Assad is growing weaker Hussain Abdul-Hussain<http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsAuthorArticles.aspx?Author=Hussain Abdul-Hussain>, t <http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=317759#> <javascript:checkSize('size');> <javascript:checkSize2('size')> An image grab from a YouTube video shows defected Syrian soldiers standing on tanks amid demonstrators in Hama. Defecting soldiers are a major threat to the Assad regime. (AFP photo/YouTube)
A ferocious battle was taking place in Rastan between army defectors and loyalists to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Witnesses said the ranks of the rebels swelled when more soldiers defected from the attacking pro-Assad forces. Benefitting from the support of the local population, the defectors unexpectedly held their ground and inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers, forcing the army to use air power to bombard the town randomly and teach both defectors and civilians a lesson. But six months after the outbreak of the uprising, it seems that Assad is the one who needs to learn some lessons. Brutality has succeeded in subduing dozens of the flashpoint Syrian cities and towns only as long as Assad keeps his tanks in the squares and his snipers on rooftops. When these are redeployed to quell the uprising elsewhere, protesters take to the streets again to demand Assad step down. Syria has seemingly reached a stalemate between Assad's loyalists and those calling for his ouster. But the rebels have time on their side, especially given their tested determination and resilience. Assad, for his part, has employed a two-pronged strategy: the unlimited use of violence coupled with a propaganda campaign aimed at scaring Syria's minorities and foreign powers of the consequences of his possible downfall. With the decline of America's power in the region and with the potential for a power vacuum to prevail, many fear the future if Assad were to fall. The scenarios have varied between a civil war that might spill into Iraq and Lebanon, and a radical Islamist takeover. News reports are also buzzing with unverifiable stories that army defectors and civilian activists have been arming. Syrian rebels fall into four general categories. One is composed of dissidents in exile who have no influence over the course of events but can help lobby world powers in favor of the uprising. The other three types of activist are inside Syria, and two of them have been instrumental in stirring the uprising. *Peaceful activists, organized into loosely connected Coordination Committees, have been the main engine of the uprising. They organize protests and tape them, and run a sophisticated social media campaign. The probability of these people turning violent is slim.* *Another group influencing events inside Syria is the army defectors, who have so far organized themselves into the Free Officers, the Free Syrian Army, and the Khaled Bin al-Walid Battalion in Homs and the Omar Ibn al-Khattab Battalion in Deir al-Zour. Estimated at more than 10,000, these soldiers have ambushed Assad's loyalists and engaged them in battles, though they often run out of ammunition and get decimated.* The last group is formed of intellectuals and opposition figures living in Syria who were active before the uprising began. They have no influence with either the peaceful activists or the army defectors. A few of them have been co-opted by Assad and have been arguing that a civil war is inevitable, thus aggravating the fear of a post-Assad Syria. Many of them call for dialogue with Assad as the only way to end the strife. More soldiers will probably defect, and some may join forces with tribal fighters and procure arms off the black market, but they will by no means be able to get their hands on enough firepower to make a dent in the official armed forces. If the Libya war tells us anything, it is that ragtag militias without foreign intervention cannot stop, let alone defeat, an organized army like the units still loyal to Assad. Still, despite Assad's brutal upper hand, time is on the rebels side. Last week, the government banned the import of any commodity with a tax that is higher than five percent to prevent the flow of hard currency out of Syria, leading experts to conclude that the volume of Syria's reserves is much smaller than the $18 billion Syria's Central Bank governor, Adib Mayyaleh, previously announced. The minute Assad runs out of foreign currency, the Syrian pound will stop being worth the paper it is printed on. Hyperinflation will hit, and Assad will not be able to pay his fighters. Unlike Libya's Moammar Qaddafi, who had an estimated $15 billion in cash in the vaults of his Central Bank during the fight for Tripoli, Assad's resources are meager, especially after Europe slapped sanctions on the countrys oil sector last week. Assad is growing weaker by the hour. If Syrians continue protesting, there is no way he can keep his terror campaign going. There is no worldwide radical Alawite network to bolster the regime or protect the sects interests if Assad is ousted. There are no foreign troops to rally Syrians against. Assad is running out of cash and excuses. Sometime soon, he will be the commander of a minority that fears that a continuation of the battle will spell its end, and it will either force Assad to give up or it will give up on him. *Hussain Abdul-Hussain is the Washington Bureau Chief of Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai * To read more: http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=317759#ixzz1a0yECc6L http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/ Wednesday, October 5, 2011 The Self-Chosen People!<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/self-chosen-people.html> *As Assads all too real war against his people continues, with blessings from the BRICKS, Syrias new self-appointed leaders press on with their opaque process of self-selection, while protesters cheer them on by burning the symbols of everything these leaders had ever stood for. New Syria will not be like Old Syria even if the new temporary leaders wore the same ideological mantle.* *Wednesday October 5, 2011 * 16 were killed, including 5 defectors, in crackdown all over Syria, including Homs, Hama, Idlib, Suweida Deraa/Hauran and Damascus. *Links* *Turkeys New Policy on Syria<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3406> * *Syrian no-fly zone has Joe-mentum<http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/04/syrian_no_fly_zone_has_joe_mentum> * *Ban Ki-moon: UN has moral obligation to stop Syria bloodshed<http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/ban-ki-moon-un-has-moral-obligation-to-stop-syria-bloodshed-1.388377?localLinksEnabled=false> * *Source: EU moves toward new sanction on Iran and Syria<http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/source-eu-moves-toward-new-sanction-on-iran-and-syria-1.388397?localLinksEnabled=false> * *SNC Update: is it SNC 3.0 or 1.5?* Despite the announcement that happened a couple of days ago, and todays endorsement by Syrias Mandela, Riyadh Al-Turk, wrangling as to the exact makeup of the SNC continues, but the rather than going in the right direction, that is, of fairer representation and greater inclusiveness, things are going in the opposite direction. The number of seats to be allocated continues to go up and down from one minute to another, with most of the 70 members of SNC 1.0 now back in play, with all the baggage they bring. So we now have on board: SNC 1.0, the Damascus Declaration, the Ghalioun Block, the LCCs, the Muslim Brotherhood and individual Kurdish and Assyrian representatives. Out is the Syrian Revolution General Commission which has announced that it will not take part in the Council because their request for one third of the seats to be used as the blocking third was denied. The Antalya Group is still debating whether to take part, but its share has now been reduced to 6 seats, so its participation will not make any difference. Some Kurdish groups have already distanced themselves from the process with others planning to follow their lead, and the tribal coalition is divided on the matter. Liberals, Alawites and Christians are out of any serious consideration except as necessary decorative pieces. *Exclusion rather than inclusion remains the central theme.* Champions of resistance ideology seem to be manipulating the process to their benefit. Their drive, it seems, other than serving their own personal egos and ambitions, is to ensure that regimefall does not lead to a change in national constants as they, and not necessarily the people, see them. *So, as protesters burn Hezbollah, Iranian, Russian and Chinese flags (as we see here in this video from Ghanto in the Homs province ** http://youtu.be/hnX1-1W2K8Q* <http://youtu.be/hnX1-1W2K8Q>* and this video from Damascuss Midan District **http://youtu.be/1VxKHDwvflc*<http://youtu.be/1VxKHDwvflc> * among many others taken earlier today in demonstrations throughout the country), given the chance, these people will likely hoist them high.