This patch allows a guest to use the VMXON and VMXOFF instructions, and
emulates them accordingly. Basically this amounts to checking some
prerequisites, and then remembering whether the guest has enabled or disabled
VMX operation.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <n...@il.ibm.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |  111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- .before/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c  2011-01-26 18:06:02.000000000 +0200
+++ .after/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c   2011-01-26 18:06:02.000000000 +0200
@@ -130,6 +130,17 @@ struct shared_msr_entry {
        u64 mask;
 };
 
+/*
+ * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
+ * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu. For example,
+ * the current VMCS set by L1, a list of the VMCSs used to run the active
+ * L2 guests on the hardware, and more.
+ */
+struct nested_vmx {
+       /* Has the level1 guest done vmxon? */
+       bool vmxon;
+};
+
 struct vcpu_vmx {
        struct kvm_vcpu       vcpu;
        struct list_head      local_vcpus_link;
@@ -177,6 +188,9 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
        u32 exit_reason;
 
        bool rdtscp_enabled;
+
+       /* Support for a guest hypervisor (nested VMX) */
+       struct nested_vmx nested;
 };
 
 static inline struct vcpu_vmx *to_vmx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -3758,6 +3772,99 @@ static int handle_invalid_op(struct kvm_
 }
 
 /*
+ * Emulate the VMXON instruction.
+ * Currently, we just remember that VMX is active, and do not save or even
+ * inspect the argument to VMXON (the so-called "VMXON pointer") because we
+ * do not currently need to store anything in that guest-allocated memory
+ * region. Consequently, VMCLEAR and VMPTRLD also do not verify that the their
+ * argument is different from the VMXON pointer (which the spec says they do).
+ */
+static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+       struct kvm_segment cs;
+       struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+       /* The Intel VMX Instruction Reference lists a bunch of bits that
+        * are prerequisite to running VMXON, most notably cr4.VMXE must be
+        * set to 1 (see vmx_set_cr4() for when we allow the guest to set this).
+        * Otherwise, we should fail with #UD. We test these now:
+        */
+       if (!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_VMXE) ||
+           !kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_PE) ||
+           (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
+               kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+       if (is_long_mode(vcpu) && !cs.l) {
+               kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
+               kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
+
+       skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+       return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Intel's VMX Instruction Reference specifies a common set of prerequisites
+ * for running VMX instructions (except VMXON, whose prerequisites are
+ * slightly different). It also specifies what exception to inject otherwise.
+ */
+static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+       struct kvm_segment cs;
+       struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+       if (!vmx->nested.vmxon) {
+               kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+       if ((vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_VM) ||
+           (is_long_mode(vcpu) && !cs.l)) {
+               kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
+               kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free whatever needs to be freed from vmx->nested when L1 goes down, or
+ * just stops using VMX.
+ */
+static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+       if (!vmx->nested.vmxon)
+               return;
+       vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMXOFF instruction */
+static int handle_vmoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+       if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+               return 1;
+       free_nested(to_vmx(vcpu));
+       skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+       return 1;
+}
+
+/*
  * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
  * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
  * to be done to userspace and return 0.
@@ -3785,8 +3892,8 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(st
        [EXIT_REASON_VMREAD]                  = handle_vmx_insn,
        [EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]                = handle_vmx_insn,
        [EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE]                 = handle_vmx_insn,
-       [EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]                   = handle_vmx_insn,
-       [EXIT_REASON_VMON]                    = handle_vmx_insn,
+       [EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]                   = handle_vmoff,
+       [EXIT_REASON_VMON]                    = handle_vmon,
        [EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD]     = handle_tpr_below_threshold,
        [EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS]             = handle_apic_access,
        [EXIT_REASON_WBINVD]                  = handle_wbinvd,
--
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