - Ted
> 


-- 
Stefan WINTER
Ingenieur de Recherche
Fondation RESTENA - Réseau Téléinformatique de l'Education Nationale et
de la Recherche
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359 Luxembourg

Tel: +352 424409 1
Fax: +352 422473

PGP key updated to 4096 Bit RSA - I will encrypt all mails if the
recipient's key is known to me

http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xC0DE6A358A39DC66


0x8A39DC66.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys


signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: Martin Millnert 

> Bruce was ... suggesting that encrypting everything on the wire makes
> both metadata and payload collection from wires less valuable. Here
> comes the key point: Encrypting everything on the wire raises the cost
> for untargeted mass surveillance significantly. And that is what it is
> all about.

I have no problems with encrypting everything, as long as we realize that in
doing so, we're only solving one corner of the problem, and the watchers will
just move their efforts elsewhere; all intelligent attackers always look for
the weak point, no?

(Although I have to wonder at the computing load needed to do so. I gather
e.g. Google's datacenters use enormous amounts of energy - I wonder if mass
encryption of all traffic on the Internet would be literally a 'boiling the
ocean' solution... I'm amused by the memory of people who used to react with
shock and horror to variable length addresses, because of the extra
computational load required to handle _them_)

> And best is of course if this can be end to end

That's going to take quite a while to accomplish; it requires updating all the
hosts. (I know, we don't have to get to 99.9%, but it's still non-trivial to
get to, say, 70%.)

Noel


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Bjoern Hoehrmann
* Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.

The United States justify these programs saying they are primarily used
to support their various current and future war efforts. Not meeting at
any level in countries currently at war might be a sound IETF policy.
-- 
Björn Höhrmann · mailto:[email protected] · http://bjoern.hoehrmann.de
Am Badedeich 7 · Telefon: +49(0)160/4415681 · http://www.bjoernsworld.de
25899 Dagebüll · PGP Pub. KeyID: 0xA4357E78 · http://www.websitedev.de/ 


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Eliot Lear

On 9/6/13 3:04 PM, Martin Sustrik wrote:
> So, what if an NSA guys comes in and proposes backdoor to be added to
> a protocol? Is it even a valid interest? Does IETF as an organisation
> have anything to say about that or does it remain strictly neutral?
>
It's happened before and we as a community have said no.  See RFC 2804.


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Martin Sustrik

On 06/09/13 14:07, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:


While we are able to fill gaps in security protocols fairly quickly we
don't always seem to make the right choices because the interests of
various participants are not necessarily aligned.


So, what if an NSA guys comes in and proposes backdoor to be added to a 
protocol? Is it even a valid interest? Does IETF as an organisation have 
anything to say about that or does it remain strictly neutral?


Martin



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Alan Johnston
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 7:07 AM, Hannes Tschofenig  wrote:

> On 06.09.2013 13:30, Stewart Bryant wrote:
>
>> Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.
>>
> It really depends where you see the boundaries of the IETF.
>
> For some the IETF only produces documents and that's it. Clearly, we have
> a lot of specification work ongoing in different areas that helps to
> mitigate various security vulnerabilities. This ranges from recent work on
> XMPP end-to-end security (as in http://tools.ietf.org/html/**
> draft-miller-3923bis-02)
> all the way to the recent RTCWEB discussions on using DTLS-SRTP as a key
> management protocol.
>

If we took protection against MitM attacks seriously, we would be using
ZRTP for RTCWEB instead of DTLS-SRTP.  See

 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-johnston-rtcweb-zrtp

- Alan -


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On 9/6/13 1:47 AM, Adam Novak wrote:
> On 09/05/2013 08:19 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>> Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already
>> doing.
>> 
>> I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users
>> should be doing; still less about what legislators should or
>> shouldn't be doing. I care about all those things, but the
>> question here is what standards or informational outputs from the
>> IETF are needed, in addition to what's already done or in the
>> works.
>> 
>> I don't intend that to be a rhetorical question.
>> 
>> Brian
> 
> One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to 
> reduce centralization in the Internet's architecture. Right now,
> the way the Internet works in practice for private individuals, all
> your traffic goes up one pipe to your ISP. It's trivial to tap,
> since the tapping can be centralized at the ISP end.
> 
> The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the
> necessary network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering
> between private individuals, it could make it much more expensive
> to mount large-scale traffic interception attacks.

+1. There's already work on things like MANET, but this seems a useful
avenue of work.

Peter

- -- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/


-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin)
Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/
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=Sezw
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Jorge Amodio
IMHO. There is no amount of engineering that can fix stupid people doing
stupid things... on both sides of the stupid line.

