On Thu, Apr 04, 2024 at 10:40:34AM +1300, Huang, Kai wrote:
>
>
> On 3/04/2024 4:42 am, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 06:48:21PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 11:21:32PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> > > > On 3/25/2024 6:38 PM, Kirill A.
On 3/04/2024 4:42 am, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 06:48:21PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 11:21:32PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
On 3/25/2024 6:38 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 06:48:21PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 11:21:32PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> > On 3/25/2024 6:38 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads
> > > to #VE.
> >
> > Will we consider
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 11:21:32PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 3/25/2024 6:38 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads
> > to #VE.
>
> Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard
> against
On 3/25/2024 6:38 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads
to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard
against X86_FEATURE_MCE as well?
If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest,