Hi Dan,
> I'm trying to understand what the correct behaviour is when two nodes
> (Alice and Bob) have an open channel, and one of the channels (Alice)
> loses their IPv4 lease,
> 1. Is there a specific behaviour prescribed in any spec in this scenario?
Assuming one of the nodes has a public
> Some folks indicated they'd like to interact with it via the supposed
> "mailing list mode", but sadly AJ indicated it may not be super reliable
> (and seems to be disabled on delvingbitcoin.org). I've asked AJ to enable
> it so people can maybe try it out but we'll see if it works. Sadly if you
Hi y'all,
Re Google Groups:
It appears that one can join a Google Group without a _gmail_ account by
sending a special subscribe email to a certain Google Groups endpoint:
https://webapps.stackexchange.com/a/126053. FWIW, this won't let you use the
web UI directly (useful for searching, the
> Let's say you have Alice, Bob and Caroll all "honest" routing hops
> targeted by an attacker. They all have 3 independent 10 000 sats HTLC
> in-flight on their outbound channels.
> It is replaced by Mallory at T+2 with a HTLC-preimage X of 200 000 sats (+
> rbf penalty 1 sat / vb rule 4).
Hi Antoine,
Thanks for this great write up, and also your diligence in reporting this
issue to the various implementations, and game planning with us re
mitigations and attack scenarios.
One small clarification: all of lnd's relevant mitigations were in place by
lnd v0.16.1-beta [1], which was
I'm excited to finally publish a draft bLIP describing how to map the
Taproot Asset Protocol onto the existing BOLT channel/invoice format,
specifically building on the active proposal for simple taproot channels!
https://github.com/lightning/blips/pull/29
This bLIP describes a variant on the
Hi David,
Happy to see that you're still working to push the state-of-the-art when it
comes to mixnets!
> Sphinx is essentially twice as fast if we eliminate the "blinding trick"
> and only have one group operation per hop, the DH. In order to make that
> work you'd also have to store the group
Hi Z,
Or you can just use AMP and call it a day:
https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/658
-- Laolu
On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 12:24 AM ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev <
lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Good morning list,
>
> I would like to share a simple scheme for creating a
lnd supports paying invoices it generates, you just need to set the
`allow_self_payment` field using this
API: https://lightning.engineering/api-docs/api/lnd/router/send-payment-v2.
This _does_ end up actually finding a circular route through the network
though, it's most commonly used to
> Their website shows an invoice to the user, whose wallet that is agnostic
> about the swap, and it would be unpractical for them to show two invoices
> to be paid simultaneously
In order to be properly non-custodial, a submarine swap client needs to be
able to unilaterally sweep or timeout
Hi Val,
Happy to see ppl continue to work on the problem space after discussions and
brainstorming we had at the past LN Summit in Oakland.
> The open research question relates to how the sender will get an invoice
> from the receiver, given that they are offline at sending-time
One existing
Hi Z,
> Quick question: is the address given by the `loop in --external` command
safe
> for reuse?
Thx for this question, I think this is the key difference I was looking for
(not the aspect about confirmations, since that's no different). Since that
address contains a swap hash in the script,
Hi Z,
> * Submarine swap/peerswap: Requires confirmation before the swap service
> will send out the HTLC on Lightning.
I might be missing something, but I don't see how this is different from a
normal on-chain to off-chain swap (calling this Loop In for short in the
remainder of the email).
Hi tbast,
FWIW, we haven't had _too_ many issues with the additional constraints
anchor channels bring. Initially users had to deal w/ the UTXO reserve, but
then sort of accepted the trade-off for the safety that actually being able
to dynamically bump the fee on your commitment transaction and
Hi Johan,
I haven't really been able to find a precise technical explanation of the
"utxo teleport" scheme, but after thinking about your example use cases a
bit, I don't think the scheme is actually sound. Consider that the scheme
attempts to target transmitting "ownership" to a UTXO. However,
Hi Alex,
This is a super cool project! I've shared some thoughts here in a comment on
the draft PR:
PR:
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/pull/6843#issuecomment-1234933319
Also I cc'd the lnd mailing list on this reply, perhaps we can move the
discussion over there (or in the issue) since
Hi Matt,
> Ultimately, paying suffers from the standard PoW-for-spam issue - you
> cannot assign a reasonable cost that an attacker cares about without
> impacting the system's usability due to said cost.
