On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 06:44:45PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 9 August 2017 at 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
> > The EFI runtime services ABI allows EFI to make free use of the
> > FPSIMD registers during EFI runtime service calls, subject to the
> > callee-save requirements of the AArch64 proc
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 06:31:05PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Hi Dave,
>
> On 9 August 2017 at 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
> > This patch adds the core support for switching and managing the SVE
> > architectural state of user tasks.
> >
> > Calls to the existing FPSIMD low-level save/restore f
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 05:33:15PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
> > Until KVM has full SVE support, guests must not be allowed to
> > execute SVE instructions.
> >
> > This patch enables the necessary traps, and also ensures that the
> > traps are disabled aga
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 05:37:55PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
> > KVM guests cannot currently use SVE, because SVE is always
> > configured to trap to EL2.
> >
> > However, a guest that sees SVE reported as present in
> > ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 may legitimately exp
On 16/08/17 11:54, Dave Martin wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 05:37:55PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
>>> KVM guests cannot currently use SVE, because SVE is always
>>> configured to trap to EL2.
>>>
>>> However, a guest that sees SVE reported as present in
On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
> Currently, a guest kernel sees the true CPU feature registers
> (ID_*_EL1) when it reads them using MRS instructions. This means
> that the guest will observe features that are present in the
> hardware but the host doesn't understand or doesn't provide supp
On 16/08/17 11:50, Dave Martin wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 05:33:15PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
>>> Until KVM has full SVE support, guests must not be allowed to
>>> execute SVE instructions.
>>>
>>> This patch enables the necessary traps, and also ens
On 16/08/17 12:20, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 16/08/17 11:50, Dave Martin wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 05:33:15PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>>> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
Until KVM has full SVE support, guests must not be allowed to
execute SVE instructions.
This
On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 12:10:53PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 16/08/17 11:54, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 05:37:55PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> >> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
[...]
> >>> + if (id == SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1) {
> >>> + static bool printed;
>
On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 12:20:41PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 16/08/17 11:50, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 05:33:15PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> >> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
> >>> Until KVM has full SVE support, guests must not be allowed to
> >>> execute SVE in
On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
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This patch uses the cpufeatures framework to determine common SVE
capabilities and vector lengths, and configures
On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
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This patch enables detection of hardware SVE support via the
cpufeatures framework, and reports its presence to th
On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 12:10:38PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 09/08/17 13:05, Dave Martin wrote:
> > Currently, a guest kernel sees the true CPU feature registers
> > (ID_*_EL1) when it reads them using MRS instructions. This means
> > that the guest will observe features that are present in
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