Good morning all,
Looking at BOLT#1, there is an `error` message which is supposed to "fail the
channel". At a first glance, it seems to be what is basically a superpowered
version of `funding_cancelled`, since it only fails the channel (and in
particular does not indicate to fail the peer or
I do not see the relevance of the example. The limit I propose that nodes will
impose is a limit imposed on *each* *peer*, not a limit imposed on all peers in
total. Indeed, imposing the limit on each peer reduces the actual CPU,
bandwidth, and storage resources that each peer can consume on
> Yes, but it still limits how much damage each peer can do to the node.
> And I think you overstate the ease of distributed denial of service attacks,
> and the relative resource consumption differences on an attacker simulating
> multiple nodes versus one simulating a single node.
So assume
As mentioned in the text, this is imposed by you on each peer that connects to
you. The point is to prevent a single peer from consuming all your memory and
CPU and prevent you from servicing legitimate peers- i.e. it prevents denial of
service using a single peer and forces attackers to use a
Ok, so limit things to 100 channels... Still don't see why the constants get
into unreasonable load here...
On January 15, 2018 2:53:07 AM UTC, ZmnSCPxj wrote:
>Good morning Matt,
>
>> I can't imagine the constants add up that fast... Allow 25 channels
>per peer and
Good morning Matt,
> I can't imagine the constants add up that fast... Allow 25 channels per peer
> and limit your peers reasonably and the cost should be low enough. Really not
> sure why something like a 25 channel limit should limit any usage or
> reasonably burden a node, what am I
Good morning Matt,
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> Original Message
> Subject: Re: [Lightning-dev] [1.1] Proposed `funding_cancelled` message
> Local Time: January 15, 2018 9:00 AM
> UTC Time: January 15, 2018 1:00 AM
&
Hello,
> intended to inform the fundee node that the funder node is definitely sure
> that the channel funding transaction can never confirm
If the deprecated tx initially sent funds to the fundee via push_msat,
then the fundee may not want to trust the funder on this. One way to
do it
I have to say I'm rather not a fan of this idea. Adding messages which do not
result in different node behavior other then waiting for the timeout with
little overhead on the node to simply keep watching for the funding transaction
is a recipe for ending up with a needlessly complex protocol