-J


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Hannes Tschofenig

On 06.09.2013 13:30, Stewart Bryant wrote:

Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.

It really depends where you see the boundaries of the IETF.

For some the IETF only produces documents and that's it. Clearly, we 
have a lot of specification work ongoing in different areas that helps 
to mitigate various security vulnerabilities. This ranges from recent 
work on XMPP end-to-end security (as in 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-3923bis-02) all the way to the 
recent RTCWEB discussions on using DTLS-SRTP as a key management protocol.


For other folks the IETF does much more, such as to reach out to those 
deploying our technology. Many folks involved in the IETF community 
produce open source code, write article in popular computer magazines 
explaining how to use the technology, give presentations at various 
conferences, teach at universities and research institutes, provide 
consulting, etc. The list is long.


It is obviously easier to write (security) documents but somewhat more 
complex to get them widely deployed. Example: TLS everywhere, DNSSEC, 
email security, routing security, etc.


While we are able to fill gaps in security protocols fairly quickly we 
don't always seem to make the right choices because the interests of 
various participants are not necessarily aligned. In general, we seem to 
develop an insecure version and a secure version of a protocol. 
Unfortunately, the insecure version gets widely deployed and we have an 
incredible hard time to introduce the secure version.


In addition to the specification work we could think about how to reach 
out to the broader Internet ecosystem a bit better. Since we have lots 
of folks in the IETF I don't think it is an impossible task but it might 
require a bit of coordination. Right now would be a good time to launch 
some of those initiatives since most people currently understand the 
need for security.


Ciao
Hannes



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Stephen Farrell

Summarising a *lot* :-)

On 09/06/2013 11:30 AM, Stewart Bryant wrote:
> 
> There is a whole bunch of stuff we can do

I fully agree. Some more detail on one of those...

We setup the perpass list [1] as a venue for triaging
specific proposals in this space. A few weeks in, we
have one I-D [2] (very much a -00) that tries to describe
a threat model that matches the recent revelations,
and that could be a good reference when folks are
developing protocols.

We have found volunteers to write a draft for a BCP
on how to use perfect forward secrecy in TLS, more
common use of which (we still think) would mitigate a
bunch of the ways in which TLS traffic could be
subverted, given various forms of collusion/coercion.
I hope the -00 for that will pop out in a weekish.

We've had some discussion about how to do better with
email, but that's not yet landed on specifics that
could be taken further. And a couple of other topics
have come up. More are welcome.

For any such topic that looks like it'll turn into
something actionable (in the IETF context), I'm very
happy to push to get it adopted by a relevant WG or
to get it AD sponsored.

If you care about this stuff, then get on that list
and make concrete proposals and write I-Ds about ways
the IETF can improve the situation. If the content
is good, you'll find you're pushing on an open door
(at least as far as the SEC ADs are concerned:-).

And as we all know the IETF cannot "solve the problem"
here, but as Stewart rightly said: there is stuff we
can do better. So let's do it.

I do think some kind of session in Vancouver would be
useful to move this along some more and there's
discussion ongoing within the IESG and IAB on how to
best do that. If we (IESG/IAB) fail in that, please do
beat us up mightily at the mic in Vancouver.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-trammell-perpass-ppa




Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Stewart Bryant

On 06/09/2013 04:19, Brian E Carpenter wrote:

On 06/09/2013 15:08, Ted Lemon wrote:

On Sep 5, 2013, at 9:36 PM, Brian E Carpenter  
wrote:

I'm sorry, I don't detect the emergency.

I think we all knew NSA was collecting the data.   Why didn't we do something 
about it sooner?   Wasn't it an emergency when the PATRIOT act was passed?   We 
certainly thought it was an emergency back in the days of Skipjack, but then 
they convinced us we'd won.   Turns out they just went around us.

Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.

I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users should
be doing; still less about what legislators should or shouldn't be
doing. I care about all those things, but the question here is what
standards or informational outputs from the IETF are needed, in addition
to what's already done or in the works.


There is a whole bunch of stuff we can do to make transit traffic less 
observable.


In other words we can modify things so the only think you know about a 
packet is where it is going, not what it is or who it came from.


Stewart


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Hannes Tschofenig

On 06.09.2013 04:36, Brian E Carpenter wrote:

I'm not saying there's no issue or no work to do, but what's new about
any of this?


Still at the end of last year I remember conversations in working groups 
that questions why we need TLS security for protocols like SCIM (a 
protocol that shuffles credentials around).


I don't think that the decision in the RTCWeb group against SDES would 
have been possible without the NSA news.


