On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 09:54:24AM +0100, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 07:06:24PM +0300, Mika Westerberg wrote:
> > Lu Baolu (1):
> > iommu/vt-d: Force IOMMU on for platform opt in hint
> >
> > Mika Westerberg (3):
> > PCI / ACPI: Identify external PCI devices
> > iommu/vt-d
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 07:12:14PM +0100, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 07:06:24PM +0300, Mika Westerberg wrote:
> > Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or newer may be
> > utilizing IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks via Thunderbolt ports. This is
> > different from the
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 07:06:24PM +0300, Mika Westerberg wrote:
> Lu Baolu (1):
> iommu/vt-d: Force IOMMU on for platform opt in hint
>
> Mika Westerberg (3):
> PCI / ACPI: Identify external PCI devices
> iommu/vt-d: Do not enable ATS for external devices
> thunderbolt: Export IOMMU based
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 8:12 PM Lukas Wunner wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 07:06:24PM +0300, Mika Westerberg wrote:
> > Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or newer may be
> > utilizing IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks via Thunderbolt ports. This is
> > different from the previou
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 07:06:24PM +0300, Mika Westerberg wrote:
> Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or newer may be
> utilizing IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks via Thunderbolt ports. This is
> different from the previous security level based scheme because the
> connected device ca
Hi all,
Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or newer may be
utilizing IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks via Thunderbolt ports. This is
different from the previous security level based scheme because the
connected device cannot access system memory outside of the regions
allocated for i
