Re: [libvirt] [RFC] Adding new filesystem 'proxy' to 9p

2011-10-04 Thread M. Mohan Kumar
That is the case if the proxy helper code is perfectly written. I am trying to think about the scenario where there is a bug (eg heap corruption / stack overflow) which allows a malicious non-root QEMU process to exploit the proxy helper to run code that it was *not* intended to run. If

Re: [libvirt] [RFC] Adding new filesystem 'proxy' to 9p

2011-09-30 Thread Daniel P. Berrange
On Thu, Sep 29, 2011 at 11:42:47PM +0530, M. Mohan Kumar wrote: On Wednesday, September 28, 2011 08:29:06 PM Daniel P. Berrange wrote: On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 07:49:34PM +0530, M. Mohan Kumar wrote: Pass-through security model in QEMU 9p server needs root privilege to do few file

Re: [libvirt] [RFC] Adding new filesystem 'proxy' to 9p

2011-09-29 Thread M. Mohan Kumar
On Wednesday, September 28, 2011 08:29:06 PM Daniel P. Berrange wrote: On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 07:49:34PM +0530, M. Mohan Kumar wrote: Pass-through security model in QEMU 9p server needs root privilege to do few file operations (like chown, chmod to any mode/uid:gid). There are two issues

Re: [libvirt] [RFC] Adding new filesystem 'proxy' to 9p

2011-09-28 Thread Daniel P. Berrange
On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 07:49:34PM +0530, M. Mohan Kumar wrote: Pass-through security model in QEMU 9p server needs root privilege to do few file operations (like chown, chmod to any mode/uid:gid). There are two issues in pass-through security model 1) TOCTTOU vulnerability: Following