I also remember the Internet Privacy workshop the IAB and others 
organized about 2 years ago and back then we argued whether government 
surveillance is something we should focus on or whether we are mainly 
interested in companies who impact your privacy.


While some (many) have already anticipated that the NSA (and other 
governments) deploy massive surveillance technologies the extend to 
which it is done has surprised most security persons I know.


In a nutshell, the understanding and awareness of the wider Internet 
community has changed with those news.


Ciao
Hannes


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Vinayak Hegde
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 12:16 PM, SM  wrote:

> In a Last Call comment a few months ago it was mentioned that a
> specification takes the stance that security is an optional feature.  I
> once watched a Security Area Director spend thirty minutes trying to
> explain to a working group that security feature should be implemented.  If
> I recall correctly the working group was unconvinced.
>
> Would the community raise it as an issue during a Last Call if a proposed
> protocol did not have strong security features?  It's up to the reader to
> determine the answer to that.


It is tragic if the community does understand strong encryption is
essential in many cases (with the caveat that it is not a panacea for all
security breaches) As for raising issues at the last-call. Why not ? The
last-call is no different than any other mailing list discussion or going
to the mic in a physical meeting. (Other than the urgency of having the
last chance to comment ?)

-- Vinayak


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Adam Novak

On 09/05/2013 08:19 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:

Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.

I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users should
be doing; still less about what legislators should or shouldn't be
doing. I care about all those things, but the question here is what
standards or informational outputs from the IETF are needed, in addition
to what's already done or in the works.

I don't intend that to be a rhetorical question.

  Brian


One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to 
reduce centralization in the Internet's architecture. Right now, the way 
the Internet works in practice for private individuals, all your traffic 
goes up one pipe to your ISP. It's trivial to tap, since the tapping can 
be centralized at the ISP end.


The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary 
network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between private 
individuals, it could make it much more expensive to mount large-scale 
traffic interception attacks.


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Hannes Tschofenig
Bruce might not know that we have already various activities ongoing. I 
just recently produced a short writeup about the efforts related to this 
topic ongoing at the last IETF meeting on my blog:

http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/wp/?p=993

Ciao
Hannes

On 06.09.2013 03:17, Dean Willis wrote:


This is bigger than the "perpass" list.

I suggested that the surveillance/broken crypto challenge represents "damage to the 
Internet". I'm not the only one thinking that way.

I'd like to share the challenge raised by Bruce Schneier in:

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying


To quote:

---
We need to know how exactly how the NSA and other agencies are subverting 
routers, switches, the internet backbone, encryption technologies and cloud 
systems. I already have five stories from people like you, and I've just 
started collecting. I want 50. There's safety in numbers, and this form of 
civil disobedience is the moral thing to do.

Two, we can design. We need to figure out how to re-engineer the internet to 
prevent this kind of wholesale spying. We need new techniques to prevent 
communications intermediaries from leaking private information.

We can make surveillance expensive again. In particular, we need open 
protocols, open implementations, open systems – these will be harder for the 
NSA to subvert.

The Internet Engineering Task Force, the group that defines the standards that 
make the internet run, has a meeting planned for early November in Vancouver. 
This group needs dedicate its next meeting to this task. This is an emergency, 
and demands an emergency response.


The gauntlet is in our face. What are we going to do about it?


--
Dean Willis




Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread Måns Nilsson
Subject: Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving 
the Internet from the NSA Date: Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 09:04:41AM +0300 Quoting 
Jari Arkko ([email protected]):
> I think we should seize this opportunity to take a hard look at what we can 
> do better. Yes, it is completely correct that this is only partially a 
> technical problem, and that there is a lot of technology that, if used, would 
> help. And that technical issues outside IETF space, like endpoint security, 
> or the properties of specific products or implements affects the end result 
> in major ways. And that no amount of communication security helps you if you 
> do not the guy at the other end.
> 
> But it is also obvious to me that we do not have a situation where everything 
> that could be done has been done. I think we can do more. Some examples:
> 
> * we're having a discussion in http 2.0 work whether encryption should be 
> mandatory

Given the relative impact of http I think that this is the most important
of your suggestions. Frankly, I do not think it is sensible to block
mandatory crypto in http 2.0. 

However, I think it is also important to look at how we handle the
key distribution problem. The traditional X.509 model has repeatedly
been shown to be extremely vulnerable to bad management and directed
attacks. Further, the dependency on relatively few root CA instances
and the lack of domain name scope limitations makes an attack on said
CA not only likely but also most rewarding to the attacker.

I do think that more distributed technoligies like DANE play an important
rôle here.

