On Mon, Dec 12, 2022 at 08:38:43PM -0500, Antoine Riard wrote:
> The attack purpose is to delay the confirmation of the final settlement
> transaction S, to double-spend a HTLC forwarded by a routing hop.
> The cltv_expiry_delta requested by Ned is equal to N=144.
I believe what you're suggesting
Hi Greg,
> Feel free to assume that we've worked around mempool pinning for all of
> these discussions, otherwise we're pretty hosed regardless. I'm implicitly
> assuming V3+ephemeral anchors, which disallows batched bumps, for example.
> You'll need to give some room for "slippage", but I think
Hi list,
The following post describes a potential attack vector against eltoo-based
Lightning channels, from my understanding also including the recent
two-party eltoo w/ punishment construction. While I think this concern has
been known for a while among devs, and I believe it's mitigable by