* I am still all for regime change of course, even if it paved the way for the temporary empowerment of these figures, but then the transitional period ahead will not lead to democracy but to a new phase in our struggle for it. The fight for our freedom will continue. But, for now, its this third rate drama that continues to unfold, as the Assads go on with their killing spree. Still, the SNC should be engaged, but engagers should beware that, regardless of SNC leaders have to say, people want a no-fly zone as well as a strong international stance on Assads crackdown including recognition of the Free Syrian Army and its legitimate role in protecting the people and fighting against the regime with all the support that this recognition entails. Most protesters want the SNC because they believe its development will encourage the international community to toughen its stands on the Assads, but as far as realities on the ground are concerned, defectors and the local popular committees (no, not necessarily the LCCs which are small though visible part of the phenomenon of popular committees) have far greater legitimacy than any council. *The Zainab Saga * Well, it has now been confirmed by Zainab Alhusnis family that the girl interviewed ion Syrian TV is indeed their daughter. But now the Assads look even worse. Because, as Lebanese human rights lawyer, Nabeel Al-Halabi argued, its Syrian authorities that told Zainabs family that the mutilated body belonged to their missing daughter, after conducting an autopsy, and they officially signed on to it to allow for the burial of the body. So, local and international human rights activists and organizations are not to blame here, as Syrian TV wants us to believe, because their identification of Zainab was based on official findings. And we are still left at end of the day with a mutilated body that needs to be identified, a heinous crime that needs to solved, where political motivations might still have played a role. In fact, some are speculating that this could be the body of teenage blogger Tal Al-Mallouhi who hasnt been heard from since her arrest in 2009. And did the authorities apologize to Zainabs family for this case of misidentification, not to mention the death of Zainabs brother? No, on the contrary, as the Guardian *reports<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/05/syria-attack-media-beheaded-girl?newsfeed=true> *: The Syrian Human Rights Network, a loyalist organisation, demanded an apology for Hosni and the Syrian people. Talk about impunity. *FEATURED VIDEOS * *Damascus/Douma:* residents demonstrated day http://youtu.be/kR5ceS3HjCs and night http://youtu.be/uTjL-M7pZkc to protest the 100s of arbitrary arrests that have taken place over the last few days. *Harasta* was among other Damascene suburbs to witness major protests today http://youtu.be/YzNHe2B9Ooo *Arbeen* http://youtu.be/7LR6Xowxc68 *Idlib/Kafar Nabbol:* loyalist army troops move in http://youtu.be/TJ6svhS4HSw open fire on locals http://youtu.be/Witsm74QZ8gMeanwhile, people take to the streets in nearby *Idlib City* http://youtu.be/ZIkjkTFuZjo *Binnish* http://youtu.be/w2pmq6s1Mus and *Jabal Al-Zawiyeh* http://youtu.be/LErje3lNR-o *Homs/Talbisseh:* more videos from September 30 invasion http://youtu.be/aU7XhWRoKS8 , http://youtu.be/fZMqFaR7v28 the body of a local martyr lying in the street (Oct 1) http://youtu.be/hiUgRmGPhH8 Meanwhile, we have more videos from the battle for *Rastan* http://youtu.be/L1rg9CF5BsI , http://youtu.be/qw45NUtGs6Y , http://youtu.be/BzKZj95i3Xo Scenes from the local hospital http://youtu.be/uB006JJ1zA0 , http://youtu.be/_a09ejfDdqo A leaked video showing the loyalist tank columns that took over Rastan http://youtu.be/JCFo8rJlsYA Hows this not Benghazi again? Oh yeah, no oil. And in *Homs City*, protesters renewed their revolutionary pledge: *Qoussour * http://youtu.be/0DSt7WOW11k *Bab Al-Sibaa* http://youtu.be/UAtZoeE_ZFE * Khaldiyeh* http://youtu.be/QtqfrtMs7wA *Inshaaat* http://youtu.be/EB8YWN3nP7I *Bayadah* http://youtu.be/uypYtXYgMe4 *Deir Baalbah* http://youtu.be/LjCasIAQ3EY *Houleh* http://youtu.be/04FMErD15-w * Palmyra/Tadmor* http://youtu.be/MZ9c7pVepzA And children keep dying (Bilal Al-Talib, Deir Baalbah) http://youtu.be/IVfJvz6Kz9I Posted by Ammar at 9:41 PM<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/self-chosen-people.html> 0 comments<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/self-chosen-people.html#comments> <http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=5987696518253844128&from=pencil> Email This<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=5987696518253844128&target=email> BlogThis!