-- 
Måns Nilsson primary/secondary/besserwisser/machina
MN-1334-RIPE +46 705 989668
Like I always say -- nothing can beat the BRATWURST here in DUSSELDORF!!


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-06 Thread SM

At 20:32 05-09-2013, Vinayak Hegde wrote:
While it is nice to do a dedication of this meeting to the SA 
surveillance, I do not see us solving any issue here. It is merely a 
"feel-good" measure without real impact.


:-)

Second, technology can never fix what is essentially a political 
problem. for eg. We mandate strong security protocols and end-to-end 
encryption in HTTP(S) by default. Lets


In a Last Call comment a few months ago it was mentioned that a 
specification takes the stance that security is an optional 
feature.  I once watched a Security Area Director spend thirty 
minutes trying to explain to a working group that security feature 
should be implemented.  If I recall correctly the working group was 
unconvinced.


Would the community raise it as an issue during a Last Call if a 
proposed protocol did not have strong security features?  It's up to 
the reader to determine the answer to that.


 assume all browsers implement this and do this perfectly without 
software flaws. All the NSA has to do is to compromise the other 
endpoint (controlled by ACME major corp). ACME gives over the 
encryption keys and access to all the unencrypted data to the NSA. So now


Yes.

 what are we going to do. The IETF can make an political statement 
by taking a stand but that may mean nothing in reality when the 
laws are weak. Another example is when you have


Taking a stand that means nothing is a feel-good measure.

 encrypted your drive and do not want to hand over the keys as it 
has some personal (and possibly incriminating evidence). In several 
countries you can be held in jail indefinitely (with obvious 
renewals of sentences) until you hand the keys over[1]. So in 
summary, technology cannot solve political and legal issues. At 
best it can make it harder. But in this case maybe not even that.


The IETF outlook does not apply in several countries.  The IETF does 
not seem to pay much attention to that details (re. hand the 
keys).  It's not clear what the emergency is.  Phillip Hallam-Baker 
and Brian Carpenter already mentioned that it's not like this is a surprise.


According to a news article key architects of the Internet plan to 
fight back by drawing a plan to defend against state-sponsored 
surveillance.  Anyway, if someone really wanted to call for an 
emergency response the person would have sent it to an IETF mailing list.


At 20:08 05-09-2013, Ted Lemon wrote:
I think we all knew NSA was collecting the data.   Why didn't we do 
something about it sooner?   Wasn't it an emergency when the PATRIOT 
act was passed?   We certainly thought it was an emergency back in 
the days of Skipjack, but then they convinced us we'd won.   Turns 
out they just went around us.


I would describe it as a scuffle instead of a battle.  My guess is 
that the IETF did not do anything sooner as nobody knows what to do, 
or it may be that the IETF has become conservative and it does not 
pay attention to the minority report.


At 23:04 05-09-2013, Jari Arkko wrote:
I think we should seize this opportunity to take a hard look at what 
we can do better.


:-)

And please do not think about all this just in terms of the recent 
revelations. The


That's an interesting perspective.

 security in the Internet is still a challenge, and if there are 
improvements they will be generally useful for many reasons and for 
many years to come. Perhaps this year's discussions are our ticket 
to motivate the world to move from "by default insecure" 
communications to "by default secure". Publicity and motivation are 
important, too.


Yes.

Regards,
-sm  



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Jari Arkko
> And that no amount of communication security helps you if you do not the guy 
> at the other end.

Do not *trust* the guy at the other end. Typos, sigh…



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Eliot Lear

On 9/6/13 5:11 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> S/MIME is almost what we need to secure email. What is missing is an
> effective key discovery scheme. We could add that and add Ben Laurie's
> Certificate Transparency and have a pretty good start on a PRISM Proof
> email scheme.

Not when the keys reside with a service that can be coerced.

Eliot


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Jari Arkko
I think we should seize this opportunity to take a hard look at what we can do 
better. Yes, it is completely correct that this is only partially a technical 
problem, and that there is a lot of technology that, if used, would help. And 
that technical issues outside IETF space, like endpoint security, or the 
properties of specific products or implements affects the end result in major 
ways. And that no amount of communication security helps you if you do not the 
guy at the other end.

But it is also obvious to me that we do not have a situation where everything 
that could be done has been done. I think we can do more. Some examples:

* we're having a discussion in http 2.0 work whether encryption should be 
mandatory
* the perpass list has talked about understanding better where fingerprinting 
is an issue with IETF protocols
* maybe it would be time to start having specs say that implementations must 
refuse older, weak algorithms
* we could do more analysis and review to understand where the weak points and 
development opportunities are -- too early to say there are none

And please do not think about all this just in terms of the recent revelations. 
The security in the Internet is still a challenge, and if there are 
improvements they will be generally useful for many reasons and for many years 
to come. Perhaps this year's discussions are our ticket to motivate the world 
to move from "by default insecure" communications to "by default secure". 
Publicity and motivation are important, too.

