Hi Christian, ZmnSCPxj ,
>> - The CSV-encumberance on settlement transactions, which are the ones
>> which carry the contracts in the channel, affects all
>> absolute-timelocked contracts transported on the channel. Compare to
>> Poon-Dryja, where commitment transactions themselves are unencumbe
Good morning Corne,
‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On May 15, 2018 9:22 PM, Corné Plooy wrote:
> Hi Christian, ZmnSCPxj ,
>
> > > - The CSV-encumberance on settlement transactions, which are the ones
> > >
> > > which carry the contracts in the channel, affects all
> > >
> >
Hello ZmnSCPxj,
I'm implementing `r` field now to `ptarmigan`.
I have more question.
`r` field doesn't contain signature like `channel_update`.
Do c-lightning check something in the `r` field from payee's invoice?
Regards,
nayuta-ueno
On 2018/05/09 14:17, ZmnSCPxj wrote:
Good morning Nayuta-
Good morning nayuto-ueno,
> `r` field doesn't contain signature like `channel_update`.
>
> Do c-lightning check something in the `r` field from payee's invoice?
>
No. Invoice has signature for whole invoice. Of course, only payee signature
(fee of this channel is fee from the peer of the pay
Anthony Towns writes:
> On Thu, May 10, 2018 at 08:34:58AM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
>> > The big concern I have with _NOINPUT is that it has a huge failure
>> > case: if you use the same key for multiple inputs and sign one of them
>> > with _NOINPUT, you've spent all of them. The current prop
Hello ZmnSCPxj,
> Payee has incentive to give accurate information about the channel.
I understand.
Thank you very much.
Regards,
nayuta-ueno
On 2018/05/15 23:23, ZmnSCPxj wrote:
Good morning nayuto-ueno,
`r` field doesn't contain signature like `channel_update`.
Do c-lightning check somet
>
> You're forgetting the failure cases, where now I can profit.
>
> If I disconnect from another node, I now have a disincentive to tell
> others. At the moment we send an update disabling the channel (though
> we should give a few seconds for reconnect first, but whatever).
>
> Similarly, the re
Good morning,
>> But I can make you look like a delaying node whenever I want. The only
>> way to ensure that I lose more reputation than you do is to leak
>> information about route length for *everyone*. And even then, it's just
>> a matter of numbers. I can make successful payments to myself
>
> This can still be manipulated if Rusty1 opens a direct channel to Jim.
> Then Rusty1 can route payments Rusty1->Jim->Rusty2 that succeed quickly,
> then route payments Rusty1->ZmnSCPxj->Jim->Rusty2 that stall. Thus Rusty2
> can have the Jim->Rusty2 reputation boosted, while alternating with
>
