Re: [PATCH 17/27] arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around EFI runtime service calls

2017-08-15 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
On 9 August 2017 at 13:05, Dave Martin wrote: > The EFI runtime services ABI allows EFI to make free use of the > FPSIMD registers during EFI runtime service calls, subject to the > callee-save requirements of the AArch64 procedure call standard. > > However, the SVE

Re: [PATCH 16/27] arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around kernel-mode NEON use

2017-08-15 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
On 9 August 2017 at 13:05, Dave Martin wrote: > Kernel-mode NEON will corrupt the SVE vector registers, due to the > way they alias the FPSIMD vector registers in the hardware. > > This patch ensures that any live SVE register content for the task > is saved by

Re: [PATCH 11/27] arm64/sve: Core task context handling

2017-08-15 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
Hi Dave, On 9 August 2017 at 13:05, Dave Martin wrote: > This patch adds the core support for switching and managing the SVE > architectural state of user tasks. > > Calls to the existing FPSIMD low-level save/restore functions are > factored out as new functions

Re: [PATCH 05/27] arm64: fpsimd: Simplify uses of {set, clear}_ti_thread_flag()

2017-08-15 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
On 9 August 2017 at 13:05, Dave Martin wrote: > The existing FPSIMD context switch code contains a couple of > instances of {set,clear}_ti_thread(task_thread_info(task)). Since > there are thread flag manipulators that operate directly on > task_struct, this verbosity isn't

Re: [PATCH 23/27] arm64/sve: KVM: Hide SVE from CPU features exposed to guests

2017-08-15 Thread Marc Zyngier
On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote: > KVM guests cannot currently use SVE, because SVE is always > configured to trap to EL2. > > However, a guest that sees SVE reported as present in > ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 may legitimately expect that SVE works and try to > use it. Instead of working, the guest

Re: [PATCH 21/27] arm64/sve: KVM: Prevent guests from using SVE

2017-08-15 Thread Marc Zyngier
On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote: > Until KVM has full SVE support, guests must not be allowed to > execute SVE instructions. > > This patch enables the necessary traps, and also ensures that the > traps are disabled again on exit from the guest so that the host > can still use SVE if it