Applying this statement to related a area, would you also agree that
proposals
to introduce
Hi Val,
> Another huge win of backpressure is that it only needs to happen in DoS
> situations, meaning it doesn’t have to impact users in the normal case.
I agree, I think the same would apply to prepayments as well (0 or 1 msat in
calm times). My main concern with relying _only_ on
29, 2022 at 5:35 PM Rusty Russell wrote:
> Olaoluwa Osuntokun writes:
> > Hi Rusty,
> >
> > Thanks for the feedback!
> >
> >> This is over-design: if you fail to get reliable gossip, your routing
> will
> >> suffer anyway. Nothing new here.
>
Hi Lisa,
> Adding a noticeable on-chain signal runs counter to the goal of the move
> to taproot / gossip v2, which is to make lightning's onchain footprint
> indistinguishable from any other onchain usage
My model of gossip v2 is something like:
* there's no longer a 1:1 mapping of channels
Hi y'all,
Quick post...
A few weeks ago, some of the dlcspecs developers reached out to ask for
feedback on this PR [1] that attempts to specify a way to send messages
larger
than 65 KB using BOLT 8 (Noise based encrypted transport). After taking a
glance at the PR, I realized that it isn't
Hi t-bast,
Happy to see this finally written up! With this, we have two classes of
proposals for rate limiting onion messaging:
1. Back propagation based rate limiting as described here.
2. Allowing nodes to express a per-message cost for their forwarding
services, which is described here
requirements to detect onchain
> closes at all, and optionally add a perm close message.
>
> Cheers,
> Rusty.
>
> Olaoluwa Osuntokun writes:
> > Hi y'all,
> >
> > This mail was inspired by this [1] spec PR from Lisa. At a high level, it
> > proposes the
Hi y'all,
This mail was inspired by this [1] spec PR from Lisa. At a high level, it
proposes the nodes add a delay between the time they see a channel closed on
chain, to when they remove it from their local channel graph. The motive
here is to give the gossip message that indicates a splice is
Hi Michael,
> A minor point but terminology can get frustratingly sticky if it isn't
> agreed on early. Can we refer to it as nested MuSig2 going
> forward rather than recursive MuSig2?
No strong feelings on my end, the modifier _nested_ is certainly a bit less
loaded and conceptually simpler,
Hi y'all,
Last week nearly 30 (!) Lightning developers and researchers gathered in
Oakland, California for three day to discuss a number of matters related to
the current state and evolution of the protocol. This time around, we had
much better representation for all the major Lightning Node
Hi John,
> That said, I believe that the correct approach to supporting "tokens on
> Lightning" is to make it a separate concern from Taro, and that LL should
> create a separate BOLT proposal from the current Taro BIPs to ensure it LN
> standards have a genericized protocol that all LN
Hi Ruben,
> Also, the people that are responsible for the current shape of RGB aren't
> the people who originated the idea, so it would not be fair to the
> originators either (Peter Todd, Alekos Filini, Giacomo Zucco).
Sure I have no problems acknowledging them in the current BIP draft. Both
Hi Harding,
Great questions!
> anything about Taro or the way you plan to implement support for
> transferring fungible assets via asset-aware LN endpoints[1] will address
> the "free call option" problem, which I think was first discussed on this
> list by Corné Plooy[2] and was later extended
ring Taro token ownership from one
> Bitcoin UTXO to another, do you generate a new UTXO for the recipient or do
> you support the ability to "teleport" the tokens to an existing UTXO like
> how RGB does it? If the latter, have you given consideration to timing
> issues that m
Hi y'all,
I'm excited to publicly publish a new protocol I've been working on over the
past few months: Taro. Taro is a Taproot Asset Representation Overlay which
allows the issuance of normal and also collectible assets on the main
Bitcoin
chain. Taro uses the Taproot script tree to commit extra
PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun
wrote:
> Hi y'all,
>
> ## Dynamic Commitments Retrospective
>
> Two years-ish ago I made a mailing list post on some ideas re dynamic
> commitments [1], and how the concept can be used to allow us to upgrade
> channel types on the fly, and also remove pe
Hi y'all,
## Dynamic Commitments Retrospective
Two years-ish ago I made a mailing list post on some ideas re dynamic
commitments [1], and how the concept can be used to allow us to upgrade
channel types on the fly, and also remove pesky hard coded limits like the
483 HTLC in-flight limit that's
ion
(FROST?) all together).
