Re: [liberationtech] Question EFF CA Let's Encrypt

2014-11-19 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:13 PM, Richard Brooks r...@g.clemson.edu wrote: Just looked at this: https://letsencrypt.org/howitworks/technology/ The EFF's new CA to make things cheap and easy for installing certs. I like the goal. What I do not get from the description is how they really

[liberationtech] Fwd: Question EFF CA Let's Encrypt

2014-11-19 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:13 PM, Richard Brooks r...@g.clemson.edu wrote: Just looked at this: https://letsencrypt.org/howitworks/technology/ The EFF's new CA to make things cheap and easy for installing certs. I like the goal. What I do not get from the description is how they really

Re: [liberationtech] Signed HTTP

2014-03-11 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 12:37 PM, Patrick Schleizer adrela...@riseup.net wrote: Natanael: It would probably be as easy as using SSL with a null cipher with authentication like poly1305. I preferred to sign the source files on my local hdd using a tool that internally uses gpg. That way the

Re: [liberationtech] Stanford blocking webmail access to those who refuse spyware

2014-02-07 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 9:52 AM, taltm...@stanford.edu wrote: This is the kind of heavy hand that Stanford is laying down on students and faculty who do not want to give up their privacy. This seemed to me like an inevitable outcome when there was little to no backlash against spyware

Re: [liberationtech] Encrypted Pastebins: Attack Vectors against ezcrypt.it and 0bin.net

2014-01-13 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 4:57 AM, carlo von lynX l...@time.to.get.psyced.org wrote: Sorry for spoiling this apparently easy solution, but the Internet is currently more broken than that. I don't think you're spoiling it. I use 0bin only for things I'd otherwise use a non-encrypted tool

Re: [liberationtech] the 14th reason not to start using PGP is out!

2013-11-21 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Thu, Nov 21, 2013 at 12:31 AM, elijah eli...@riseup.net wrote: I don't need to beat a dead horse, but nearly every email from carlo contains one or more logical fallacies. This email contains two: the strawman fallacy (enigmail has poor security, so no usage of OpenPGP can have good

Re: [liberationtech] 10 reasons not to start using PGP

2013-10-11 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:24 AM, Tempest temp...@tushmail.com wrote: Gregory Maxwell: My other big technical complaint about PGP is (3) in the post, that every encrypted message discloses what key you're communicating with. PGP easily _undoes_ the privacy that an anonymity network like tor

Re: [liberationtech] 10 reasons not to start using PGP

2013-10-11 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 12:10 PM, Tempest temp...@tushmail.com wrote: a fair point. but one could significantly address this issue by hosting the public key on a tor hidden service. that would greater ensure that, in order to get your key, they would be using a system that protects against

Re: [liberationtech] 10 reasons not to start using PGP

2013-10-10 Thread Gregory Maxwell
I'm surprised to see this list has missed the thing that bugs me most about PGP: It conflates non-repudiation and authentication. I send Bob an encrypted message that we should meet to discuss the suppression of free speech in our country. Bob obviously wants to be sure that the message is coming

Re: [liberationtech] Open Whisper Systems' neat asynch FPS pre-keying

2013-08-22 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org wrote: TextSecure’s upcoming iOS client (and Android data channel client) uses a simple trick to provide asynchronous messaging while simultaneously providing forward secrecy. I've seen people want PGP to do this before— have

Re: [liberationtech] Freedom Hosting, Tormail Compromised // OnionCloud

2013-08-06 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Aug 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Florian Weimer f...@deneb.enyo.de wrote: (Automated updates are a mixed blessing because they could invite court orders to roll out specific versions to certain users.) No crap. _please_ don't deploy automatic updates in a sensitive environment like this without

Re: [liberationtech] Tormail in trouble. Experts at Black Hat recommend Elliptic Curves: this is what PassLok 1.3 is based on.

2013-08-06 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Aug 6, 2013 at 3:20 PM, Francisco Ruiz r...@iit.edu wrote: Hi folks, Thank you very much for your great feedback on the previous version. The next version is now up at http://passlok.com, which redirects to https://passlok.site44.com This may come in handy now that there are problems

[liberationtech] Tormail in trouble. Experts at Black Hat recommend Elliptic Curves: this is what PassLok 1.3 is based on.

2013-08-06 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Aug 6, 2013 at 3:20 PM, Francisco Ruiz r...@iit.edu wrote: Hi folks, Thank you very much for your great feedback on the previous version. The next version is now up at http://passlok.com, which redirects to https://passlok.site44.com This may come in handy now that there are problems

Re: [liberationtech] Is Most Encryption Cracked?

2013-07-17 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Wed, Jul 17, 2013 at 10:18 AM, Collin Sullivan coll...@benetech.org wrote: http://unsene.com/blog/2013/06/15/is-most-encryption-broken/ HALP. I've slipped on a snake oil spill and can't get up! [...]Here’s why we think many of these encryption algorithms are cracked; [...] • These entities

Re: [liberationtech] Designing Fairness for DMCA

2013-07-16 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 1:00 PM, John Adams j...@retina.net wrote: http://www.mediabistro.com/appnewser/files/2012/02/infographic-dmca-process1.png The process here is not correct— or at least it has some unstated assumptions and a confusing presentation. For example, if— as a safe harbor

[liberationtech] Designing Fairness for DMCA

2013-07-16 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 1:00 PM, John Adams j...@retina.net wrote: http://www.mediabistro.com/appnewser/files/2012/02/infographic-dmca-process1.png The process here is not correct— or at least it has some unstated assumptions and a confusing presentation. For example, if— as a safe harbor

