Hi Bill!
Thanks for your interest, comments below.
snip
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=info.guardianproject.mrapp
The app is open source (+1) and the developers behind it include Free
Press Unlimited, The Guardian Project and Small World News so its
provenance is indeed sound.
- Forwarded message from John Young j...@pipeline.com -
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 19:01:34 -0400
From: John Young j...@pipeline.com
To: Crypto List cryptogra...@randombit.net, cypherpu...@cpunks.org
Subject: NSA History of Traffic Analysis
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Many thanks Brian and Nathan for your detailed replies.
I look forward to using StoryMaker and I'll keep up with news about the app.
Good luck with the rest of the project and all the best for now
Bill
--
Community Media Association
http://www.commedia.org.uk/
http://twitter.com/community_media
From: Katerina Fialova katerina.fial...@apcwomen.org
Take Back the Tech,along with UN Women and other partners, are organizing
this month's #OrangeDay, which takes place every month on the 25th to raise
global awareness about GBV and the internet. We’re joining this day to
highlight technology
In the past few weeks, revelations regarding global surveillance
mechanisms have resulted in growing awareness and public debates about
data protection and privacy issues. Unfortunately, not many concrete
demands have been voiced so far. Therefore, German digital rights
association Digitale
(See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) )
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
Feds put heat on Web firms for master encryption keys
Whether the FBI and NSA have the legal authority to obtain the master keys
that
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:19:22AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
(See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) )
Would Convergence help here? I can't see how. If a government
secretly aquired the SSL private keys for a site, and the site
continued using them, then no convergence notary
Hi!
Some very good arguments *for* DRM on the web:
http://unitscale.com/mb/bomb-in-the-garden/
Mitar
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:22:25AM +0100, Nick wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:19:22AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
(See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) )
Would Convergence help here? I can't see how. If a government
secretly aquired the SSL private keys for a site, and
On Thu, Jul 25 2013, Eugen Leitl wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:22:25AM +0100, Nick wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:19:22AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
(See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) )
Would Convergence help here? I can't see how. If a government
secretly
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 04:14:56AM -0700, Mitar wrote:
Some very good arguments *for* DRM on the web:
http://unitscale.com/mb/bomb-in-the-garden/
That's a very interesting article. Though the author isn't exactly
arguing for DRM; his last paragraph calls out the W3C for their
recent moves in
This article details deploying forward secrecy.
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/06/25/ssl-labs-deploying-forward-secrecy
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 5:54 AM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote:
On 25 July 2013 06:41, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
What helps here is perfect
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 3:41 AM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On 25 July 2013 11:22, Nick liberationt...@njw.me.uk wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:19:22AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
(See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) )
Would Convergence help here? I can't see
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 12:41 PM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On 25 July 2013 11:22, Nick liberationt...@njw.me.uk wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:19:22AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
(See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) )
Would Convergence help here? I can't see
On 07/25/2013 07:14 AM, Mitar wrote:
Hi!
Some very good arguments *for* DRM on the web:
http://unitscale.com/mb/bomb-in-the-garden/
Sure. It's also _necessarily_ an argument against free software operating
systems as well as an argument against general purpose computing.
It is both of these
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 04:41:43AM -0700, Owen Barton wrote:
If a government
secretly aquired the SSL private keys for a site, and the site
continued using them, then no convergence notary would know any
cause not to vouch for the key.
What helps here is perfect forward secrecy.
Google also declined to disclose whether it had received requests
for encryption keys. But a spokesperson said the company has never
handed over keys to the government,
Surely they have provided hard disk images containing key material to
aid government investigations related to themselves or
The reason why Twitter, Google, and other companies went to RC4 is because
of issues with AES. The CBC and known IV attacks permitted BEAST to occur.
RC4 was the safest way out.
Even then, RC4 can be broken. In short, no one on the Internet is running
SSL in a way that cannot be broken. Although,
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 12:05 PM, Andy Isaacson a...@hexapodia.org wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 04:41:43AM -0700, Owen Barton wrote:
If a government
secretly aquired the SSL private keys for a site, and the site
continued using them, then no convergence notary would know any
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi Michael,
Sorry for the wait on my part as well, I was very busy last week.
On 07/24/2013 05:27 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Hi Caleb,
Thanks for the detailed answers - I'm sorry it's taken me so long to reply.
- From your answers and the
Libtech,
My brother from Syria just asked me to chat using tango. As you know it
has been hacked by the SEA along with Viber and other apps. Can you
please make sure to spread the word about the insecurities of those
applications to everyone you know? It seems that no one is getting the
message.
* John Adams:
The reason why Twitter, Google, and other companies went to RC4 is because
of issues with AES. The CBC and known IV attacks permitted BEAST to occur.
RC4 was the safest way out.
Anyone who has switched to RC4 because of BEAST should seek better
cryptographic advice. Seriously.
- Forwarded message from hellekin helle...@hackerspaces.org -
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 13:45:14 -0300
From: hellekin helle...@hackerspaces.org
To: disc...@lists.hackerspaces.org
Subject: [hackerspaces] Prism Break Badge
Organization: http://hackerspaces.org/
Reply-To: Hackerspaces General
Hey there,
hope this mail finds you well. As suggested by @liberationtech on Twitter
(great sharing, I really love it!), I post my question here. As I follow
the discussion since a while, I do wonder how my current project does fit
into or relate to this framework.
*How does ( OFFTIME )
And as we all know, DRM doesn't keep out or prevent hacking, but it
does impede the normal citizen from doing what they want to do with
what they buy.
Cory Doctorow's DRM Talk at Microsoft is still quite relevant. So much
so that I actually placed a copy of it on my blog since 2004:
25 matches
Mail list logo