-- Laolu
On Wed, Mar 23, 2022 at 2:02 PM David A. Harding wrote:
> On 22.03.2022 15:10, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
> > ### Should the proof+verification strongly bind to the LN context?
> > Today, nodes use the two bitcoin keys and construct a p
Hi Rusty,
> Timestamps are replaced with block heights.
This is a conceptually small change, but would actually make things like
rate limiting updates for implementations easier and more uniform. A simple
rule would be only allowing an update per block, which cuts down a lot on
potential chatter
Hi y'all,
On the lnd side we've nearly finished fully integrating taproot into the
codebase [1] (which includes the btcsuite set of libraries and also full
btcwallet support), scheduled to ship in 0.15 (~April), which will enable
existing users of lnd's on-chain wallet and APIs to start getting
nding algorithms continue to evolve to factor
in "reliability" information (usually some derived probability of success),
which can tend to favor well managed and responsive nodes.
[1]: https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
[2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/6
Hi y'all,
(TL;DR: a way to nodes to get paid to forward onion messages by adding an
upfront session creation phase that uses AMP tender a messaging session to a
receiver, with nodes being paid upfront for purchase of forwarding
bandwidth, and a session identifier being transmitted alongside onion
Hi Jozef,
> I'm working on a project that uses LND with Atomic Multi-path Payments
> (AMP) invoices. It seems there isn't any mobile lightning wallet that is
> able to send sats to AMP invoices.
Any mobile wallet built on lnd v0.14 should be able to send to the
reusable invoices (has the
and revocations, what
> purpose do the additional commitments and revocations provide?
>
>
> Thanks again!
> Ben
>
> --
> Ben Weintraub
> PhD Student
> Khoury College of Computer Sciences
> Northeastern University
> https://ben-weintraub.com/
>
>
Hi Benjamin,
> 1) Multiple sources indicate that after Alice sends the `update_add_htlc`,
> she should then send the `commitment_signed`, but why is it important that
> she sends it first (before Bob)? As far as I understand, as long as she
> doesn't revoke the old state before Bob commits to the
-- Laolu
On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 7:34 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
> Circling back to close the loop here:
>
> * The new Github org (https://github.com/lightning) now exists, and all
> the
> major implementation maintainers have been added to the organization as
> admi
ace
during the recent protocol dev meetup!), happy we were able to resolve
things
and begin the next chapter in the evolution of the Lightning protocol!
-- Laolu
On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 1:49 AM Fabrice Drouin
wrote:
> On Tue, 12 Oct 2021 at 21:57, Olaoluwa Osuntokun
> wrote:
> > Also not
Hi y'all,
A few weeks ago over a dozen Lightning developers met up in Zurich for two
days to discuss a number of matters related to the current state and
evolution of the protocol. All major implementations were represented to
some degree, and we even had a number of "independent"
Hi Fabrice,
> I believe that was a mistake: a few days ago, Arcane Research published a
> fairly detailed report on the state of the Lightning Network:
> https://twitter.com/ArcaneResearch/status/1445442967582302213. They
> obviously did some real work there, and seem to imply that their report
Hi Joost,
> The conventional approach is to create a lightning invoice on a node and
> store the invoice together with order details in a database. If the order
> then goes unfulfilled, cleaning processes remove the data from the node
> and database again.
> The problem with this setup is that
Hi Ole,
It's generally known that one can use out of band transaction construction,
and the push_amt feature in the base funding protocol to simulate dual
funded channels.
The popular 'balanceofsatoshis' tool has a command that packages up the
interaction (`open-balanced-channel`) into an easier
Earlier this week I was helping a user debug a Tor related issue, and
realized (from the logs) that some newer Tor clients are already refusing to
connect out to v2 onion services.
On the lnd side, I think we'll move to disallow users creating a v2 onion
service in our next major release (0.14),
Matt wrote:
> I'm frankly still very confused why we're having these conversations now
1000% this!!
This entire conversation strikes me as extremely premature and backwards
tbh. Someone experimenting with a new approach shouldn't prompt us to
immediately modify the protocol to better "fit" the
ory instead. I don't see the value in having both bLIPs and
>> BIPs since AFAICT they seem to be functionally equivalent and BIPs are
>> not restricted to exclude lightning, and never have been.
