Re: [Lightning-dev] Preventing delay abuse in a Lightning-based peer-to-peer exchange

2018-05-22 Thread ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
Good morning Corne, It seems to me that exchange delay abuse and the loop attack in the other thread have the same attack vector, namely delaying up to just before the delay period before responding. So mitigations for one should apply as mitigations of the other. Regards, ZmnSCPxj ​Sent wi

[Lightning-dev] Preventing delay abuse in a Lightning-based peer-to-peer exchange

2018-05-22 Thread Corné Plooy via Lightning-dev
Hi, Lately I've been thinking about de-centralized crypto/crypto exchange ("atomic swap") on the Lightning network. In my view, the main problem is that participants can delay transactions (up to HTLC time-out, which can be quite long), in order to speculate on exchange rate changes. I've been lo