[kleopatra] [Bug 363309] certificates signed through marginal trusted certificates are incorrectly displayed

2020-04-03 Thread Andre Heinecke
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=363309

--- Comment #3 from Andre Heinecke  ---
The proper fix here would be to use the trust levels that we use in GpgOL
throughout Kleopatra and KMail (libkleo)

https://wiki.gnupg.org/AutomatedEncryption#Trust_Levels

There is already some work on this done in libkleo as I would like to move it
also there. (GpgOL also uses libkleo for GUI Elements).

We had an issue in phabricator for KMail to do this but never gotten around to
it. I hope to do some more work on this later this year to have KMail use the
same keyresolver dialog from Libkleo that GpgOL uses.

-- 
You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.

[kleopatra] [Bug 363309] certificates signed through marginal trusted certificates are incorrectly displayed

2020-03-31 Thread John Scott
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=363309

John Scott  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

   See Also||http://bugs.debian.org/9490
   ||42
 CC||jsc...@posteo.net

-- 
You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.

[kleopatra] [Bug 363309] certificates signed through marginal trusted certificates are incorrectly displayed

2016-08-09 Thread Bernhard E . Reiter via KDE Bugzilla
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=363309

Bernhard E. Reiter  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 Status|UNCONFIRMED |CONFIRMED
 Ever confirmed|0   |1

--- Comment #2 from Bernhard E. Reiter  ---
Hi Andre,
to me this is a clear defect in the current gui.

The gui aims to be for power users (aka Bob and Annika in
https://wiki.gnupg.org/EasyGpg2016/VisionAndStories ).
And the GUI claims to help you manage the Web of Trust,
which some power users still want to do.

In the Web of Trust (and some other trust context) a trusted certificate comes
with a strong indication that it belongs to the userid and is a base for
trusting other certificates.
A certificate that is marginally trusted should not fall in this category,
at least it is missleading. The certificate in questions falls in the category
"some trust"
and when in doubt this meant: not enough trust.

If a user starts to understand the WoT implementation of GnuPG, she will
be surprised by the different behaviour of the kleopatra display and the GnuPG 
backend.

If there is an easy fix, it probably should also be done on older product lines
as long
as they are still in usage.

Best,
Bernhard

-- 
You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.


[kleopatra] [Bug 363309] certificates signed through marginal trusted certificates are incorrectly displayed

2016-05-20 Thread Andre Heinecke via KDE Bugzilla
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=363309

Andre Heinecke  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 CC||bernh...@intevation.de,
   ||eman...@intevation.de

-- 
You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.
___
Kdepim-bugs mailing list
Kdepim-bugs@kde.org
https://mail.kde.org/mailman/listinfo/kdepim-bugs


[kleopatra] [Bug 363309] certificates signed through marginal trusted certificates are incorrectly displayed

2016-05-20 Thread Andre Heinecke via KDE Bugzilla
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=363309

--- Comment #1 from Andre Heinecke  ---
I'm not sure how to handle marginal trust in the UI. Is marginal trust really
something we should warn about? I think we need to have this information
available for the advanced user and generally treat marginal keys as "ok".
E.g. in the trusted certificates group there is some trust there and trusted
certificates does not say "Fully trusted certificates ;-) "

I think it is more important to highlight the case where there is no indication
that the key belongs to the UID.

With Tofu this is important because TOFU will return marginal trust with a sub
validity:

Values for VALIDITY are:
- 0 :: conflict
- 1 :: key without history
- 2 :: key with too little history
- 3 :: key with enough history for basic trust
- 4 :: key with a lot of history

I think generally we should stick with the three levels "Green, Yellow and Red"
and make further information available in details and for advanced users.

Here I would say that after a validity of 2 we switch to "green". For
"Encrypting to this certificate" and in some overall "UID validity status
indicator" and "yellow" (or whatever gnupg tells us to do, when verifying
signatures).

Here is what I'm currently proposing to use for the Indicator for Opportunistic
Encryption in KMail:
https://phabricator.kde.org/differential/changeset/?ref=34677

(And what I plan to reuse in Kleopatra for recipient selection)

Pretty unsure about this though.

-- 
You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.
___
Kdepim-bugs mailing list
Kdepim-bugs@kde.org
https://mail.kde.org/mailman/listinfo/kdepim-bugs


[kleopatra] [Bug 363309] certificates signed through marginal trusted certificates are incorrectly displayed

2016-05-20 Thread Jochen via KDE Bugzilla
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=363309

Jochen  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 CC||joc...@intevation.de

-- 
You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.
___
Kdepim-bugs mailing list
Kdepim-bugs@kde.org
https://mail.kde.org/mailman/listinfo/kdepim-bugs