Re: [Lightning-dev] Commitment delay asymmetry

This makes a lot of sense to me as a way to correct the incentives for closing channels. I figure that honest nodes that have truly gone offline will not require (or be able to take advantage of) immediate access to their balance, such that this change shouldn't cause too much inconvenience. I

Re: [Lightning-dev] Commitment delay asymmetry

> By extension, perhaps both sides should use the maximum delay either one > asks for? > I'm not sure that is necessary. As long as both parties have to wait the same amount of time regardless of whether they publish the commitment or the other side does, that would resolve the issue. > I don't

Re: [Lightning-dev] Closing Transaction Cut-through as a Generalization of Splice-in/Splice-out

Good morning Christian, > > The connection the channel factories is not really necessary, as long as > > we have an invalidation scheme that allows us to invalidate a prior > > funding transaction we can reseat without needing a cut-through, just > > invalidate the funding tx of the old

Re: [Lightning-dev] High level fee mechanics

Good morning Benjamin, Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email. ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On April 13, 2018 4:37 AM, Benjamin Mord wrote: > Thank you, ZmnSCPxj. > > "... by adjusting the on-Lightning `fee_base_msat` and > `fee_proportional_millionths`