Thank you for the summaries.
--
Michael Richardson. o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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> On 10 Nov 2021, at 16:41, Michael Richardson wrote:
>
>
> Yoav Nir wrote:
Tero Kivinen wrote:
>> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
>> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of the
>> attacker per each connection. Now, a
Hi Michael,
> >> I've implemented puzzles, but I'm not aware of any other
> implementation.
> >>
> >> What about cookies - in stress tests they are used very intensively.
> >> But I don't have any real life stats for them.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >> Valery.
>
> > I a
Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> Tero Kivinen wrote:
> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of the
> attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must still accept
> these costs bu
> On 1 Nov 2021, at 13:07, Valery Smyslov wrote:
>
> Hi Michael,
>
>> Tero Kivinen wrote:
Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of the
attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must sti
e efficient PQ KEMs?
Rgs,
Panos
-Original Message-
From: Daniel Herzinger
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2021 8:26 AM
To: CJ Tjhai ; Kampanakis, Panos
Cc: Valery Smyslov ; ipsec@ietf.org; i...@gazdag.de
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] AW: [IPsec] Cost-efficient
quantum-resistan
Hi Michael,
> Tero Kivinen wrote:
> >> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
> >> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of the
> >> attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must still accept
> >> these costs but can use one c
Hi
I'm not aware of any IKEv2 implementations that use puzzles.
I probably see cookies enabled in maybe 5% to 10% of deployments. On Cisco,
the cookie can be enabled if X number of 1/2 open sessions are seen, hence
it might not be active unless there is either some anomaly in the network
(GW rebo
Tero Kivinen wrote:
>> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
>> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of the
>> attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must still accept
>> these costs but can use one connection to trigger s
Daniel Herzinger writes:
> the fact is that accepting a significantly increased amount of data
> from an unauthenticated peer also significantly increases the
> surface to DoS attacks.
Accepting data is not a DoS attack problem.
If the other end sends you lots of packets, you will have to cope wi
INIT(SNTRUP761)+IKE_INTERMEDIATE(X25519)).
Regards,
Valery.
>
>
> Regards,
> Stefan and Daniel
>
> Von: CJ Tjhai
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Oktober 2021 18:39:16
> An: Kampanakis, Panos
> Cc: Valery Smyslov; Daniel Herzinger; ipsec@i
redesigns and no other options.
>
> As a great cryptographer told me one time, if we are to use McEliece what is
> the point of all this work taking
> place to come up with better and more efficient PQ KEMs?
>
> Rgs,
> Panos
>
>
>
> -Original Message
ubject: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
Hi Daniel,
> To give more insight about these measurements, we implemented all three
> drafts and tested the performance of a medium-sized McEliece key exchange
> under different networking conditions (variable latenc
to come up with better and more
efficient PQ KEMs?
Rgs,
Panos
-Original Message-
From: Daniel Herzinger
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2021 8:26 AM
To: CJ Tjhai ; Kampanakis, Panos
Cc: Valery Smyslov ; ipsec@ietf.org; i...@gazdag.de
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] AW: [IPsec] Cost-effi
er 2021 18:39:16
An: Kampanakis, Panos
Cc: Valery Smyslov; Daniel Herzinger; ipsec@ietf.org; i...@gazdag.de
Betreff: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
Hi Panos,
There are two drafts involved here.
a) the main draft,
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-i
ed public keys) is more practical.
>
> Rgs,
> Panos
>
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: IPsec On Behalf Of Valery Smyslov
> Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2021 11:46 AM
> To: 'Daniel Herzinger' ; ipsec@ietf.org
> Cc: i...@gazdag.de
> Subject:
From: IPsec On Behalf Of Valery Smyslov
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2021 11:46 AM
To: 'Daniel Herzinger' ; ipsec@ietf.org
Cc: i...@gazdag.de
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. D
Hi Daniel and Stefan-Lukas,
> Hi,
>
> in response to the new version of
> draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-04.txt, we wanted to emphasize the
> issue of DoS attacks during intermediate exchanges. The new version does
> address it by mentioning the
> option of simply avoiding intermediate ex
Daniel Herzinger writes:
> in response to the new version of
> draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-04.txt, we wanted to emphasize
> the issue of DoS attacks during intermediate exchanges. The new
> version does address it by mentioning the option of simply avoiding
> intermediate exchanges altoget
Hi,
in response to the new version of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-04.txt,
we wanted to emphasize the issue of DoS attacks during intermediate exchanges.
The new version does address it by mentioning the option of simply avoiding
intermediate exchanges altogether but still require addit
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