<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=5987696518253844128&target=blog>Share to Twitter<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=5987696518253844128&target=twitter>Share to Facebook<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=5987696518253844128&target=facebook> Restive Rastan Wrested by Pro-Assad Militias!<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/restive-rastan-wrested-by-pro-assad.html> *No rest for the restive! Assads crackdown against protest and dissent continues, as Russia and China shield them against worlds ire.* *Tuesday October 4, 2011 * Russia and China veto a UN resolution condemning the Assads, as U.S. express outrage *---* 10 protesters were reported killed in different parts of Syria, including 3 in the besieged town of Talbisseh in the Homs Province * ---* Clashes between defectors and loyalists reported in Sarjah in Idlib Province and neighboring communities have left 3 loyalists dead *---*Demonstrations near the presidential place in the Mohajreen Neighborhood in Damascus featured calls for executing the president and were followed by a swift crackdown *---* Turkish army to conduct maneuver in Hatay Province on the borders with Syria, as Colonel Riyad Al-Assaad denies rumors that he was arrested and confirms establishing contacts with members of SNC *---*Assad security forces continue their crackdown on High School and Junior High students with dozens of arrests in Baniyas, Damascus, Homs and other communities. *More on SNC* As the wrangling over the final makeup of the Syrian National Council continues, let me clarify my position stated in my post yesterday on the issue of representation. First, I am not necessarily advocating the adoption of a strict quota system for representing different communities, what I am proposing is taking the demographic realities into consideration when making decisions on representation. For instance, when only 2% of members are Christians while their demographic size is 8%, there is definitely a problem here. But if Christians are represented at 6-7%, if not 9%, then should be acceptable. The idea is to have a critical mass of Christians that is capable of voicing the concerns of the diverse Christian communities in Syria and having a serious impact on the decision-making process in the Council. Of course, the issue of communal representations is further complicated by the unavoidable intersection with political ideology. For a Christian member of the SNC can a communist, a socialist, a Nasserist or a liberal. The same goes for an Alawite, a Druze or a Sunni Arab. So, we certainly cannot look at Christians or Alawites independently of their political affiliations, the process of balancing communal identity and political affiliation will be a complicated one indeed, but one that has to be dealt with. The fact that the SNC is being joined by groups most of which represent coalitions between parties with different political ideologies will complicate things even further. Thats why I am not proposing strict quota system, but proposing the use of demographic realities as a guide towards fairer representation of all. *The Missing Liberals *** In his post *Tread Carefully on Syria II<http://blogs.cfr.org/husain/2011/10/04/tread-carefully-in-syria-part-ii/> * Ed Hussein cautions that the assumption that a Syrian regime without Assad and the Alawites at the helm would mean an isolated Iran is wishful thinking at best, and uncertain at worse. He is correct. A Sunni government in Syria, led by a combination of the traditional left and Islamists would more likely adopt a similar stance on resistance and relationship with Iran that is currently espoused by the Assads. The liberal Sunni Arabs are the only force in the Syrian political landscape that can provide a counterweight in this regard, which is why their exclusion from SNC in *both * its iterations is rather ominous. *Protectus Interruptus: Protection without Intervention * It took Syrian opposition groups 6 months to realize what the protesters have long realized: that toppling the Assad regime requires the immediate ouster of Bashar Al-Assad. I wonder how long it will take them, especially those who joined the SNC, before realizing that the call for protecting civilians requires a certain level of foreign military intervention, and that their attempt at balancing calls for protection with statements rejecting military intervention is all too hypocritical and cowardly. Nonviolence reaches its limits when tanks are set against unarmed civilians, no matter how brave they happen to be. The inability to see that and to realize that international protection was indeed required is exactly what drove some of the protesters, encouraged by defectors and the prospects of more defections, to finally take up arms. True, the international community may not be in a listening mode regarding calls for intervention, but it will never get there unless we do our part in getting it there. And we *should*get it there, our faith in nonviolence notwithstanding. A large segment of the protest movement has already made up its mind after months of living in the shadows of Assads tanks, and they are now being exterminated, we cannot just pretend that this is not happening. Assads genocide might be unfolding in slow-motion, but it is taking place, it is real. We might have wanted things to unfold differently, but they didnt. And we are partly to blame. We spent the last months wrangling over lists of names and councils and quotas, instead of coming up with a strategy to support the peaceful protesters, and to chart a vision for the future that can alley the fears of minorities, attract the hesitant and inspire the protesters. Until now, our revolution still lacks a strategy and a vision. Who knows? Had we tackled this challenge earlier on, we might not be facing the dilemma of international intervention today? Our failure to unite around a common vision is as responsible for bringing us to the current quagmire as Assads bloody crackdown. Its not too late, however, to come up with something. But we dont have much time. *To Ban or not to Ban * A few days ago, Syrian authorities banned the import of certain products in the hope of preserving hard currency, but just yesterday the decision was * revoked<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/middleeast/syria-revokes-ban-on-imports.html?partner=rss&emc=rss> *. The *reason*: the decision was opposed by members of the business community who would have been more hurt by this decision than by any sanctions so far imposed on the Assad regime. The *lesson*: the business elite does have an influence over decision-making on certain levels, so sanction the hell out of them, let them use their influence to stop the violence, or let them pay the price. *Rastan* Spokesman for the defectors in *Rastan, *Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Division, says that they have withdrawn from the town in order to safeguard the local population from continuous shelling by loyalist troops. The town has been under attack by pro-Assad troops and militias for over a week http://youtu.be/CqFZj-hihwg . If anything, the battle has shown that defectors are organized and are capable of making tactical decisions in the heat of battle. Regimes victory at this stage might be pyrrhic, as troops might get bogged down in Rastan with defectors mounting guerrilla warfare and treating them as an occupation force. In this video, survivors from the Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Division confirm that they have joined the Free Syrian Army under the leadership of Riyadh Al-Assaad who has now emerged as the de facto military leader of the opposition. Meanwhile, however, the shelling of the town by Assad loyalists continues http://youtu.be/sRZJuTDDR-M On October 3, Assad troops tried a new technique, spraying the town with pesticides http://youtu.be/sM5SMIkYGSk But the battle followed a mostly traditional route (Sept 27) http://youtu.be/rshV_NMphN8 Havoc http://youtu.be/G_8noWrpe9w Locals hae been demanding a no-fly zone for weeks, but recently their calls have been adopted even by protesters in Damascuss *Midan* district http://youtu.be/LPX-BwX2vr4 *Zainab* Syrian TV *broadcasted statements<http://www.dp-news.com/en/detail.aspx?articleid=98772> * by a woman claiming to be Zainab Al-Husni, but protesters say that the woman shown on TV was not the real Zainab who, they insist, was killed and mutilated by security forces. The banner carried by a protester in *this video <http://youtu.be/W9w-6ZciNE8>* says Syria media lies, this is not the real Zainab. Others provided this photo comparing the two Zainabs and claiming that mothers name on ID card is different. <http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GGAtMkfOr5k/TowOYCoqMHI/AAAAAAABWEc/_iAOuxwPQ2g/s1600/312552_274269979261662_234822726539721_960982_351448540_n.jpg> **** *Supporting