Re: [PATCH] iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 06:43:00PM +, Rajat Jain wrote: > Hi MIka, > > Thanks for taking a look. > > On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 2:50 AM Mika Westerberg > wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 10:45:17PM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote: > > > Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID > > > of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively > > > disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself. > > > > > > Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is > > > indeed an internal trusted device. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain > > > --- > > > drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 28 > > > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > > > index ef0a5246700e5..f2a480168a02f 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > > > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > > > @@ -6214,6 +6214,11 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = { > > > > > > static void quirk_iommu_igfx(struct pci_dev *dev) > > > { > > > + if (dev->untrusted) { > > > + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted gfx > > > dev\n"); > > > > I think you should be consistent with other messages. For example iommu > > should be spelled IOMMU as done below. > > > > Also this is visible to users so maybe put bit more information there: > > > > pci_warn(dev, "Will not apply IOMMU quirk for untrusted graphics > > device\n"); > > > > Ditto for all the other places. Also is "untrusted" good word here? If > > an ordinary user sees this will it trigger some sort of panic reaction. > > Perhaps we should call it "potentially untrusted" or something like > > that? Wish we called it external_facing rather than untrusted attribute, so its description is consistent with the spec that defines it. Once we have Platform Component Security Enhancements. to be correct, maybe call "Device located on an untrusted link" rather than assert blame on the device. Since the information is harvsted from BIOS tables and there are chances this could be wrongly grouped such, add "Check with your BIOS/Platform Vendor. > > Fixed it, posted new patch at > https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/2/822 > > Thanks, > > Rajat > > > > > > + return; > > > + } > > > + > > > pci_info(dev, "Disabling IOMMU for graphics on this chipset\n"); > > > dmar_map_gfx = 0; ___ iommu mailing list iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Re: [PATCH] iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
Hi MIka, Thanks for taking a look. On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 2:50 AM Mika Westerberg wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 10:45:17PM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote: > > Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID > > of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively > > disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself. > > > > Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is > > indeed an internal trusted device. > > > > Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain > > --- > > drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 28 > > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > > index ef0a5246700e5..f2a480168a02f 100644 > > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > > @@ -6214,6 +6214,11 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = { > > > > static void quirk_iommu_igfx(struct pci_dev *dev) > > { > > + if (dev->untrusted) { > > + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted gfx dev\n"); > > I think you should be consistent with other messages. For example iommu > should be spelled IOMMU as done below. > > Also this is visible to users so maybe put bit more information there: > > pci_warn(dev, "Will not apply IOMMU quirk for untrusted graphics device\n"); > > Ditto for all the other places. Also is "untrusted" good word here? If > an ordinary user sees this will it trigger some sort of panic reaction. > Perhaps we should call it "potentially untrusted" or something like > that? Fixed it, posted new patch at https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/2/822 Thanks, Rajat > > > + return; > > + } > > + > > pci_info(dev, "Disabling IOMMU for graphics on this chipset\n"); > > dmar_map_gfx = 0; ___ iommu mailing list iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Re: [PATCH] iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 10:45:17PM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote: > Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID > of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively > disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself. > > Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is > indeed an internal trusted device. > > Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain > --- > drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 28 > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > index ef0a5246700e5..f2a480168a02f 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c > @@ -6214,6 +6214,11 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = { > > static void quirk_iommu_igfx(struct pci_dev *dev) > { > + if (dev->untrusted) { > + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted gfx dev\n"); I think you should be consistent with other messages. For example iommu should be spelled IOMMU as done below. Also this is visible to users so maybe put bit more information there: pci_warn(dev, "Will not apply IOMMU quirk for untrusted graphics device\n"); Ditto for all the other places. Also is "untrusted" good word here? If an ordinary user sees this will it trigger some sort of panic reaction. Perhaps we should call it "potentially untrusted" or something like that? > + return; > + } > + > pci_info(dev, "Disabling IOMMU for graphics on this chipset\n"); > dmar_map_gfx = 0; ___ iommu mailing list iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
[PATCH] iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself. Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is indeed an internal trusted device. Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain --- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 28 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c index ef0a5246700e5..f2a480168a02f 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c @@ -6214,6 +6214,11 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = { static void quirk_iommu_igfx(struct pci_dev *dev) { + if (dev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted gfx dev\n"); + return; + } + pci_info(dev, "Disabling IOMMU for graphics on this chipset\n"); dmar_map_gfx = 0; } @@ -6255,6 +6260,11 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x163D, quirk_iommu_igfx); static void quirk_iommu_rwbf(struct pci_dev *dev) { + if (dev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted dev\n"); + return; + } + /* * Mobile 4 Series Chipset neglects to set RWBF capability, * but needs it. Same seems to hold for the desktop versions. @@ -6285,6 +6295,11 @@ static void quirk_calpella_no_shadow_gtt(struct pci_dev *dev) { unsigned short ggc; + if (dev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted gfx dev\n"); + return; + } + if (pci_read_config_word(dev, GGC, &ggc)) return; @@ -6318,6 +6333,13 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void) pdev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x3a3e, NULL); if (!pdev) return; + + if (pdev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(pdev, "skipping iommu quirk due to untrusted dev\n"); + pci_dev_put(pdev); + return; + } + pci_dev_put(pdev); /* System Management Registers. Might be hidden, in which case @@ -6327,6 +6349,12 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void) if (!pdev) return; + if (pdev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(pdev, "skipping iommu quirk due to untrusted dev\n"); + pci_dev_put(pdev); + return; + } + if (pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x188, &vtisochctrl)) { pci_dev_put(pdev); return; -- 2.27.0.rc2.251.g90737beb825-goog ___ iommu mailing list iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Re: [PATCH] iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
On 2020/6/2 13:45, Rajat Jain wrote: Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself. Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is indeed an internal trusted device. Acked-by: Lu Baolu Best regards, baolu Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain --- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 28 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c index ef0a5246700e5..f2a480168a02f 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c @@ -6214,6 +6214,11 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = { static void quirk_iommu_igfx(struct pci_dev *dev) { + if (dev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted gfx dev\n"); + return; + } + pci_info(dev, "Disabling IOMMU for graphics on this chipset\n"); dmar_map_gfx = 0; } @@ -6255,6 +6260,11 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x163D, quirk_iommu_igfx); static void quirk_iommu_rwbf(struct pci_dev *dev) { + if (dev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted dev\n"); + return; + } + /* * Mobile 4 Series Chipset neglects to set RWBF capability, * but needs it. Same seems to hold for the desktop versions. @@ -6285,6 +6295,11 @@ static void quirk_calpella_no_shadow_gtt(struct pci_dev *dev) { unsigned short ggc; + if (dev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(dev, "skipping iommu quirk for untrusted gfx dev\n"); + return; + } + if (pci_read_config_word(dev, GGC, &ggc)) return; @@ -6318,6 +6333,13 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void) pdev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x3a3e, NULL); if (!pdev) return; + + if (pdev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(pdev, "skipping iommu quirk due to untrusted dev\n"); + pci_dev_put(pdev); + return; + } + pci_dev_put(pdev); /* System Management Registers. Might be hidden, in which case @@ -6327,6 +6349,12 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void) if (!pdev) return; + if (pdev->untrusted) { + pci_warn(pdev, "skipping iommu quirk due to untrusted dev\n"); + pci_dev_put(pdev); + return; + } + if (pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x188, &vtisochctrl)) { pci_dev_put(pdev); return; ___ iommu mailing list iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu