Dnia 2009-12-17, czw o godzinie 16:58 +0100, Simon Josefsson pisze:
Sure, but caching the hashed values scales better. Remember, we are
not
talking about just one hash call, typically there is 4096 hash
iterations when deriving the keys from a password in SCRAM.
Oh. So you really meant that
Am 18.12.2009 02:33, schrieb Kurt Zeilenga:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 9:55 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Low iteration counts removes one nice features of SCRAM (mitigating
dictionary attacks on stolen hash databases).
It's only a nice feature if you can take advantage of it. If you need to
Am 18.12.2009 14:58, schrieb Alexander Holler:
Storing a hash for every mechanism will not work. E.g. for DIGEST-MD5
the server has to hash the clear-text password with a value the client
provides. So the server needs the clear-text password. And if the server
is able to get the clear-text
Alexander Holler hol...@ahsoftware.de writes:
Am 18.12.2009 02:33, schrieb Kurt Zeilenga:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 9:55 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Low iteration counts removes one nice features of SCRAM (mitigating
dictionary attacks on stolen hash databases).
It's only a nice feature if you
Am 18.12.2009 16:42, schrieb Simon Josefsson:
Storing a hash for every mechanism will not work. E.g. for DIGEST-MD5
the server has to hash the clear-text password with a value the client
provides.
That is true for CRAM-MD5, but not for DIGEST-MD5 and SCRAM-MD5. With
the latter two mechanisms,
On 12/18/09 8:07 AM, Alexander Holler wrote:
Am 18.12.2009 14:58, schrieb Alexander Holler:
Storing a hash for every mechanism will not work. E.g. for DIGEST-MD5
the server has to hash the clear-text password with a value the client
provides. So the server needs the clear-text password. And if
On Fri Dec 18 15:41:39 2009, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
On 12/18/09 8:07 AM, Alexander Holler wrote:
Am 18.12.2009 14:58, schrieb Alexander Holler:
Storing a hash for every mechanism will not work. E.g. for
DIGEST-MD5
the server has to hash the clear-text password with a value the
client
On 12/18/09 9:17 AM, Dave Cridland wrote:
On Fri Dec 18 15:41:39 2009, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
On 12/18/09 8:07 AM, Alexander Holler wrote:
Am 18.12.2009 14:58, schrieb Alexander Holler:
Storing a hash for every mechanism will not work. E.g. for DIGEST-MD5
the server has to hash the
Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im writes:
On 12/16/09 9:03 AM, Simon Tennant (Buddycloud) wrote:
I'm curious what the community makes of the recent news
http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-myspace-facebook-passwords/
given SASL's cleartext password storage? It seems
Dnia 2009-12-17, czw o godzinie 14:35 +0100, Simon Josefsson pisze:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn CPU
time for every login to derive the SCRAM hash keys. That doesn't scale
well.
Why do you say so?
It scales well vertically by CPU upgrade, and
On Dec 17, 2009, at 5:35 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn CPU
time for every login to derive the SCRAM hash keys. That doesn't scale
well.
If you ONLY store the hash keys, you limit which password-based mechanisms can
be used.
Subject: Re: [jdev] plaintext passwords hack
Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im writes:
On 12/16/09 9:03 AM, Simon Tennant (Buddycloud) wrote:
I'm curious what the community makes of the recent news
http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-myspace-facebook-passwords/
given
On Thu Dec 17 15:48:14 2009, Jonathan Dickinson wrote:
Sorry for not conforming to the list standards, I am on my mobile.
Logins taking a long time is advantageous, remember we are not a
primitive/chatty protocol like HTTP; so burning CPU cycles during a
login is a VERY small problem;
Kurt Zeilenga kurt.zeile...@isode.com writes:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 5:35 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn CPU
time for every login to derive the SCRAM hash keys. That doesn't scale
well.