the SNC* *The SNC gets support from some protest community following a tradition that has been established since the Antalya Conference, but, by now, protesters have developed certain weariness. This is the fourth council to receive such popular endorsement. * *Homs / Qoussour* http://youtu.be/wO9bWXuxGLY *Homs/Jouret Al-Shayah* http://youtu.be/T6smZ9Nc0a8 *Homs/Khaldiyeh* http://youtu.be/P9yPNVzdn-8 *Homs/Bab Dreib* http://youtu.be/rAyyNB7AOpY *Homs/Baba Amr* http://youtu.be/DiQOyY7-wjo *Deraa/Harrah* http://youtu.be/mImhEf7Lx8s * Idlib/Heesh* http://youtu.be/-soNePcB2to *Idlib/Jabal Al-Zawiyeh* http://youtu.be/oplqN1Hk_IU *Idlib/Kafar Nabbol* http://youtu.be/PWkJjmrlKeY *Aleppo/Tal Rifaat* http://youtu.be/4Mug_b6EaAc *Damascus/Zamalka* http://youtu.be/8v3EAQ96-Uw *Damascus/Madaya* http://youtu.be/ZAcNiy_YQSk * Damascus/Zakiyah* http://youtu.be/EYK7FapEZF8 *Damascus/Al-Hajar Al-Aswad* http://youtu.be/WhNk5qE4bqY *Student defiance continues * *Mostly Junior High and High School students * *Deraa/Khirbet Ghazaleh:* students shout the people want to execute the president as they run down the halls http://youtu.be/p039ULO09gc * Deraa/Sanamein* http://youtu.be/V5_XXOBvZTc *Deraa/Bosra* http://youtu.be/MLHYiRK_UGs *Deraa/Tseel* http://youtu.be/xhjt9IuPZ6s * Damascus/Douma* (Oct 3) http://youtu.be/K-gUmxo_dBI *Damascus/Douma* (Oct 2) http://youtu.be/IJ3MyFtq4wY *Damascus/Barzeh* http://youtu.be/FQay1SKFf4o * Aleppo/Bayanoun* http://youtu.be/mOexJKi81_8 *Idlib/Marrat Hourmah* http://youtu.be/7OlC79PekeI *Idlib City* http://youtu.be/vAFOT8qtFfU * Idlib/Saraqib* http://youtu.be/axkrd4juX0o *Deir Ezzor/Qouriyeh* http://youtu.be/sRZJuTDDR-M *Homs/Qoussour* (University) http://youtu.be/42vcG6BZKsA *Homs/Midan* http://youtu.be/EAUyI4_Y854 *Tables turned * Captured *shabbiha* confess as they get beat that they received orders to shoot at civilians from Maher Al-Assad, that army troops were involved in rape, and that Hezbollah men have been involved in lending support to pro-Assad militias http://youtu.be/vX8jVwHLnnI Captured *security officer*confesses that security forces and army troops and not just militias are kidnapping local women in *Homs City* http://youtu.be/fnAi9WHxzIk *DERAA/HAURAN* *Tuesday was dedicated to showing solidarity with Sheikh Ahmad Al-Sayasneh now languishing in Assads jails. * *Daytime: **Sourah* http://youtu.be/71xxtsmcIYY *Abtaa* http://youtu.be/614xIsA99nY *Hraak* tanks still occupy the streets http://youtu.be/FXrhYdbs4Qs *Nighttime: **Hraak* http://youtu.be/BLzAcDP8lAM *Dael* http://youtu.be/DDsth1VD-2E *Deraa City* http://youtu.be/p039ULO09gc *Oct 3 - in support of Rastan:* *Karak* http://youtu.be/xhjt9IuPZ6s *Basr Al-Harir* http://youtu.be/KwRhg2etVTk *Tal Shihab* http://youtu.be/dKzTy06k2UI * Sanamein* http://youtu.be/5ODQwVmyv0A *DAMASCUS * *Daytime: **Douma* a funeral for an activist http://youtu.be/uoiFjTgwXKE *Nighttime: **Douma* http://youtu.be/TBo8M47O0z8 *Midan/Corniche* http://youtu.be/eW7jAZpBMs4 *Zabadani* http://youtu.be/C3nsMCaWrx4 *IDLIB* *Daytime: **Sarjah* sounds of battle between loyalists and defectors http://youtu.be/eUkVV4kNNVs *Sarmeen* Assad loyalists celebrate a pyrrhic victory http://youtu.be/rTbZ1mfOP6k *Khan Al-Subul* tanks in the streets http://youtu.be/6jMpIO9m6gI , http://youtu.be/nsQWzor8xks *Kafar Ouayd*funeral http://youtu.be/k-gbR6lRrNM *Nighttime: **Binnish* http://youtu.be/T4YuaFhRJ5E *Marrat Al-Nouman* http://youtu.be/dIprF_3YUIA *Marr Tamsareen* http://youtu.be/NdutGl4zxlc *HOMS* *Homs City / Daytime: *Locals who were tortured to death by pro-Assad militias http://youtu.be/JZJqNBHqq_s *Homs City / Nighttime: **Bab Houd* http://youtu.be/fJTEgHbzYAY *Inshaaat* http://youtu.be/Kbjg33Jm6nk *Ghoutah* http://youtu.be/e9qFQGEN6zs *Homs Province: **Talbisseh* house directly hit by tank shell (Sept 30) http://youtu.be/XHMfxqMKq_o Nonstop shelling (Oct 1) http://youtu.be/0HQsNMcAtLM Nonstop shelling (Sept 28) http://youtu.be/rpiI2tzM0OU Leaked video shows the scene from the loyalists perspective: shelling and missing the target (Sept 27) http://youtu.be/4p2f9-agKEE *Palmyra/Tadmor *http://youtu.be/TBEiAUVh6-0 * Houleh* http://youtu.be/HObhs-xi0zA *HAMA* *Hama/Taybat Al-Imam* http://youtu.be/ncH-ApynERc , http://youtu.be/GCYkfLhg0oM Posted by Ammar at 1:00 AM<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/restive-rastan-wrested-by-pro-assad.html> 1 comments<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/restive-rastan-wrested-by-pro-assad.html#comments> <http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=1910935703482038086&from=pencil> Email This<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=1910935703482038086&target=email> BlogThis!