>>
>> I believe the reason this move to BIPs hasn't happened organically is
>
ere
> strongly encouraged to write specs for new lightning features
> elsewhere (like the BIP repo) then you would see this issue of growing
> BOLTs resolved.
>
> Cheers
> Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
>
> On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 1:16 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun
> wrote:
> >
&
> That being said I think all the points that are addressed in Ryan's mail
> could very well be formalized into BOLTs but maybe we just need to rethink
> the current process of the BOLTs to make it more accessible for new ideas
> to find their way into the BOLTs?
I think part of what bLIPs are
> I think the problem of accidental channel closure is getting ignored by
> devs.
>
> If we think any anti-DoS fee will be "insignificant" compared to the cost
> of closing and reopening a channel, maybe dev attention should be on
> fixing accidental channel closure costs than any anti-DoS fee
Hi Z,
Thanks for such kind words!
> Is there a documentation for the client/server intercommunications
> protocol?
Long form documentation on the client/server protocol hasn't yet been
written. However, just like Loop, the Pool client uses a fully-featured gRPC
protocol to communicate with the
Hi y'all,
We've recently released a new system which may be of interest to this list,
Lightning Pool [1]. Alongside a working client [2], we've also released a
white paper which goes deeper into the architecture of the system.
Pool builds on some earlier ideas that were tossed around the ML
> I suggest adding tlv records in `commitment_signed` to tell our channel >
> peer that we're changing the values of these fields.
I think this fits in nicely with the "parameter re-negotiation" portion of
my
loose Dynamic commitments proposal. Note that in that paradigm, something
like this
> It seems to me that the "funder pays all the commit tx fees" rule exists
> solely for simplicity (which was totally reasonable).
At this stage, I've learned that simplicity (when doing anything that
involves multi-party on-chain fee negotiating/verification/enforcement can
really go a long
Hi Z,
> Probably arguably off-topic, but this post triggered me into thinking
> about an insane idea: offchain update from existing Poon-Dryja to newer
> Decker-Russell-Osuntokun ("eltoo") mechanism.
Ooo, yeh I don't see why this would be possible assuming at that point
no_input has been
queue these un-acked
> messages
> and replay them after the commitment format update completes (or just drop
> them
> and cancel corresponding upstream HTLCs if needed).
>
> Regarding initiating the commitment format update, how do you see this
> happen?
> The funder activate
-- Laolu
On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 6:18 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun
wrote:
> Hi y'all,
>
> In this post, I'd like to share an early version of an extension to the
> spec
> and channel state machine that would allow for on-the-fly commitment
> _format/type_ changes. Notably, this wou
Hi y'all,
In this post, I'd like to share an early version of an extension to the spec
and channel state machine that would allow for on-the-fly commitment
_format/type_ changes. Notably, this would allow for us to _upgrade_
commitment types without any on-chain activity, executed in a
Hi Jeremy,
The up-front costs can be further mitigated even without something like CTV
(which makes things more efficient) by adding a layer of in-direction w.r.t
how
HTLCs are manifested within the commitment transactions. To do this, we add
a
new 2-of-2 multi-sig output (an HTLC indirect block)
Hi Rene,
IMO this is mostly mitigated by anchor commitments. The impact of this
attack is predicated on the "victim" paying 5x on-chain fees (for their
confirmation target) to sweep all their HTLCs. Anchor commitments let the
initiator of the channel select a very low starting fee (just enough
Hi Antoine,
> Even with cheaper, more efficient protocols like BIP 157, you may have a
> huge discrepancy between what is asked and what is offered. Assuming 10M
> light clients [0] each of them consuming ~100MB/month for filters/headers,
> that means you're asking 1PB/month of traffic to the
BOLTs, which does actually seem relatively
> minimal (although as you mention, these minimal changes to the BOLTs do
> trigger large changes in many implementations). Also, good point on how
> BOLT 11 (invoicing) will have to be altered as well, must've slipped my
> mind.
>
> Best,
Hi Nadav,
Thanks for the updates! Super cool to see this concept continue to evolve
and integrate new technologies as they pop up.
> I believe this would only require a few changes to existing nodes:
Rather than a "few changes", this would to date be the largest network-level
update undertaken
fee increase, it's likely that the war terminates
with _one_ of them getting into the block, which seems to resolve
everything?
