I am wondering about the proposals made during this discussion.
1) It appears that some of the suggestions in this thread are about not
using the existing Internet infrastructure to route packets but rather
to either use local communication technology (e.g., short range radio)
or adhoc
From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?= rog...@gmail.com
Isn't the payload the important part to protect?
Ecrypting only the headers was a suggestion for the case where the routers
don't have enough spare crunch to encrypt the entire payload of every packet.
Whether that would do
On 7 Sep 2013, at 04:05, j...@mercury.lcs.mit.edu (Noel Chiappa) wrote:
From: Scott Brim scott.b...@gmail.com
The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 5:05 AM, Noel Chiappa j...@mercury.lcs.mit.edu wrote:
From: Scott Brim scott.b...@gmail.com
The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
traffic on the
From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?= rog...@gmail.com
The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
get fast deployment to.
Alas, now that I think about the practicalities I don't think the average
router has enough spare computing power to
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 2:20 PM, Noel Chiappa j...@mercury.lcs.mit.edu wrote:
From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?= rog...@gmail.com
The userbase and deployment are relative small atm so it's doable to
get fast deployment to.
Alas, now that I think about the
Noel Chiappa wrote:
There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
Making intermediate systems more intelligent is against
the end to end principle and assured to fail.
Considering that google, facebook, yahoo, etc., which are
end
On 6 Sep 2013, at 21:32, Roger Jørgensen rog...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak interf...@gmail.com wrote:
The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary
network numbers) to facilitate direct network peering between private
individuals, it
On 07/09/2013 08:55, Tim Chown wrote:
On 6 Sep 2013, at 21:32, Roger Jørgensen rog...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak interf...@gmail.com wrote:
The IETF focused on developing protocols (and reserving the necessary
network numbers) to facilitate direct network
hum…
i did work on a DNS architecture that can be fully disconnected from
the Internet and still work with nodes within the visible topology.
Needs serious rework of DNSSEC and has some assumptions about topology
discovery - but it might be a basis for starting some discussion
On Sep 6, 2013 4:33 PM, Roger Jørgensen rog...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Adam Novak interf...@gmail.com wrote:
snip
One way to frustrate this sort of dragnet surveillance would be to
reduce
centralization in the Internet's architecture. Right now, the way the
From: Scott Brim scott.b...@gmail.com
LISP does nothing for decentralization. Traffic still flows
hierarchically
Umm, no. In fact, one of LISP's architectural scaling issues is that it's
non-hierarchical, so xTRs have neighbour fanouts that are much larger than
typical packet
On Sep 6, 2013 10:06 PM, Noel Chiappa j...@mercury.lcs.mit.edu wrote:
From: Scott Brim scott.b...@gmail.com
LISP does nothing for decentralization. Traffic still flows
hierarchically
Umm, no. In fact, one of LISP's architectural scaling issues is that it's
non-hierarchical,
From: Scott Brim scott.b...@gmail.com
The encapsulation is not much of an obstacle to packet examination.
There was actually a proposal a couple of weeks back in the WG to encrypt all
traffic on the inter-xTR stage.
The win in doing it in the xTRs, of course, is that you don't have to
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