-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 05/08/13 19:55, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
This is good from a capabilities standpoint but it doesn't cover
motive which is hugely important to threat modeling. If someone
has significant resources and their motive is to cause mayhem,
securing
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi Caleb,
On 03/08/13 01:33, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
We could spend a long time discussing locally effective attacks on
social networks and not be any closer to agreement.
Instead I think it's worth asking who your attacker is... I find
that
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hello,
On 08/05/2013 01:26 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Hi Caleb,
On 03/08/13 01:33, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
We could spend a long time discussing locally effective attacks on social
networks and not be any closer to agreement.
Instead I
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 08/01/2013 08:04 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Hi Caleb,
On 01/08/13 17:20, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
At this point, Alice knows that Carol is real in the sense that someone
owns Carol's private key and uses it to respond to pings. But Alice
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Thanks yet again for the answers, Caleb! Responses inline.
On 02/08/13 19:03, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
That's a big if. Do you currently have a way to detect Sybil
edges?
Sure, I'd just run `cjdcmd traceroute` and look for the nodes
whose
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 08/02/2013 04:48 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Thanks yet again for the answers, Caleb! Responses inline.
On 02/08/13 19:03, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
That's a big if. Do you currently have a way to detect Sybil edges?
Sure, I'd just run
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi Caleb,
On 01/08/13 17:20, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
At this point, Alice knows that Carol is real in the sense that
someone owns Carol's private key and uses it to respond to pings.
But Alice has no way to determine whether Bob and Carol are
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi Michael,
Sorry for the wait on my part as well, I was very busy last week.
On 07/24/2013 05:27 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Hi Caleb,
Thanks for the detailed answers - I'm sorry it's taken me so long to reply.
- From your answers and the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 15/07/13 01:49, Mitar wrote:
BTW, how do you propose to make Sybil nodes impossible?
I don't. I am just making an argument, that maybe there is some way
we (or I) don't yet know which would allow us to don't have to
trust other nodes with
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 07/15/2013 04:52 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
On 15/07/13 01:49, Mitar wrote:
BTW, how do you propose to make Sybil nodes impossible?
I don't. I am just making an argument, that maybe there is some way we (or
I) don't yet know which would
Hi!
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote:
I don't see how no need to make a decision should be possible. If you
don't know any contacts in the network, how are you supposed to trust them?
Ideally, you shouldn't have to trust anybody. :-)
You should be able to
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 12:36 PM, Mitar mmi...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi!
I am a bit concerned with the CJDNS hype I am observing around. I do
like that decentralized Internet is getting momentum, but I am
concerned if CJDNS is really the way to achieve that. From its
whitepaper it seems that it
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 12:36 PM, Mitar mmi...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi!
I am a bit concerned with the CJDNS hype I am observing around. I do
like that decentralized Internet is getting momentum, but I am
concerned if CJDNS is really the way to achieve that. From its
whitepaper it seems that it
@lists.stanford.edu
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] CJDNS hype
Reply-To: liberationtech liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
Hi!
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote:
I don't see how no need to make a decision should be possible. If you
don't know any contacts
Hi!
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote:
I wasn't talking about the routing - I was referring to just who that
other person might be. If you want to avoid censorship, you also need to
be sure who you're talking to. And there is no way to achieve that
without
Hi!
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 10:25 AM, Caleb James DeLisle
calebdeli...@lavabit.com wrote:
The most scary general attack on the idea is a node who drops 10% of the
packets sent through them. I don't know how to detect it statelessly and
they can do quite a bit of damage.
Exactly. You don't
Hi!
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 1:15 PM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote:
Ah, I see. I was thinking more along the lines of how do I make sure I
am not accidentally speaking to the censor himself?. As that would be
as harmful as not being able to speak at all.
Not necessary, if you still have
On 07/14/2013 10:00 PM, Mitar wrote:
Hi!
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 10:25 AM, Caleb James DeLisle
calebdeli...@lavabit.com wrote:
The most scary general attack on the idea is a node who drops 10% of the
packets sent through them. I don't know how to detect it statelessly and
they can do
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 8:28 PM, Caleb James DeLisle
calebdeli...@lavabit.com wrote:
You'd need a botnet to attack the network because then you could have
nodes spread out over physical space but clustered in keyspace.
And, presumably, convince people to connect to them. If I understood
Right, I didn't explain that well.
It would be a botnet of machines which are already part of the cjdns network.
Not something we have to worry about today or tomorrow but if it becomes a
new defacto standard for the internet, it would be a concern.
Thanks,
Caleb
On 07/15/2013 07:12 AM, Gregory
Hi!
I am a bit concerned with the CJDNS hype I am observing around. I do
like that decentralized Internet is getting momentum, but I am
concerned if CJDNS is really the way to achieve that. From its
whitepaper it seems that it is susceptible to a Sybil attack:
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 12:36 PM, Mitar mmi...@gmail.com wrote:
For me it seems far from something which would be resistant to any
adversary trying to prevent communication from happening. It seems to
me that it just ignores many of issues with DHTs and routing in
overlay networks put out in
Hi!
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 1:15 PM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
That said CJ is, in fact, aware of these issues
Are they described anywhere? There is nothing about that in the whitepaper:
https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/master/rfcs/Whitepaper.md
I would assume there
23 matches
Mail list logo