So I for one would like to see work to determine what we could do, and some 
meeting time in the Vancouver agenda to talk about it.

Jari



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Melinda Shore
On 9/5/13 8:59 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
> side discussion wonders whether bruce may be a bit on the
> pollyanna side on this aspect.

That's a really interesting question, and I have no idea what
the answer is.  One reason it's interesting is that until
this all broke there was a reasonable assumption that as long
as you were more inconvenient to compromise than your neighbors,
you were safe.  That actually appears not to be the case at all
where eavesdropping is concerned.

Melinda



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Randy Bush
> This assumes, of course, that current crypto technology
> (ciphers, anyway) is sufficient, which Schneier seems to
> think is the case.

side discussion wonders whether bruce may be a bit on the
pollyanna side on this aspect.

randy


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Martin Millnert
On 6 sep 2013, at 05:39, [email protected] (Noel Chiappa) wrote:

>> From: Phillip Hallam-Baker 
> 
>> S/MIME is almost what we need to secure email.
> 
> If by "secure email" you mean 'render email impervious to being looked at
> while on the wire', perhaps. If, however, you mean 'render it secure from
> ever being looked at by anyone else', no way.
> 
> Even if it's stored on the destination host in encrypted form, if that host is
> compromised, the contents of that email are now at risk. Even if the key is
> not stored on that machine, the next time it's entered into that machine (or,
> more broadly, the encrypted email and the key are brought near each other), it
> can be lifted, _if that computer has been compromised_.

This and several other comments about the endpoint threat thus far in this 
thread does not seem to understand a very vital point:
Bruce was in 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance
 not suggesting that more encryption on the wire by open protocols can starve 
off attacks on endpoints.
He was not suggesting that backdoors in eg. network driver's firmwares cannot 
provide special access to host memory, extremely hard to detect and never 
utilized in friendly territories where raw opto tapping provides cheaper access 
anyway.

But he IS suggesting that encrypting everything on the wire makes both metadata 
and payload collection from wires less valuable.
Here comes the key point:
Encrypting everything on the wire raises the cost for untargeted mass 
surveillance significantly. And that is what it is all about.

And best is of course if this can be end to end, though hiding metadata 
requires either something onion like or transport encryption by layers below 
said metadata.

/M

Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 11:32 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 03:28:28PM +1200, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
> >
> > OK, that's actionable in the IETF, so can we see the I-D before
> > the cutoff?
>
> Why is that discussion of this nailed to the cycle of IETF meetings?


It is not. I raised the challenge over a week ago in another forum. Last
thing I would do is to give any institution veto power.


The design I think is practical is to eliminate all UI issues by insisting
that encryption and decryption are transparent. Any email that can be sent
encrypted is sent encrypted.

So that means that we have to have a key distribution infrastructure such
that when you register a key it becomes available to anyone who might need
to send you a message. We would also wish to apply the Certificate
Transparency approach to protect the Trusted Third Parties from being
coerced, infiltrated or compromised.


Packaging the implementation is not difficult, a set of proxies for IMAP
and SUBMIT enhance and decrypt the messages.

The client side complexity is separated from the proxy using Omnibroker.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 11:28 PM, Brian E Carpenter <
[email protected]> wrote:

> On 06/09/2013 15:11, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> ...
> > S/MIME is almost what we need to secure email. What is missing is an
> > effective key discovery scheme. We could add that and add Ben Laurie's
> > Certificate Transparency and have a pretty good start on a PRISM Proof
> > email scheme.
>
> OK, that's actionable in the IETF, so can we see the I-D before
> the cutoff?


Yes, the ID should be out next week together with the request for a BOF on
PRISM Proof email which has a shorter fuse.




> > What we lack is not the technology, it is demand for deployment.
>
> Exactly, and that is not actionable in the IETF



On the contrary. taking advantage of a marketing opportunity is certainly
something the IETF can do.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: Phillip Hallam-Baker 

> S/MIME is almost what we need to secure email.

If by "secure email" you mean 'render email impervious to being looked at
while on the wire', perhaps. If, however, you mean 'render it secure from
ever being looked at by anyone else', no way.

Even if it's stored on the destination host in encrypted form, if that host is
compromised, the contents of that email are now at risk. Even if the key is
not stored on that machine, the next time it's entered into that machine (or,
more broadly, the encrypted email and the key are brought near each other), it
can be lifted, _if that computer has been compromised_.

