Good morning Bastien,
> * it's impossible for a node to prove that it did *not* receive a message:
> you can prove knowledge,
> but proving lack of knowledge is much harder (impossible?)
Yes, it is impossible.
If there could exist a proof-of-lack-of-knowledge, then even if I personally
kne
Good morning,
I agree, this onion message trick could let us work around this kind of
cheating
attempt. However, it becomes quite a complex protocol, and it's likely that
the more we progress towards specifying it, the more subtle issues we will
find that will require making it even more complex.
Good Morning Bastien,
> I believe there is another limitation that you're not mentioning: it's
> easy for a malicious node to blame an honest node. I'm afraid this is a
> serious limitation of the proposal.
Thank you very much for your review and comments. I have just updated the
proposal on git
Good morning,
Thanks for looking into this!
I believe there is another limitation that you're not mentioning: it's
easy for a malicious node to blame an honest node. I'm afraid this is a
serious limitation of the proposal.
If we have a payment: A -> B -> C -> D and C is malicious.
C can forward
Good morning list,
I have just published a proposal to address (but unfortunately not solve) the
old issue of HTLC spam via onions:
https://github.com/lightning-developer/lightning-network-documents/blob/main/A%20blame%20ascribing%20protocol%20to%20mitigate%20HTLC%20spam.md
The proposal picks u
