Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-28 Thread Tero Kivinen
Valery Smyslov writes: And you can always retry when you notice that you get authentication error after using private key, provided you have multiple types of keys. In general you can't if it is responder who selected wrong key. That is something I realized on our way home, but it is

Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Tero, Valery Smyslov writes: The problem, that the draft is not solving, is the situation, when one of the peers has more than one private key, each for different signature algorithm. This may happen if in deployed VPN there is a need to move from one signature alg to another (for any

Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Johannes Merkle
Valery, I suggest to change this as following. Instead of adding IKE registry, listing hash algorithms, add registry listing combinations of hashsignature algorithms, as listed in Appendix A. So, the registry would look like: RESERVED 0

Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Johannes, Your proposal creates exactly the issue which the draft is trying to solve: The lack of flexibility by relying on IPsec code points for the signature algorithm (as opposed to using existing OIDs commonly used in certificates and CMS) and the coupling of signing algorithms and

Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Johannes Merkle
Hi Valery, As far as I remember, the main problem was that Auth Method field in AUTH Payload was only 8 bits and its codepoints coupled signature with particular hash. Well, this was the initial problem, but then Yoav had the great idea of generalizing the mechanism by using the OIDs in