-- Laolu
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 4:20 PM Matt Corallo
wrote:
>
>
> On Apr 22, 2020, at 16:13, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
>
>
> > Hmm, maybe the prop
en everyone is
made whole.
[1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18191
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 9:50 AM Matt Corallo
wrote:
> A few replies inline.
>
> On 4/22/20 12:13 AM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
> > Hi Matt,
> >
> >
> >> While this is somewha
, Apr 22, 2020 at 4:05 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun
wrote:
> Hi Z,
>
> > It seems to me that, if my cached understanding that `<0>
> > OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY` is sufficient to require RBF-flagging, then
> adding
> > that to the hashlock branch (2 witness bytes, 0.5 weight) w
Hi Z,
> It seems to me that, if my cached understanding that `<0>
> OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY` is sufficient to require RBF-flagging, then adding
> that to the hashlock branch (2 witness bytes, 0.5 weight) would be a
pretty
> low-weight mitigation against this attack.
I think this works...so
> So what is needed is to allow B to add fees to HTLC-Timeout:
Indeed, anchors as defined in #lightning-rfc/688 allows this.
> * With `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` we can make the C-side signature
> `SIGHASH_NOINPUT|SIGHASH_SINGLE` and allow B to re-sign the B-side
> signature for a higher-fee version of
Hi Matt,
> While this is somewhat unintuitive, there are any number of good anti-DoS
> reasons for this, eg:
None of these really strikes me as "good" reasons for this limitation, which
is at the root of this issue, and will also plague any more complex Bitcoin
contracts which rely on nested
Hi y'all,
We've been discussing the current state of the spec and implementation
readiness of anchor outputs for a few week now on IRC. As detailed
conversations are at times difficult to have on IRC, and there's no true
history, I figured I'd start a new discussion thread where we can hammer out
Hi y'all,
A new paper analyzing the security of the Sphinx mix-net packet format [1]
(and also HORNET) has recently caught my attention. The paper is rather long
and very theory heavy, but the TL;DR is this:
* The OG Sphinx paper proved various aspects of its security using a
model for
Hi Rusty,
Agreed w.r.t the need for prepaid HTLCS, I've been mulling over other
alternatives for a few years now, and none of them seems to resolve the
series of routing related incentive issues that prepaid HTLCs would.
> Since both Offers and Joost's WhatSat are looking at sending messages,
>
Hi t-bast,
> She creates a Bolt 11 invoice containing that pre-encrypted onion.
This seem insufficient, as if the prescribed route that Alice selects fails,
then the sender has no further information to go off of (let's say Teddy is
offline, but there're other pats). cdecker's rendezvous sketch
Hi Rusty,
I think this change may be a bit misguided, and we should be careful about
making sweeping changes to default values like this such as fees. I'm
worried that this post (and the subsequent LGTMs by some developers)
promotes the notion that somehow in Lightning, developers decide on fees
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
We've confirmed instances of the CVE being exploited in the wild. If you’re
not on the following versions of either of these implementations (these
versions are fully patched), then you need to upgrade now to avoid risk of
funds loss:
* lnd
> I found out recently (mid-2019) that mainnet Lightning nodes take an
> inordinate amount of time to find a route between themselves and an
> arbitrary payee node.
> Typical quotes suggested that commodity hardware would take 2 seconds to
> find a route
Can you provide a reproducible benchmark
Hi y'all,
Recently we've started to do more design work related to the Sphinx packet
(EOB format, rendezvous protocol). This prompted me to re-visit the original
Sphinx paper to refresh my memory w.r.t some of the finer details of the
protocol. While I was re-reading the paper, I realized that
Hi Andrea,
> This saves the receiving node from doing a database lookup
Nodes can and eventually should start using bloom filters to avoid most
database lookups for incoming payment hashes. The false positive rate can be
set to a very low value as the bloom filter doesn't need to transmitted,
It isn't mandatory. It can be left blank, none of the existing wallets
require users to input a description when they make an invoice.
On Mon, Jan 14, 2019, 3:28 PM Francis Pouliot I'm currently in the process of building the Lightning Network payout
> feature which will allow users to purchase
> OG AMP is inherently spontaneous in nature, therefore invoice might not
exist
> to put the feature on.
That is incorrect. One can use an invoice along with AMP as is, in order to
tag
a payment. As an example, I want to deposit to an exhcange, so I get an
invoice
from them. I note that the
I realized the other day that the wumbo bit should also likely encompass
wumbo
payments. What good is a wumbo channel that doesn't also allow wumbo
payments?