<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=1910935703482038086&target=blog>Share to Twitter<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=1910935703482038086&target=twitter>Share to Facebook<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1338638543807523351&postID=1910935703482038086&target=facebook> Monday, October 3, 2011 Council & Consequence!<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/council-consequence.html> *Hundreds killed, thousands detained, new council formed, nothing changed. * *Monday October 3, 2011 * France welcomes the formation of a new Syrian national council as killing continues ** *On Travelling * I have not been able to update the blog in a while because I had to undertake a mini-European tour during which I met with representatives of civil society organizations, academic institutions, Syrian opposition groups and a few officials and parliamentarians. Our discussions focused on some of things below, especially the issue of criteria that can be used to assess the credibility and legitimacy of a council claiming to represent the Syrian revolution. *On Homs and the prospects of civil war * Nothing taking place in Homs city and the larger province, including Rastan and Talbisseh, should come as a surprise to anyone whos been following this blog. I have recently described the situation there as a low intensity conflict, and if it has by now acquired aspects of a civil war, especially in Homs City, what could be more natural? The situation is no less critical in neighboring Idlib and Hama provinces. Still, and as opposition groups argue whether to call for international protection, the international community doesnt seem to be that concerned: going beyond sanctions is out of the question even should a thousand Benghazi take place in Syria. Meanwhile, the Assads continue to retake the country one rebellious community at a time. Today, it was Rastans turn, tomorrow Talbissehs then on to Homs City, and the rebellious communities in Damascus. The regime has not fallen yet, there are no spoils to divide, and no matter how emphatic it is in its condemnation of the Assads, the international community could just as easily re-legitimate them should their regime survive something that is still quite possible, even if we dont want to admit it. Assads violence is methodical, organized and overwhelming, disorganized violence will not only fail against them: it will play right into their hands. While nonviolence could only work on the longer run, but in order for protesters to keep committed to it in the face of all provocations, they need to be inspired. Still, the only thing Syrian opposition figures seem capable of inspiring in their people these days, other than mild sympathy, is strong contempt. Be that as it may, the situation in Homs and Idlib remains particular to these regions, the protest movement in Damascus, the Kurdish regions and most Deraa/Hauran remain quite peaceful. This could remain a two-track revolution for a while. *On Assassinations * 6 *assassinations<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203791904576608982056241782.html> * in less than a week reflect a level of organization and coordination not witnessed among ordinary protesters. So either we have a new group in our midst with experience in surveillance, tracking and operating below the radar of security apparatuses, or we have to give the repeated assertions made by activists that Assad security agents are indeed to blame for these assassination in hope of continuing to stoke sectarian fires some serious consideration. Time will tell. *On the new National Council * Meanwhile, we now have a new council, namely the Syrian National Council 2.0 a new and expanded version of the one launched 3 weeks ago. The Council has met with approval of many key players, individuals and groups, on the Syrian political scene, acting both inside and outside Syria, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus Declaration Council, the Local Coordination Committees, the Syrian Revolution General Commission, Burhan Ghalioun and Co. and a number of Kurdish and Christian personalities. The manner with which the Council was put together is controversial to say the least, as many important figures and groups were excluded from the deliberations, and