Hi Scott,
this is a very interesting approach.
Please, find below my feedback.
Kind regards, Oscar.
From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Scott Fluhrer
(sfluhrer)
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2016 5:10 PM
To: IPsecme WG (ipsec@ietf.org)
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Quantum
> I'm very concerned that we don't wind up with insecure Group PSKs as
> we had with IKEv1.
This description does not reduce IKEv2 security - the PPK is used next to IKEv2
security.
Furthermore, the description can also support pairwise keys.
I had a look at the description, and a later
Hi Scott,
I see your point.
But I can imagine that very conservative users (critical applications) might
want to use some of the schemes that have been out there for a longer period of
time (e.g., McEliece). This can be specially true at the beginning, while other
more efficient schemes get
On 01/11/2018, 10:00, "CJ Tjhai" wrote:
Hi all,
>
> That implementation is broken, and needs to be fixed.
What's the procedure on this? Is there a need to publish a document or
some test vectors that all implementations can validate against?
Personally, it is more