Naturally if the bit is signalled globally, then this should also signal the
willingness of the node to forward larger payments up to their
> If I'm not mistaken it'll not be possible for us to have spontaneous
> ephemeral key switches while forwarding a payment
If this _was_ possible, then it seems that it would allow nodes to create
unbounded path lengths (looks to other nodes as a normal packet), possibly
by controlling multiple
Was approaching more so from the angle of a node new node with no existing
channels seeking to bootstrap connections to the network.
-- Sent from my Spaceship
On Fri, Nov 9, 2018, 9:10 AM Anthony Towns On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 05:32:01PM +1030, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
> > > A
> A node, via their node_announcement,
Most implementations today will ignore node announcements from nodes that
don't have any channels, in order to maintain the smallest routing set
possible (no zombies, etc). It seems for this to work, we would need to undo
this at a global scale to ensure
Hi Fabrice,
I think HORNET would address this rather nicely!
During the set up phase (which uses Sphinx), the sender is able to get a
sense
of if the route is actually "lively" or not, as the circuit can't be
finalized
if all the nodes aren't available. Additionally, during the set up phase,
the
r operation up
right afterwards.
-- Laolu
On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 9:31 AM Rusty Russell wrote:
> Olaoluwa Osuntokun writes:
> > Hi Rusty,
> >
> > Happy to get the splicing train rolling!
> >
> >> We've had increasing numbers of c-lightning users get upset the
Hi tomokio,
This is so dope! We've long discussed creating canned protocol transcripts
for
other implementations to assert their responses again, and I think this is a
great first step towards that.
> Our proposal:
> Every implementation has compile option which enable output key
information
>
> However personally I do not really see the need to create multiple
channels
> to a single peer, or increase the capacity with a specific peer (via
splice
> or dual-funding). As Christian says in the other mail, this
consideration,
> is that it becomes less a network and more of some channels to
> This seems at odds with the goal of "if the remote party force closes,
then
> I get my funds back immediately without requiring knowledge of any secret
> data"
Scratch that: the static back ups just need to include this CSV value!
-- Laolu
On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:29 PM
Hi Rusty,
I'm a big fan in general of most of this! Amongst many other things, it'll:
simplify the whole static channel backup + recovery workflow, and avoid all
the fee related headaches we've run into over the past few months.
> - HTLC-timeout and HTLC-success txs sigs are
>
> I would suggest more to consider the simpler method, despite its larger
> onchain footprint (which is galling),
The on-chain footprint is a shame, and also it gets worse if we start to
allow multiple pending splices. Also the lack of a non-blocking splice in is
a big draw back IMO.
> but
you cancel back, then they know that you had enough
bandwidth to _accept_ the HTLC in the first place.
-- Laolu
On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 5:54 PM Rusty Russell wrote:
> Olaoluwa Osuntokun writes:
> >> That might not be so desirable, since it leaks the current channel
> >> cap
ror`
> message from BOLT #1
>* If the error is not specific to any channel: set channel_id to 0.
>
> A receiving node
>* If experiment_name_hash is unknown:
> - MUST fail the channel.
>* If channel_id is 0
> - MUST fail all the channels
>
> Ration
n was not about creating another place
> but more about making the process more transparent or kind of filling the
> gap that I felt was there.
>
> I am sorry for spaming mailboxes with my suggestion just because I didn't
> understand the current process.
>
>
> Olaoluwa
We already have the equiv of improvement proposals: BOLTs. Historically new
standardization documents are proposed initially as issues or PR's when
ultimately accepted. Why do we need another repo?
On Sun, Jul 22, 2018, 6:45 AM René Pickhardt via Lightning-dev <
> #1 lets us leave out double-funded channels. #2 and #3 lets us leave out
> splice.
> For myself, I would rather leave out AMP and double-funding and splicing
> than remove ZKCP.
It isn't one or the other. ZKCPs are compatible with various flavors of AMP.
All of these technologies can be
veral tradeoffs,
like everything else does.
Also, everything we can do with Schnorr, we can also do with ECDSA, but
today.
-- Laolu
On Wed, Jul 4, 2018 at 7:12 PM Rusty Russell wrote:
> Olaoluwa Osuntokun writes:
> > What's the nasty compromise?
> >
> > Let's also not under
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