On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 02:13:38PM -0400, Corey Bryant wrote:
Are there any other requirements that need to be taken care of to
enable execution of QEMU guests under separate unprivileged user IDs
(ie. DAC isolation)?
At this point, this patch series (Per-guest configurable user/group
for
Hi,
Any comments about that?
Regards,
Marcelo
On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 02:13:38PM -0400, Corey Bryant wrote:
Are there any other requirements that need to be taken care of to
enable execution of QEMU guests under separate unprivileged user IDs
(ie. DAC isolation)?
At this point, this patch
Are there any other requirements that need to be taken care of to enable
execution of QEMU guests under separate unprivileged user IDs (ie. DAC
isolation)?
At this point, this patch series (Per-guest configurable user/group for
QEMU processes) is upstream, allowing libvirt to execute guests
On 16.08.2012 00:10, Marcelo Cerri wrote:
This is a v4 patch series that updates the libvirt's security driver
mechanism to support per-guest configurable user and group for QEMU processes
running together with other security drivers, such as SELinux and AppArmor.
Marcelo Cerri (5):
This is a v4 patch series that updates the libvirt's security driver mechanism
to support per-guest configurable user and group for QEMU processes running
together with other security drivers, such as SELinux and AppArmor.
Marcelo Cerri (5):
Internal refactory of data structures
Multiple
