Re: kadmin problem...

2002-01-25 Thread Andreas Hasenack
Em Thu, Jan 24, 2002 at 12:09:38PM -0600, Steve Langasek escreveu: I've found that I have to do this locally even if I have all SRV records in place. Either there's something wrong with the SRV record I'm using, or the kadmin from MIT KRB5 1.2.3 doesn't check SRV records. The documentation

Re: multi-hop cross-realm authentication

2002-01-25 Thread Steve Langasek
On Fri, Jan 25, 2002 at 09:21:15AM -0600, Douglas E. Engert wrote: I have three Kerberos realms, all running MIT KDCs, which we'll call ONE.NET, TWO.NET, and FOO.TWO.NET. If I grab a TGT for a principal in realm FOO.TWO.NET, I can acquire tickets for services in the TWO.NET realm. If I

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Andreas Hasenack
LDAP services aren't really a distinct category. You might run several LDAP services on the same host whose data and access controls are completely different, and that's what you would I though ACLs were not kerberos' concern. Kerberos only says that you are you, right? What you can or

Re: multi-hop cross-realm authentication

2002-01-25 Thread Marc Horowitz
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Steve Langasek) writes: It would be nice to not have to configure an explicit capath, of course. Still, I gather from your comments that after configuring the shared keys this should Just Work. Since it did not, I'm lead to the same conclusion that there's a bug at

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Nicolas Williams
On Fri, Jan 25, 2002 at 08:39:51AM -0800, Booker C. Bense wrote: On 24 Jan 2002, Donn Cave wrote: Quoth [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Andreas Hasenack): | I'm suddenly a little bit confused about host and services | principals. | An LDAP service certainly should have its own key, but in my

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Andreas Hasenack
Em Fri, Jan 25, 2002 at 12:25:54PM -0500, Nicolas Williams escreveu: How should a client distinguish between two *different* LDAP databases using the same service principal name? I think each LDAP DB should have a unique service principal name. Most times ldap/fqdn@REALM will do, but if

Re: multi-hop cross-realm authentication

2002-01-25 Thread Paul Vixie
... IMHO, the default capath through the root is also a bad idea, but since there has never been a gTLD kerberos realm that I am aware of, and there is unlikely to be one, it's a moot point in practice. maybe. i'm not convinced that a pay-for-CA model wouldn't work, and wouldn't thus permit

Re: multi-hop cross-realm authentication

2002-01-25 Thread Marc Horowitz
Paul Vixie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: ... IMHO, the default capath through the root is also a bad idea, but since there has never been a gTLD kerberos realm that I am aware of, and there is unlikely to be one, it's a moot point in practice. maybe. i'm not convinced that a pay-for-CA

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Donn Cave
Quoth [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Andreas Hasenack): | LDAP | services aren't really a distinct category. You might run | several LDAP services on the same host whose data and access | controls are completely different, and that's what you would | | I though ACLs were not kerberos' concern.

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Donn Cave
Quoth [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Booker C. Bense): ... | - There's nothing stopping these various ldap servers from | sharing the same keytab. I can see some reasons for not wanting | to do that, but the only compelling one to me is that if | you don't trust the security of one of the servers. | Other

Client side/application authentication and Kerberos

2002-01-25 Thread John D.
I'm a newbie to Kerberos and am looking for some help. We are going to use Kerberos and strong authentication to supply security to an Oracle 9i database. From reading the documentation, I see that once you install and configure Kerberos on the client and server, you simply perform an okinit or

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Ken Hornstein
Sadly, it looks like LDAP uses the hostname of the server, which is probably not what you really want. I'm not sure in the context of SASL it's possible to do anything else. --Ken

Re: multi-hop cross-realm authentication

2002-01-25 Thread Steve Langasek
On Fri, Jan 25, 2002 at 01:16:00PM -0600, Douglas E. Engert wrote: After thinking about it a bit, it seems I may just create cross-realm keys for FOO.TWO.NET-ONE.NET, as this maps better onto the real-world trust relationships. That would work, but does not solve the N**2 key problem

Re: multi-hop cross-realm authentication

2002-01-25 Thread Nicolas Williams
On Fri, Jan 25, 2002 at 01:36:56PM -0600, Steve Langasek wrote: 1.2.3 is the first version that I've personally tried this with. 1.2.2 doesn't have code to return a policy error with respect to transited field values. I just checked. I haven't checked 1.2.3 yet. Steve Langasek postmodern

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Sam Hartman
Donn == Donn Cave [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Donn An LDAP service certainly should have its own key, but in my Donn opinion this should actually be a run time option. LDAP Donn services aren't really a distinct category. You might run Donn several LDAP services on the same host

Re: host and services principals/tickets

2002-01-25 Thread Donn Cave
Quoth [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Sam Hartman): | Donn == Donn Cave [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: | |Donn An LDAP service certainly should have its own key, but in my |Donn opinion this should actually be a run time option. LDAP |Donn services aren't really a distinct category. You might run |