Good Afternoon,
It is worth reconsidering the value accumulated in dust. Speculatively, when
the value of 1 BTC reaches US$ 1,000,000.00 then the value of one satoshi will
be US$ 0.01 so, for 1 satoshi to be of any substantial value the value of
Bitcoin will have to rise substantially higher. I ask what then should the
value of fees be? Is there not a future case foreseeable at least in
consideration of Bitcoin's comparison with Gold that the value may be so high
as to allow that 1 satoshi may cover the mining cost of any transaction despite
the reduction in sat/B for including the additional transaction. Is it not that
we can foresee the dust has value and that the wealthy may have in fact
millions of dust transactions that are inheritable, though I hesitate to make
my business collecting them I may set up a website. The current reason for
excluding dust is because it costs more to the transaction to add the dust than
its value but that does not say that will always be the case.
KING JAMES HRMH
Great British Empire
Regards,
The Australian
LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH (& HMRH)
of Hougun Manor & Glencoe & British Empire
MR. Damian A. James Williamson
Wills
et al.
Willtech
www.willtech.com.au
www.go-overt.com
and other projects
earn.com/willtech
linkedin.com/in/damianwilliamson
m. 0487135719
f. +61261470192
This email does not constitute a general advice. Please disregard this email if
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From: bitcoin-dev on behalf of
shymaa arafat via bitcoin-dev
Sent: Friday, 27 August 2021 7:07 PM
To: Billy Tetrud ; Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
Cc: lightning-dev
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Removing the Dust Limit
Allow me to ask:
-Untill you find a mitigation that consolidate all dust UTXOS, why don't you
separate them and all probably Unspendable UTXOS in a different partition?
-I'm talking at the real UTXO storage level (to be kept in secondary storage),
and at the Merkleization level in any accumulator design Utreexo or what so
ever(putting them in one or two subtree/forest with hardly changing roots
according to the categorization will reduce the proof size, even if slightly)
-This will also help things like Bloom filters, assume UTXOs,...etc when about
10% with almost zero probability are trimmed from the pool you are withdrawing
from.
.
-The paper I mentioned earlier says in Feb 2018, there was about 2.4m UTXOS
less than 1000 Satoshi, of which ~824,892 holds exactly 1 Satoshi
-I don't think any of those were spent since that time, in fact there could be
a possibility that the numbers may have increased
-As the last previous reply mentioned you have to consider the long run effect
on the UTXO set forever, this is a straight forward improvement that comes with
almost no effort
.
Ps.
-If there is something wrong, something I missed in this idea please explain it
to me
-Or do you find the improvement itself a "dust" that doesn't worth the effort???
.
Regards & thank you all for your time in reading & replying
Shymaa M. Arafat
On Fri, Aug 27, 2021, 00:06 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev
mailto:bitcoin-...@lists.linuxfoundation.org>>
wrote:
One interesting thing I thought of: the cost of maintenance of the dust creates
a (very) small incentive to mine transactions that *use* dust outputs with a
slightly lower fee that contain dust, in order to reduce the future maintenance
cost for themselves. However, the rational discount would likely be vanishingly
small. It would be interesting to add something to the consensus rules to
decrease the vbytes for a transaction that consumes dust outputs such that the
value of removing them from the system (saving the future cost of maintenance)
is approximately equal to the amount that the fee could be made lower for such
transactions. Even measuring this as a value over the whole (future) bitcoin
network, I'm not sure how to evaluate the magnitude of this future cost.
On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 8:12 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
mailto:bitcoin-...@lists.linuxfoundation.org>>
wrote:
Good morning Jeremy,
> one interesting point that came up at the bitdevs in austin today that favors
> remove that i believe is new to this discussion (it was new to me):
>
> the argument can be reduced to:
>
> - dust limit is a per-node relay policy.
> - it is rational for miners to mine dust outputs given their cost of
> maintenance (storing the output potentially forever) is lower than their
> immediate reward in fees.
> - if txn relaying nodes censor something that a miner would mine, users will
> seek a private/direct relay to the miner and vice versa.
> - if direct relay to miner becomes popular, it is both bad for privacy and
> decentralization.
> - therefore the dust limit, should there be demand to create dust at
> prevailing mempool feerates, causes an incentive to increase network
> centralization (immediately)
>
> the tradeoff is if a short term immediate incentive to