If you ONLY store the hash keys, you limit
Tomasz Sterna to...@xiaoka.com writes:
Dnia 2009-12-17, czw o godzinie 14:35 +0100, Simon Josefsson pisze:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn CPU
time for every login to derive the SCRAM hash keys. That doesn't scale
well.
Why do you say so?
It scales well
On 12/17/09 6:47 AM, Kurt Zeilenga wrote:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 5:35 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn
CPU time for every login to derive the SCRAM hash keys. That
doesn't scale well.
If you ONLY store the hash keys, you limit
Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im writes:
On 12/17/09 6:47 AM, Kurt Zeilenga wrote:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 5:35 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn
CPU time for every login to derive the SCRAM hash keys. That
doesn't scale well.
On 12/17/09 9:10 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im writes:
On 12/17/09 6:47 AM, Kurt Zeilenga wrote:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 5:35 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn
CPU time for every login to derive the
On Dec 17, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Tomasz Sterna to...@xiaoka.com writes:
Dnia 2009-12-17, czw o godzinie 14:35 +0100, Simon Josefsson pisze:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn CPU
time for every login to derive the SCRAM hash keys. That
Kurt Zeilenga kurt.zeile...@isode.com writes:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Tomasz Sterna to...@xiaoka.com writes:
Dnia 2009-12-17, czw o godzinie 14:35 +0100, Simon Josefsson pisze:
If you don't store the hashed password for SCRAM, you need to burn CPU
time for
Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im writes:
Agreed. That's the main reason we won't deploy hashed-only on the
backend plus SCRAM-only on the wire at jabber.org.
So will you 1) not support SCRAM at all, or 2) derive the hash keys from
the plaintext passwords during authentication, or 3)
On 12/17/09 11:03 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im writes:
Agreed. That's the main reason we won't deploy hashed-only on the
backend plus SCRAM-only on the wire at jabber.org.
So will you 1) not support SCRAM at all, or 2) derive the hash keys from
the
On Dec 17, 2009, at 9:55 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Low iteration counts removes one nice features of SCRAM (mitigating
dictionary attacks on stolen hash databases).
It's only a nice feature if you can take advantage of it. If you need to
support multiple password mechanisms, each either
Kurt Zeilenga kurt.zeile...@isode.com writes:
On Dec 17, 2009, at 9:55 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
Low iteration counts removes one nice features of SCRAM (mitigating
dictionary attacks on stolen hash databases).
It's only a nice feature if you can take advantage of it. If you need
to
I'm curious what the community makes of the recent news
http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-myspace-facebook-passwords/
given SASL's cleartext password storage? It seems like a monster breech.
Are we, as XMPP network operators, headed to a similar compromise as
larger
On 12/16/09 9:03 AM, Simon Tennant (Buddycloud) wrote:
I'm curious what the community makes of the recent news
http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-myspace-facebook-passwords/
given SASL's cleartext password storage? It seems like a monster breech.
This topic is more
On 17.12.09 00:56, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
And even if you do have hashed passwords, if someone breaks into your
machine then it's not that much work to de-hash them all. It just looks
scarier if they're in cleartext to start with.
That more or less depends on what you store in your
On Dec 16, 2009, at 4:17 PM, Tobias Markmann wrote:
On 17.12.09 00:56, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
And even if you do have hashed passwords, if someone breaks into your
machine then it's not that much work to de-hash them all. It just looks
scarier if they're in cleartext to start with.
That
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 2009-12-17 01:43, Kurt Zeilenga wrote:
On Dec 16, 2009, at 4:17 PM, Tobias Markmann wrote:
On 17.12.09 00:56, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
And even if you do have hashed passwords, if someone breaks into your
machine then it's not that much
On 12/16/09 6:12 PM, Mihael Pranjić wrote:
For a start you should really have you server very well secured. Very
restriced access to anything, not letting mysql server or whatever to be
accessed by anything else than localhost. No root ssh login, only
certificate login, and so on and so on...
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