Re: [liberationtech] CJDNS hype

2013-07-14 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 12:36 PM, Mitar mmi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi! I am a bit concerned with the CJDNS hype I am observing around. I do like that decentralized Internet is getting momentum, but I am concerned if CJDNS is really the way to achieve that. From its whitepaper it seems that it

[liberationtech] CJDNS hype

2013-07-14 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 12:36 PM, Mitar mmi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi! I am a bit concerned with the CJDNS hype I am observing around. I do like that decentralized Internet is getting momentum, but I am concerned if CJDNS is really the way to achieve that. From its whitepaper it seems that it

Re: [liberationtech] CJDNS hype

2013-07-14 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 8:28 PM, Caleb James DeLisle calebdeli...@lavabit.com wrote: You'd need a botnet to attack the network because then you could have nodes spread out over physical space but clustered in keyspace. And, presumably, convince people to connect to them. If I understood

Re: [liberationtech] CJDNS hype

2013-07-13 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 12:36 PM, Mitar mmi...@gmail.com wrote: For me it seems far from something which would be resistant to any adversary trying to prevent communication from happening. It seems to me that it just ignores many of issues with DHTs and routing in overlay networks put out in

[liberationtech] Government surveillance technical details hiding in plain sight

2013-06-15 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 4:32 PM, Gregory Maxwell g...@xiph.org wrote: I've been continually amazed at how poorly the public has been doing at figuring out the mechanisms used for this stuff— You don't need some insider to tell you how it works, you could have just looked up Counter evidence

Re: [liberationtech] New Anonymity Network for Short Messages

2013-06-11 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 9:52 AM, Sean Cassidy sean.a.cass...@gmail.com wrote: I have created a simple anonymity network that broadcasts all messages to participants so that you cannot associate chatters. https://bitbucket.org/scassidy/dinet See also: https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page (I

Re: [liberationtech] Guardian reporter delayed e-mailing NSA source because crypto is a pain

2013-06-11 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 6:56 PM, Kate Krauss ka...@critpath.org wrote: It's really easy to use these tools if you already know how to do it. I've been using PGP since 1994, if not earlier. In more recent times it's become a regular part of my workflow in discussing security critical bugs. I am a

[liberationtech] Mechanisms of intercepting service provider internal connectivity

2013-06-09 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Fri, Jun 7, 2013 at 6:47 AM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote: but the ability to assemble intelligence out of taps on providers' internal connections would require reverse engineering the ever changing protocols of all of those providers. This is somewhat less difficult than some

[liberationtech] Why we can't go back to business as usual post-PRISM.

2013-06-09 Thread Gregory Maxwell
Many people in spheres of cryptography and digital rights activism have long assumed (or—frankly—known about) pervasive government surveillance of the Internet and other communications networks. So it's unsurprising that there is something of an undertone in PRISM discussions of meh, it's terrible

Re: [liberationtech] Efficient digital one-way communication

2013-03-04 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Mon, Mar 4, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Jens Christian Hillerup j...@hillerup.net wrote: Yes, and then I can scrap the stereo encoding again. I'd rather have it optional than required. And I agree, it would make more sense to pick eight notes and use them as a bitmap. We'd face the same problems as

Re: [liberationtech] Internships available at leading Palo Alto tech startup

2013-02-22 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Fri, Feb 22, 2013 at 9:52 AM, Greg Norcie g...@norcie.com wrote: Unpaid internships are illegal actually. Unless receiving course credit from a university - then they're just morally unsound :) But such a great research opportunity to go find out about more privacy invading technology and

Re: [liberationtech] Using Gajim Instead of Pidgin for More Secure OTR Chat

2013-02-20 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 10:27 PM, Micah Lee micahf...@riseup.net wrote: I just wrote a blog post that people here might find interesting about using Gajim, a chat client written in python, and Gajim's OTR plugin, a purely python implementation of the OTR standard, instead of Pidgin and libotr.

Re: [liberationtech] Cryptography super-group creates unbreakable encryption

2013-02-07 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 8:36 AM, Douglas Lucas d...@riseup.net wrote: Can Silent Circle promoters explain why Zimmerman is excused from Kerckhoffs's principle? Is it because something unverifiable is allegedly better than nothing? Even if we had divine knowledge to tell us Silent Circle is

Re: [liberationtech] Cryptography super-group creates unbreakable encryption

2013-02-07 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:12 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.net wrote: My area of research is the intersection of law, policy and technology. As such, I am most interested in companies' surveillance policies, their commitment to transparency, and their stated willingness to tell the

Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat

2012-08-13 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 12:38 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) li...@infosecurity.ch wrote: The average user (a very stupid, dumb user but with very strong political commitment in freedom fighting) will always trust the website / operator. We CANNOT FIX that problem in any technical/cryptographic

Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat

2012-08-09 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Thu, Aug 9, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Mark Belinsky mark.belin...@gmail.com wrote: Of course it's important to note that this too can be spoofed, but it's potentially better than nothing But thats so trivially spoofed and the only users it would protect would be the ones trying to get protection...

Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat

2012-08-06 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 6:53 PM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: The blog post suggests that becoming a local browser app means that Cryptocat no longer uses JavaScript cryptography. This is nonsense: JavaScript is a *language*, and since browser apps/plugins are written in an HTML5

Re: [liberationtech] New YouTube face blur tool and its human rights implications

2012-07-18 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 4:37 PM, Matisse Bustos Hawkes mati...@witness.org wrote: Hello all, I'm sure some of you saw today's news that YouTube announced a new face blur tool into their editing suite - as they put it: Whether you you want to share sensitive protest footage without exposing the