*Marxism 'no longer responds to reality,' pope says of Cuba*

Responding to Pope Benedict XVI's comment that Marxism "no longer responds
to reality," Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez said Friday that his
country respects all opinions.

"We consider the exchange of ideas useful," Rodriguez said at Havana's
historic Hotel Nacional, adding that his country is perfecting its system.

The pontiff answered reporters' questions about the Caribbean communist
island on the papal plane Friday as he began a six-day trip to Mexico and
Cuba, according to the Vatican. He arrived in Mexico on Friday afternoon.

"With this visit, a way of cooperation and dialogue has been inaugurated, a
long road that requires patience but that leads forward," the pope said,
according to the Vatican.

"It is evident today that Marxist ideology as it had been conceived no
longer responds to reality," Benedict continued.

http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/12709/the_second_coming_of_el_papa_to_cuba

<http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/12709/the_second_coming_of_el_papa_to_cuba/>
Culture » March 7, 2012 The Second Coming of El Papa to Cuba

Pope Benedict XVI makes common cause with the Castro brothers.
BY Samuel Farber <http://www.inthesetimes.com/community/profile/265627>

Why has the Cuban government granted such recognition to the Church,
allowing it to play an important role in the country's political and social
life? Cuba is not Poland.

On March 26, Pope Benedict XVI will arrive in Cuba for a two-day whirlwind
of religious ceremonies and meetings with the Castro brothers and other
political leaders. Fourteen years will have elapsed since John Paul II
became the first pope to visit the country in 1998. Yet Benedict’s visit
will have a very different meaning than John Paul’s. Then, the Cuban
Catholic hierarchy was in the initial stages of its approach to the Cuban
regime in response to the island’s Communist Party having lifted, in 1991,
its ban on religious practitioners joining the ruling party. This ban had
deprived practitioners of Catholicism and other religions from access to
the most desirable educational and job opportunities.

Since then, Cuba’s officially communist government and Catholic leaders
have become improbable partners – sort of. The Cuban leadership welcomed
the Church and the Spanish government’s participation in the negotiations
leading to the release of most Cuban political prisoners in 2010 and 2011.
Cardinal Jaime Ortega Alamino, currently the head of the Church in Cuba
(who spent some time in the infamous UMAP labor camps when he was a young
seminarian in the ’60s), has traveled to the United States and Europe to
act as an unofficial diplomatic bridge between the Cuban government and
Washington, as well as with the European Union.

In return, the Cuban Catholic hierarchy has obtained a number of
institutional concessions from the Cuban government. Some involver ights
that would be taken for granted in any democracy, such as organizing
religious processions like Cubans’ celebration of the Virgen de la Caridad
del Cobre, the island’s patron saint, an icon for Catholics as well as for
practitioners of the Afro-Cuban Santer’a religion. The government has also
allowed the Church to establish websites and electronic bulletins, and –
more importantly in light of very limited internet access on the island –
to publish dozens of print publications that collectively reach about
250,000 people. Although read by less than 5 percent of the adult
population, they constitute the one significant exception to the
government’s media monopoly.

The government has also provided material help in building a new Catholic
seminary near Havana. The inauguration of which in November 2010 was
attended by Raúl Castro.

*Catholic realpolitik*

Why has the Cuban government granted such recognition to the Church,
allowing it to play an important role in the country’s political and social
life? Cuba is not Poland, and Cuban Catholicism has been, even before the
1959 Revolution, among the weakest in Latin America. According to the *National
Catholic Reporter*, less than half of the population identified as Catholic
in 2006. It is therefore unlikely that the Cuban government has behaved in
this manner to accommodate growing popular support for the Church on the
island.

Instead, Raúl Castro has chosen the Church as a negotiating partner to
implement his foreign policy designs, because the Church is a Cuban
institution that is simultaneously part of an influential international
organization. Indeed, the Church is the most important institution on the
island outside of the government’s control. In addition, the Church has a
degree of moral authority that the government may attempt to harness to
defend the legitimacy of the regime from growing corruption, especially
after the octogenarian Castro brothers pass from the scene.

The cooperation between political and Catholic leaders runs parallel to
broader changes on the island. The economic reforms approved at the Sixth
Communist Party Congress of April 2011 point to the establishment of a
Sino-Vietnamese model – political authoritarianism combined with a state
capitalist economy. Doing its part, the Cuban Church has established
business administration classes in association with the Catholic University
of Murcia in Spain, and begun training self-employed workers, an activity
from which the Cuban government has been notably absent.

Supported by the Vatican, it appears that Cuban Catholic leaders see
tactical collaboration with the government as part of a long-term strategy
to strengthen the church’s position and influence as the regime decays and
recasts itself.

Meanwhile, the Church has disciplined and tried to isolate Cuba’s more
militant priests, like José Conrado Rodr’guez, and laymen, like Dagoberto
Valdés, who have dared to go beyond the hierarchy’s very mild diplomatic
criticisms of the government’s dictatorial practices, while ignoring and
sometimes rejecting outright the vitriolic attacks directed at it by the
Cuban right ensconced in Florida.

The Church is hoping to achieve an ideological influence that can translate
into major gains such as restrictions on, if not the abolition of,
abortion. It is unlikely that such a change would have broad popular
support except among some practicing Catholics.

But the biggest prize is the one the church has been pursuing for well over
a century, long before the 1959 Revolution: the incorporation of Catholic
teaching in public education.

The real political differences among Catholics on the island may end up
helping the church pursue these goals, as they allow it to cover all bases,
and hedge its political and ideological bets. Thus on one hand Palabra
Nueva, the website of the Havana archdiocese, voices a conservative
perspective, while on the other hand the Lay Council of the same
archdiocese publishes *Espacio Laical Digital*, one of the few forums for
the expression of non-Catholic liberal, social democratic and even leftist
criticisms of the government.

In September 2011, the government allowed the Church to open the Félix
Varela Cultural Center, named after a pro-independence priest who lived in
the early part of the nineteenth century, in Havana. At the time of the
opening, Cardinal Ortega declared that the facility would offer studies in
philosophy, sociology and psychology, and hold art expositions, film
screenings, concerts and other cultural events. The Center is bound to
increase Catholic influence, though it is too early to tell the kind of
political impact it will have.

In late March, as international media breathlessly highlight Pope Benedict
XVI’s trip, remember this: The visit is the Vatican’s recognition of and
reward to the Cuban Church and government for their partnership, and also
the Cuban government’s reward to the church for its diplomatic role and
loyalty.

Undoubtedly, the Cuban people will come out to greet Benedict XVI. But
appearances can be deceiving. The Pope’s visit is an operation carried out
by the Cuban religious and political establishments entirely for their
benefit, as the island’s government attempts to renovate its rule from
above.
 ABOUT THIS AUTHOR

*Samuel Farber* is a professor of political science at Brooklyn College.
Born and raised in Cuba, his books include *Revolution and Reaction in
Cuba, 1933-1960*, and, most recently, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution
Reconsidered*.


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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