Re: [IPsec] Notify types, was: RE: Review of rest of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2 (section 2.23.1 forward)

2010-01-18 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi, I also agree with Tero and Yaron. It's better to have all defined notifications listed in one table. In this case the paragraph immediately preceeding the table must be changed from: The values in the following table are only current as of the publication date of RFC 4306. Other values

[IPsec] Notify types, was: RE: Review of rest of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2 (section 2.23.1 forward)

2010-01-18 Thread Yaron Sheffer
I agree with Tero, regardless of the discussion we had on where to put the tables etc., the document needs to be internally consistent. So we should add the new notify types that we're defining in *this* document to the notify types table. Luckily there aren't many. Thanks, Yaron -

[IPsec] Issue #144: Placement of INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD text

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
There are two places that have very similar text about INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD: Section 1.3 (for CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange), and Section 2.7 (for IKE_SA_INIT exchange). Especially the latter seems a bit strange, everything else in that section applies to CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges, too, but this par

[IPsec] Issue #141: Silently deleting the Child SA after a CHILD_SA_NOT_FOUND

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 2.25: "A peer that receives a CHILD_SA_NOT_FOUND notification SHOULD silently delete the Child SA": Is this really necessary? I think this notification should only occur in cases where DELETE payload for this Child SA pair has already been sent, and probably has been processed already

[IPsec] Issue #142: Difference from RFC 4718 in rekeying IKE SA

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 2.25.2, "If a peer receives a request to delete a Child SA when it is currently rekeying the IKE SA, it SHOULD reply as usual, with a Delete payload." I noticed this is different from what RFC 4718 recommended, but this is probably OK, given the other text... (but I still hope this wa

[IPsec] Issue #138: Calculations involving Ni/Nr

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 2.14: "only the first 64 bits of Ni and the first 64 bits of Nr are used in the calculation". This section has two calculations involving Ni/Nr, but this sentence should only apply to the former. Suggested rephrasing: "the calculation" -> "when calculating SKEYSEED (but all bits are us

[IPsec] #145: IKE_SA rekeying wording in 2.8

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 2.8, sentence: "Note that, when rekeying..." This is in wrong place; the rest of this paragraph is about IKE_SA rekeying, so it should be moved to the previous paragraph. [[ Tero noted this as well, but Paul disagreed, saying that the placement was correct. This needs to be resolved.

[IPsec] Issue #146: Encapsulation wording

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 2.23, paragraph starting: "An initiator can float..." needs some clarifications. Probably "UDP encapsulation/encapsulated" should be "UDP encapsulation of ESP/UDP-encapsulated ESP" (since at other places, the document also talks about IKE packets being UDP encapsulated). --Paul Hoffm

[IPsec] Issue #143: Rewrite of 1.5

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 1.5 doesn't read well, and needs a rewrite. Pasi can provide text once the substantial issue re: INVALID_IKE_SPI is decided. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/

[IPsec] Issue #140: No SPD entry for transport mode

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 2.23.1: If the responder doesn't find SPD entry for transport mode with the modified traffic selectors, and does a lookup with the original selectors, if it finds an entry for transport mode, can it use it? (And would that screw up the initiator processing of the reply? Unfortunately,t

[IPsec] Issue #139: Keying material taken in the order for RoHC

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
One of the differences between RFC 4306 and the IKEv2bis draft is in Section 2.17, Generating Key Material for Child SAs. Appendix E.2 of the IKEv2bis draft indicates the following: In Section 2.17, removed "If multiple IPsec protocols are negotiated, keying material is taken in the order in

[IPsec] Issue #137: Sending INVALID_IKE_SPI notification inside an existing IKE_SA

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Section 1.5: I noticed the 1st paragraph nowadays (well, since -00 of the WG draft) allows sending INVALID_IKE_SPI notification inside an existing IKE_SA. This contradicts a MUST NOT in RFC 4306, and I'm not sure if it really brings any benefits? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium __

Re: [IPsec] Review of rest of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2 (section 2.23.1 forward)

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
Another big thank you for doing this review. I have incorporated everything other than the following. -- Also the bullet - Store the original traffic selector IP addresses as real source and destination address in case w

Re: [IPsec] IKEv2bis editorial nits (Sections 1-2)

2010-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
All of these are fine; done. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

[IPsec] IKEv2bis, comments about sections 1-2

2010-01-18 Thread Pasi.Eronen
I'm doing a yet another full review pass over the whole document (not just diff as I've usually done; to find issues/inconsistencies that diffs wouldn't necessarily show). So far, I've covered Sections 1 and 2. Substantial comments: - Section 1.5: I noticed the 1st paragraph nowadays (well, sin

[IPsec] IKEv2bis editorial nits (Sections 1-2)

2010-01-18 Thread Pasi.Eronen
- Abstract: "It replaces..." Here "it" seems to refer to "IKE", which isn't correct; it should refer to "This document". This could be fixed by e.g. switching the first and second sentence, or changing "it" to "This document". - Section 1.2: s/IKE_INFORMATIONAL/INFORMATIONAL/ - Section 1.4, 3rd p

[IPsec] Review of rest of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2 (section 2.23.1 forward)

2010-01-18 Thread Tero Kivinen
Here is the final part of my comments. -- In section 2.23.1 there is extra "the": It can have multiple traffic selectors if it has, for example, multiple port ranges that it wants to negoti

Re: [IPsec] Issue #135: Which IKE SA inherits a Child SA?

2010-01-18 Thread Pasi.Eronen
I agree. This was also noted in http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4718 Best regards, Pasi (not wearing any hats) > -Original Message- > From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf > Of ext Paul Hoffman > Sent: 17 January, 2010 18:07 > To: IPsecme W

Re: [IPsec] question about 2.8.1 simultaneous child SA rekeying

2010-01-18 Thread Yoav Nir
Hi On Jan 18, 2010, at 12:48 PM, Toshihiko Tamura wrote: > Hi, I want to ask about simultaneous Child SA rekeying > at section 2.8.1 in IKEv2bis. > > I'm sure it is convenient to support this function, > but why is current IKEv2bis draft saying this fucntion > as SHOULD? > -

[IPsec] question about 2.8.1 simultaneous child SA rekeying

2010-01-18 Thread Toshihiko Tamura
Hi, I want to ask about simultaneous Child SA rekeying at section 2.8.1 in IKEv2bis. I'm sure it is convenient to support this function, but why is current IKEv2bis draft saying this fucntion as SHOULD? --- If redundant SAs are created though such a collision, the SA c