This whole 'surveillance of online activity' is a lot bigger problem than the
IETF's work domain. For us to think we can 'solve' it is massively hubristic.

Noel


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Vinayak Hegde
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:02 AM, Vinayak Hegde  wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 9:36 PM, Brian E Carpenter <
>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> I'm sorry, I don't detect the emergency.
>>>
>>> I'm not saying there's no issue or no work to do, but what's new about
>>> any of this?
>>
>>
>> As I have suggested to several people, we can turn lemons into lemonade.
>>
>
> While it is nice to do a dedication of this meeting to the SA
> surveillance, I do not see us solving any issue here. It is merely a
> "feel-good" measure without real impact.
>
> First, the IETF always had a bias for action. We always respect "rough
> consensus and running code". So far I have not seen not I-Ds and drafts to
> fix the privacy and encryption issues on this thread.
>
> Second, technology can never fix what is essentially a political problem.
> for eg. We mandate strong security protocols and end-to-end encryption in
> HTTP(S) by default. Lets assume all browsers implement this and do this
> perfectly without software flaws. All the NSA has to do is to compromise
> the other endpoint (controlled by ACME major corp). ACME gives over the
> encryption keys and access to all the unencrypted data to the NSA. So now
> what are we going to do. The IETF can make an political statement by taking
> a stand but that may mean nothing in reality when the laws are weak.
> Another example is when you have encrypted your drive and do not want to
> hand over the keys as it has some personal (and possibly incriminating
> evidence). In several countries you can be held in jail indefinitely (with
> obvious renewals of sentences) until you hand the keys over[1]. So in
> summary, technology cannot solve political and legal issues. At best it can
> make it harder. But in this case maybe not even that.
>
> -- Vinayak
> 1. http://www.infoq.com/presentations/HTTP-Performance by Poul
> Henning-Kamp
>

Also when people talk about NSA surveillance, they often talk about servers
and PCs which serve as endpoints. The NSA seems to have figured out that
the weaker points are in the intermediate routers and bugs in the
software[1]. If anything, network engineers and operations should update
their software more regularly[1].

-- Vinayak
1. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-router-hacking/


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Andrew Sullivan
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 03:28:28PM +1200, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
> 
> OK, that's actionable in the IETF, so can we see the I-D before
> the cutoff?

Why is that discussion of this nailed to the cycle of IETF meetings?

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email protected]


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Vinayak Hegde
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

>
> On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 9:36 PM, Brian E Carpenter <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> I'm sorry, I don't detect the emergency.
>>
>> I'm not saying there's no issue or no work to do, but what's new about
>> any of this?
>
>
> As I have suggested to several people, we can turn lemons into lemonade.
>

While it is nice to do a dedication of this meeting to the SA surveillance,
I do not see us solving any issue here. It is merely a "feel-good" measure
without real impact.

First, the IETF always had a bias for action. We always respect "rough
consensus and running code". So far I have not seen not I-Ds and drafts to
fix the privacy and encryption issues on this thread.

Second, technology can never fix what is essentially a political problem.
for eg. We mandate strong security protocols and end-to-end encryption in
HTTP(S) by default. Lets assume all browsers implement this and do this
perfectly without software flaws. All the NSA has to do is to compromise
the other endpoint (controlled by ACME major corp). ACME gives over the
encryption keys and access to all the unencrypted data to the NSA. So now
what are we going to do. The IETF can make an political statement by taking
a stand but that may mean nothing in reality when the laws are weak.
Another example is when you have encrypted your drive and do not want to
hand over the keys as it has some personal (and possibly incriminating
evidence). In several countries you can be held in jail indefinitely (with
obvious renewals of sentences) until you hand the keys over[1]. So in
summary, technology cannot solve political and legal issues. At best it can
make it harder. But in this case maybe not even that.

-- Vinayak
1. http://www.infoq.com/presentations/HTTP-Performance by Poul Henning-Kamp


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Melinda Shore
On 9/5/13 7:19 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
> I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users
> should be doing; still less about what legislators should or
> shouldn't be doing. I care about all those things, but the question
> here is what standards or informational outputs from the IETF are
> needed, in addition to what's already done or in the works.

There are pretty clearly still some serious problems around
crypto and usability.  I tend to look at those problems as
largely being implementation questions.  But still, it may
be the case that there's work that can be done to protect
leaking what might be called signaling (or metadata).

This assumes, of course, that current crypto technology
(ciphers, anyway) is sufficient, which Schneier seems to
think is the case.

Melinda


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Brian E Carpenter
On 06/09/2013 15:11, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
...
> S/MIME is almost what we need to secure email. What is missing is an
> effective key discovery scheme. We could add that and add Ben Laurie's
> Certificate Transparency and have a pretty good start on a PRISM Proof
> email scheme.

OK, that's actionable in the IETF, so can we see the I-D before
the cutoff?

> 
> What we lack is not the technology, it is demand for deployment. 

Exactly, and that is not actionable in the IETF.

Brian


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Dave Crocker

On 9/5/2013 8:08 PM, Ted Lemon wrote:

  they convinced us we'd won


We've done quite a sales job on ourselves, also.

Remember the IAB tech plenary that declared protocols dead, because the 
client is downloaded from the server?  Think about that, in the light of 
recent revelations about compromised service providers.


That is, contrast it with truly distributed and independent clients, 
where the protocol defines a controlled and publicly vetted interface 
between the client and the server.  The former makes the client a 
semantic slave to the server.  The latter makes clients semantically 
independent and easily able to layer things on top of the services 
provided by the server.  Such things as, ummm, encryption.


Clients downloaded from the server, during a session, are extremely 
convenient.  But they can represent an interesting violation of the 
end-to-end "principle", by placing too much into the infrastructure.


d/

--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Brian E Carpenter
On 06/09/2013 15:08, Ted Lemon wrote:
> On Sep 5, 2013, at 9:36 PM, Brian E Carpenter  
> wrote:
>> I'm sorry, I don't detect the emergency.
> 
> I think we all knew NSA was collecting the data.   Why didn't we do something 
> about it sooner?   Wasn't it an emergency when the PATRIOT act was passed?   
> We certainly thought it was an emergency back in the days of Skipjack, but 
> then they convinced us we'd won.   Turns out they just went around us.

Tell me what the IETF could be doing that it isn't already doing.

I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users should
be doing; still less about what legislators should or shouldn't be
doing. I care about all those things, but the question here is what
standards or informational outputs from the IETF are needed, in addition
to what's already done or in the works.

I don't intend that to be a rhetorical question.

 Brian


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Noel Chiappa
> From: Dean Willis 

> The [IETF] .. needs dedicate its next meeting to this task. This is
> an emergency, and demands an emergency response.

The thing is that I'm not sure how much of this is the NSA 'breaking'
protocols/algorithms, and how much is finding ways past/around that security.
E.g. some of it (from accounts in the news) is definitely back doors,
inserted into hardware or software, and clearly we can't fix those.

Most importantly, in one news story I read, Snowden was quoted as saying
"Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically weak that NSA can
frequently find ways around it".

If this is accurate, we can fix protocols till the cows come home, and people
who wish to gain access to the data will just break into the hosts, and grab
the data before/after it crosses the network. So it's not at all clear than
the IETF can really fix (much of) the problem.

Noel


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 9:36 PM, Brian E Carpenter <
[email protected]> wrote:

> I'm sorry, I don't detect the emergency.
>
> I'm not saying there's no issue or no work to do, but what's new about
> any of this?
>
> Was PRISM a surprise to anyone who knew that the Five Eyes sigint
> organisations have been cooperating since about 1942 and using
> intercontinental data links since 1944)? Was Xkeyscore a surprise
> to anyone who's been observing the whole Big Data scene? Is any
> ISP or router vendor actually unaware of the security issues in
> routers? Aren't most of them o/s implementation issues in any case?
> Hasn't the IETF been working on BGP4 security for quite a while now?
>
> I'm very glad we did RFC 1984 and RFC 2804 when we did, but it's
> probably more important that we did RFC 3552. We certainly need
> to apply it.
>
> I am against any panic response to the hype. If someone can identify
> any specific, new, protocol-based threats in the recent media stories,
> that would be worth an I-D and appropriate IETF action.
>
> Regards
>Brian Carpenter



As I have suggested to several people, we can turn lemons into lemonade.

The NSA has conspicuously failed to keep the state secrets of the US
secret. Clapper should be forced to resign or be sacked. The NSA is too big
to keep secrets.

But they have also failed on the technical mission to develop and deploy
technology to protect secrets. They have harassed people trying to deploy
strong crypto, myself included. I don't think it is exactly a coincidence I
had my car searched three times on a round trip between Geneva and London
when I started working on security. Or that the harassment suddenly stopped
after I used my family connections to make a complaint.


I knew that the CERN hub was compromised when I was at CERN. I have known
that the System-X telephone system in the UK is expressly designed to allow
any telephone handset in the UK to be turned into a passive room bug. But
until the Snowden materials were released I have found it difficult to
convince other people of the extent of those capabilities or the risks that
they pose.