the representation of certain confessional and national groups, such as Alawites, Christians and Kurds, fall way below their demographic size. The same can unsurprisingly be said of women as well. *The correspondence between demographic size and representation in the council is the only objective criterion we have at this stage to help us decide on fairness, legitimacy and, of course, engageability. * Still, this Council, it seems, is the best that can be achieved by Syrias myriad opposition groups without external pressure. While the Council in its new formation cannot be denounced as Islamist anymore, it cannot be described with any credibility as truly representative. In sectarian terms, Sunni Arabs seem to make up a majority that is much higher than their demographic size should entail. There seems to be a problem with regional representation as well. We should be able to form a clearer picture once we have full disclosure of the names, backgrounds and affiliations of council members. The Council, we are told, will operate on three levels: the General Assembly (230 seats, including 40 seats reserved for activists inside Syria), the General Secretariat (29) and the Executive Committee (7). In theory, the Assembly will elect the Secretariat and the Executive Committee, but, in practice, the names seem to have already been decided, with Burhan Ghalioun named as the President, and Basma Kodmani as spokeswoman. Most decision-making, in theory, will be done at the Secretariat level, but we cannot discount that, in practice, most decisions will be likely made by certain individual(s) in the Executive Committee. If the list of names of potential EC members I reviewed is accurate, then, the strategy is to create a diverse membership at this all too visible level to hide the homogeneity at the base. The strategy might prove effective indeed as far as the international community is concerned, that is, until experts begin sifting through the backgrounds of the various individuals making up the Assembly. Domestically though, the SNCs current makeup is bound to send the wrong message to the Alawites and Christians, playing right into Assads hands of framing the revolution in purely confessional and sectarian terms. It will not be well-received as well by Kurds, tribal groups and liberal Sunnis, including members of the artistic community and the business community. But Kurdish parties and main tribal groups will still back the Council at this stage for the lack of better options. But considering the long fight ahead, these internal contradictions will hurt and are bound to resurface all too soon. Personally, and after noting that I cannot get along with the kind of politicking taking place in all activities involved with council-formation, where transparency is minimal and personalities rather than ideas and programs continue to dominate, I will refrain from joining the fray, and will simply observe and critique from a distance while lobbying for greater inclusion of currently underrepresented and excluded groups to guarantee the emergence of a truly national and representative body down the road. Because no council, no matter how temporary, should be considered final and legitimate until it is truly representative. So my advice to the international community at this stage, including the U.S. and E.U., regarding future dealings with this new revised version of SNC: *approach with caution, do not fully endorse, until certain criteria allowing for fairer representation of Syrias demographic and political realities are met. Perhaps, this conditional engagement can help nudge SNC leadership in the right direction.* This table might be of use for future reference: *Syrias Major Ethnic Groups* *Group* *%* Sunni Arabs (Tribal 20%, Urban 40%) 60 Kurds 15 Alawites 10 Christians (including Assyrians, Armenians, Greeks, etc.) 8 Turkmen 3 Druze 3 Others (Ismailis, Circassians, etc.) 1 Posted by Ammar at 7:45 PM<http://syrianrevolutiondigest.blogspot.com/2011/10/council-consequence.html> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:laamn-unsubscr...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:laamn-subscr...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:laamn-dig...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:laamn-ow...@egroups.com?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:la...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/laamn@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! 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