The CIA has finally admitted that they were behind the Operation Ajax coup
that replaced democracy in Iran with a convenient dictator. At least until
the rabble rouser the US embassy hired to set up the riots that brought the
government down toppled the convenient despot in the 1979 revolution. What
has not yet come out is that the coup was only possible because the NSA had
cracked the Iranian ciphers and that is how the CIA knew which army
officers might be sympathetic.

So I don't think that the unrestricted ability to read other gentlemen's
mail is quite the boon that some imagine.

Now I also have known for over twenty years that when some of us were
trying to bring the East German government down because the communist
system was a disgrace to humanity my own Prime Minister was meeting with
Gorbachev begging him to send in the tanks and stop the regime collapsing.

There are many things that I know and have known but I don't generally
mention because mentioning such things without the ability to prove them
tends to make you look like a bloody fool. Thanks to Snowden I can now
confirm that HEPNET was tapped at CERN without looking a bloody fool.


S/MIME is almost what we need to secure email. What is missing is an
effective key discovery scheme. We could add that and add Ben Laurie's
Certificate Transparency and have a pretty good start on a PRISM Proof
email scheme.

What we lack is not the technology, it is demand for deployment. Snowden
supplies that demand in two ways. First by revealing the extent of NSA and
GCHQ surveillance, second by exposing the fact that the agency is badly,
sloppily run and likely riddled with Snowdens from Russia, China and
goodness knows where else.


At this point the closure of PRISM and BULLRUN and the rest is
inevitable.  Likely not under this President but the next won't owe the
same debts.Clapper has to go and so has Alexander. Heads have to roll when
there is a security breach caused by such abject incompetence and a failure
of the NSA mission to protect US government secrets, especially their own.

What we can achieve instead is to secure the Internet. I don't care what
bogeyman is that motivates people to do what is necessary provided that
they do it. We have to lock down the nuclear power stations that have
control systems based on MODBUS and no authentication controls whatsoever.
We have to lock down electricity, water, gas.


The mission here is to make our countries safe. Making our countries unsafe
to protect the ability of idiots to play wargames is notthe act of a
patriot, it is the act of a traitor.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Ted Lemon
On Sep 5, 2013, at 9:36 PM, Brian E Carpenter  
wrote:
> I'm sorry, I don't detect the emergency.

I think we all knew NSA was collecting the data.   Why didn't we do something 
about it sooner?   Wasn't it an emergency when the PATRIOT act was passed?   We 
certainly thought it was an emergency back in the days of Skipjack, but then 
they convinced us we'd won.   Turns out they just went around us.



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread Ted Lemon
On Sep 5, 2013, at 8:46 PM, Lucy Lynch  wrote:
>> I'd like to share the challenge raised by Bruce Schneier in:

I thought it was a great call to action.   Is Bruce coming to Vancouver?



Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

2013-09-05 Thread cb.list6
On Sep 5, 2013 5:17 PM, "Dean Willis"  wrote:
>
>
> This is bigger than the "perpass" list.
>
> I suggested that the surveillance/broken crypto challenge represents
"damage to the Internet". I'm not the only one thinking that way.
>
> I'd like to share the challenge raised by Bruce Schneier in:
>
>
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying
>
>
> To quote:
>
> ---
> We need to know how exactly how the NSA and other agencies are subverting
routers, switches, the internet backbone, encryption technologies and cloud
systems. I already have five stories from people like you, and I've just
started collecting. I want 50. There's safety in numbers, and this form of
civil disobedience is the moral thing to do.
>
> Two, we can design. We need to figure out how to re-engineer the internet
to prevent this kind of wholesale spying. We need new techniques to prevent
communications intermediaries from leaking private information.
>
> We can make surveillance expensive again. In particular, we need open
protocols, open implementations, open systems – these will be harder for
the NSA to subvert.
>
> The Internet Engineering Task Force, the group that defines the standards
that make the internet run, has a meeting planned for early November in
Vancouver. This group needs dedicate its next meeting to this task. This is
an emergency, and demands an emergency response.
> 
>
> The gauntlet is in our face. What are we going to do about it?
>
>

Is there a standards gap or an implementation gap?

All Tor, all TLS, all PGP,  all DANE all the time?

And dont forget about this
http://www.zdnet.com/nokia-hijacks-mobile-browser-traffic-decrypts-https-data-709655/

I like this post below, just accept the risk that there is no expectation
of privacy. The snoops have optical taps and all the private keys.  And the
T&Cs for most public email services, social networks,  maps, hospitals,
airport wifi... make it clear your data is not private.

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/our_newfound_fe.html

CB

> --
> Dean Willis


  1   2   >